Notes

Chapter 1


3. I declined to discuss the political views of relatives when faced with questions like, “What are your father’s views with regard to Communism as practiced in the USSR?” I said, “Relatives are a very close thing, and politics are a very vague thing.” Asked if any of my immediate relatives had “ever associated with any individuals whom you have known or suspected were a member of a long list of organizations,” I said I was “unwilling to discuss the political associates of any person except myself.”

I said, “Whether I agree with the United States in all its actions or whether I agree with my father in all of his political views, I remain loyal to both.” It is hard to believe, today, that security officials would ask sons to provide information on fathers, but this was customary then.

In 1977, thanks to an FOIA request, I learned with amusement that the background investigation had debated the political character of the New School for Social Research, where, during my high school days, I had taken three night courses in higher mathematics and had been asked, at age seventeen, to teach an adult education course on three-dimensional chess.

4. At Hudson, between Kennedy’s quarantine of Cuba (October 22) and Khrushchev’s capitulation (October 28), I prepared a paper urging the UN to register strategic weapon transfers around the world. (“An Arms Control Proposal Related to Cuba—Registration of Certain Strategic Weapons Outside of the United States and the Soviet Union,” Hudson Institute, October 26, 1962.).
By spring 1963, still worrying about future Cuban missile crises, I thought of a way to strengthen the UN in such crises. Needing some kind of endorsement from the UN Secretariat, and hearing that Secretary-General U Thant actually opened his own mail, I sent him a “proposal to study the intellectual resources which would be available to the United Nations Secretary-General should he attempt to mediate a military confrontation of the two blocs.” He responded with a helpful diplomatic letter of April 26 expressing the “hope that the study which you propose to undertake from an independent standpoint would be of such a nature as to stimulate interest not only of the theorists in international politics and organization but also of the practitioners of diplomacy and mediation.” But this fledgling effort to work out and stockpile crisis preparations for terminating a nuclear war had not been funded by the time I left the Hudson Institute.

We did secure such a contract, and on August 20, 1963, I balanced my ticket on strategic evacuation with Annex I: “The Question of Crisis Evacuation” in a Hudson Institute study on “Arms Control and Civil Defense” (HI–216–RR). It warned that ACDA would find that crisis evacuation programs “will interfere with traditional methods of achieving arms control and disarmament.”

A review of his book found antimissiles mentioned only twice and in passing and nothing whatsoever about controlling them either tacitly or formally.

The table of contents, reprinted below, shows the thrust:

- U.S. Progress
- Likelihood of U.S. Procurement
- Likelihood of Soviet Procurement and the Soviet National Interest
- Would Soviet Restraint in Procurement Be Risky?
- Would U.S. Restraint Be in the U.S. Interest?
- Implications for the Arms Race and Arms Control of
  - ABM Systems or ABM Restraint
  - Research and Development in ABM
- A No-First Procurement Policy
- The Decision to Deploy
- Verification of No-First-Procurement Policies
- Urgency
- Advances over Terminal-Intercept Systems
- Postdeployment Arms Race
- Progress Toward General Disarmament
- Accidents
- Nth Country Deterrence
- Hard Point Defense of ICBMs
- Destruction if War Occurs
- Separation of Forces and Urban Targets
- Destabilization

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8. The table of contents, reprinted below, shows the thrust:
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Inspection
Limitations of Weapons
Nuclear Diffusion and Denuclearization of Europe
Qualitative Acceleration of the Arms Race
Weapons in Orbit
Catalytic War (or Unauthorized Behavior)
Nuclear Materials Cutoff
Test Ban Treaty
What Is to Be Done?
Observations

9. This later appeared in World Politics (October 1964) as “Bomber Disarmament” and, also, as a chapter in Containing the Arms Race: Some Specific Proposals (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1966).

Chapter 2

10. The papers covered the verification of a strategic freeze, the mothballing of strategic missile forces, the problem of general disarmament, ABM systems and China, and strategic reductions.


12. By 1984, however, after President Reagan announced his Star Wars program, Henry Kissinger wrote an article entitled “We Need Star Wars,” in which he encouraged defenses and said, “If only an all-out attack can penetrate defenses and if a strategic defense makes it uncertain what weapons will get through, rational incentives for nuclear war will diminish.”

   After the ABM Treaty was signed, Kissinger wrote, “It has become clear that to rely on a strategy of mutual annihilation based on unopposed offensive weapons raises profound moral and political issues.” He urged that a commission be created to study Reagan’s idea. Henry Kissinger, “We Need Star Wars,” The Washington Post, September 8, 1986.

