As this memoir goes to press, two important initiatives of November-December, 1998 are underway.

Efforts to Revive Zero-Ballistic Missiles (ZBM)

In November 1998, in an effort to revive a program started at FAS in 1992 designed to shape a missile-free world—and which is not focused on in this memoir—I visited Beijing, armed with a September/October FAS Public Interest Report entitled *Missile Encirclement: China’s Interest In Missile Controls*. The purpose of the report (prepared with staffer Charles Ferguson) was to persuade the Chinese Government that it should bestir itself to work for regional missile control zones in Northeast Asia, in South Asia and in Central Asia by offering to keep parts of China missile-free. We also encouraged China to make such pronouncements as “No first use of ballistic missiles.” Examples of actions that the Chinese Government could take were coupled with worst-case analyses of how quickly missiles and anti-missiles could spread around China if prompt action were not taken to encourage missile restraint. We made presentations...
to the Chinese Foreign Ministry, to an association of Chinese generals (The China Institute for International Strategic Studies), to a representative of the People’s Liberation Army’s Office of Foreign Affairs, to the Institute for Applied Physics and Computational Mathematics (IAPCM), and to an international conference in Shanghai on arms control sponsored by Fudan University. A number of institutions promised to study the issue. Following the visit to China, I visited Australia in mid-November to seek to persuade the Australian Government to introduce a resolution in the United Nations that would, on a generic basis, critique missiles and their special dangers and provide a basis for work toward a missile-free world. The Australian Government showed keen interest, at two different well-placed staff levels and through a key parliamentarian, and promised to study the issue.

The conventional wisdom in disarmament does not assume the disappearance of nuclear-armed ballistic missiles as a way-station to the achievement of “zero-nuclear weapons”. This seems an obvious mistake since nuclear weapons are much easier to maintain than the ballistic missiles that might carry them. Thus, a regime controlling the missiles is likely to be feasible before a regime eliminating the warheads. Certainly the introduction of nuclear-armed ballistic missiles was an important way-station in the U.S.-Soviet arms race. It seems plausible that it will be an equally important way station in the world’s eventual disarmament. We hope the readers will support our efforts.

On January 12, 1999, Ambassador Sha Zukang, Director-General of the Chinese Department of Arms Control and Disarmament, to whom I had presented our ideas in China in November, gave a speech at the Carnegie International Non-Proliferation Conference saying: “Devoid of any legal basis in international law, missile non-proliferation is the most under-developed part of the entire international non-proliferation regime. . . . It is time for the international community to take a collective look at the missile proliferation issue, including the Missile Technology Control Regime.
(MTCR), and explore better ways to combat this danger.” This was a very important development.

Initiating a Scientific Dialogue with Iran

Following up on efforts described in the book to catalyze scientific exchange with China in 1972 (Chapter 12), with Vietnam in 1990 (described in Chapter 24), and with North Korea in 1991 (described in Chapter 22), I organized an FAS scientific delegation that visited the Islamic Republic of Iran—evidently the first American scientific delegation since Iran’s 1979 revolution two decades before. It required nine months of complicated negotiations. The plans for a December 1998 visit were further complicated by events of the weekend of November 21–22, 1998 that saw attacks on a bus carrying American businessmen and the killing of an Iranian married couple who led a small opposition party. In street demonstrations, the anti-American group that had attacked the bus put out a press release noting that the next delegation of Americans would be dealt with “more severely”. In addition, some group was killing moderate Iranian writers—about one a week.

Persisting, nonetheless, FAS Vice Chairman Robert McCormack Adams (an archeologist with experience in Iran and a former long-time chief executive of the Smithsonian Institution), Iranian-American Professor Massoud Simnad (a member of the U.S. National Academy of Engineering), and I spent the week of December 11-18 in Tehran, returning only after the American bombing of Iraq began. This successful visit turned out to be a promising first step in beginning a scientific dialogue with Iran. The expansion of this dialogue is an important agenda item for FAS in 1999 because it clearly represents the will of the vast majority of the Iranian people and of the new Khatami Government—besieged though it may be by certain forces opposing the “dialogue of civilizations” for which President Khatami called.
Science, and scientific exchange, can be a universal solvent in dissolving animosities and securing normal relations. No country can do without science. The scientists of the world are fully prepared to talk to one another even when their statesmen will not. How successful and effective these Iranian contacts can be, in the short and medium run, remains to be seen. But the effort reminds us all that science can be a force for peace.

Afterword: New Initiatives at Press Time