Chapter I (Truncate the Sword) relates Stone’s success in personally persuading Russian Prime Minister Sergei Vadimovich Stepashin of the Yeltsin Administration to propose to President Clinton, in July 1999, in the White House, a grand bargain in arms control. Under the agreement proposed, both Russia and America would reduce their deployed arsenals to 1,000 warheads and the United States would be permitted a small anti-ballistic missile system designed against North Korea.
Chapter II (Trying Again With President Putin) relates Stone’s continued efforts to draw the attention of the Russian Government to the stabilizing advantages of reducing arms on both sides to 1,000. In the course of three visits to Moscow, he elicited a surprising affirmative private response from President Vladimir Putin, of March 5, 2001, that the Russian Government had ordered intensive investigation of “your ideas and proposals for reductions that would preclude first strikes.”
Chapter III (Mothballing the ABM Treaty) summarizes an effort in 2001 to keep the ABM Treaty going for an additional five years with the proviso that its rules on testing would not be enforced. The Chapter shows that Stone’s proposal was first flatly rejected by the White House, then treated as something “unlikely to be accepted,” then accepted by the Russian Government. Unfortunately, when it was later accepted and, indeed, proposed by the Bush Administration, a Russian last-minute amendment was made, leading to a breakdown in the negotiations and the Bush Administration cancellation of the Treaty.
Chapter IV (Russian Civil Society) describes the situation in Russia in 2004 when Stone kicks off the Russian publication of his life memoir “Every Man Should Try” in Moscow’s Andrei Sakharov Museum. He summarizes Russian-related aspects of his career, describes some ingredients of his success, and provides the audience with a reverse twist on Andrei Sakharov’s famous Nobel-Prize-winning injunction that weapons of mass destruction could not be controlled unless the countries possessing them had a certain level of human rights.
By contrast, Stone proposed that the opposite was also true: “Without the control of weapons of mass destruction, the threat of their use by terrorists will undermine civil liberties everywhere.”
Chapter V (Political Jujitsu for Arms Control) describes Stone’s effort to put deep cuts in nuclear weapons on the agenda of the Slovakian Summit. It contains a vignette of Stone’s address to the newly created Public Chamber and shows the rising anti-Americanism in Moscow that made these kinds of efforts for arms control much more difficult.
[The above arms control achievements of Chapters 1-3 rest upon earlier efforts and successes chronicled in the following chapters of Every Man Should Try: 1, 2 and 3 (on the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty); and 20 and 21 on SALT and START Treaties. The discussion in Chapter 4 above on Andrei Sakharov is related to Chapters 14-16 in Every Man Should Try on Andrei Sakharov. Chapter 22 of that book on forging a CIA and KGB connection is also relevant.]