   Was he giving lip service to arguments he did not believe just to create and direct a commission as some cynics thought? Or was he was shifting backward under the pressure of Reagan’s dream? In a contemporaneous op-ed piece, reciting this history of Kissingerian reversals, I concluded, “Perhaps giving lip service to arguments in which you could not possibly believe is a price of power. How would I know?” See Jeremy J. Stone, “Anti-Missile Defense for Utopia: Kissinger now Plumps for What He Once Negotiated Away,” The Los Angeles Times, October 25, 1984.

13. Jerome Wiesner wrote a preface for my book calling the chapters on anti-ballistic missile defenses “particularly timely” and expressing the hope that “maybe the Russians will translate and publish it.”
Notes


15. *The Washington Post* praised the book as "meticulous" and noted that I had made a "detailed case in favor of a 'freeze' and a 'pause' in the procurement of missile and anti-missile systems . . . with a fairness to opposing viewpoints, which is quite rare in the messianic world of the megatons." And *The Los Angeles Times* said the book showed a "degree of thoughtful concentration" that entitled the book to a hearing. My *Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists* piece and other articles had made me a minor figure in the debate.

16. Much later, in the seventies, Don did the one thing that lives on from his work. He deliberately invented the acronym MAD for Mutual Assured Destruction to provide a pejorative characterization of the majority view. In fact, contrary to the views of most casual observers, the policy in question was not described by its supporters as "mutual assured destruction." Instead, two policies were involved: mutual deterrence was one, and assured destruction was the other. In a feat of Madison Avenue enterprise, he had just combined MD and AD into MAD.

Brennan died of a self-inflicted shotgun wound on April 18, 1980, a day before his appointment by Ronald Reagan to a campaign advisory committee was to have been announced. He left a recorded suicide message at the Hudson Institute that outlined a number of financial and work-related problems, but he cited no political motives or reservations about his positions on national policies or the prospects of working in Reagan's campaign. In the preceding weeks he had rewritten his will, put his affairs in order, and updated his obituaries at several newspapers. See *The New York Times*, April 19, 1980.

17. According to a letter provided to me much later under the Freedom of Information Act, U.S. intelligence had her confused with a ballerina and had no idea what her ideology was.

18. See *Containing the Arms Race*, p. 74.


20. A CIA official, Thomas W. Braden, persuaded CIA director Allen Dulles to overrule regional subordinates and to permit Braden to run an operation funneling moneys to international student groups and European unions and the like, with a view to helping them hold up their end in the struggle against Communist penetration and control. See Thomas W. Braden, "Speaking Out," *Saturday Evening Post*, May 20, 1967. This became a major issue in April of 1966 with a five-part *New York Times* series entitled "C.I.A.: Maker of Policy or Tool." By March 29, 1967, President Lyndon Johnson accepted the conclusion of a blue-ribbon panel that "no Federal agency shall provide any covert financial assistance or support, direct or indirect, to any of the nation's educational or private voluntary organizations." See *The New York Times*, March 30, 1967. As Chapter 3 shows, the fallout from this debate complicated and shaped my life.
Chapter 3

21. I had been promised by Bernard Feld, on leaving Boston for Moscow, that if Wiesner did not attend the upcoming Polish Pugwash conference, I would be invited. On hearing in Moscow that Wiesner was not, in fact, coming, and seeing that a “Stone” was on the list, I traveled to the meeting place only to discover that the “Stone” was Shepard Stone. Joseph Rotblat, the executive director of Pugwash, invited me to leave. The Americans, arriving thereafter, reached me in Warsaw and urged me to return as an “observer.” But I was too proud to agree, and the entire incident was never explained to me beyond its characterization by Feld as a “comedy of errors.”

22. Stone, Strategic Persuasion.
23. Arbatov was Jewish, or half Jewish, depending upon whether one believed Robert Kaiser’s or Hedrick Smith’s book on the Russians. He had had this disabling fact deleted from his internal passport, as Soviet law permitted with persons who wanted to abandon their ethnic identity.


27. A former science adviser to President Eisenhower, George Kistiakowsky revealed, years later, that he, also, had become concerned when he heard an American general say that nukes could extricate marines if they got in trouble at Khesanh. He rounded up two other senior science advisers, I. I. Rabi and J. R. Killian Jr., and the three of them sent General Eisenhower a telegram on February 16. According to Kisty:

“Luck was with us as President Johnson, unbeknownst to us, was to visit Eisenhower the next day. A day or two later the Secretary of Defense, Robert McNamara [immediately before Clark Clifford replaced him], personally telephoned each of us and ‘on instructions of the President’ unequivocally stated that there were no contingency plans to use nukes around Khesanh.” See G. B. Kistiakowsky, “A New Form of Diffuse Responsibility?” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists (March 1976): 58.
Notes

28. Konrad Lorentz, *On Aggression* (New York: Bantam, 1970), pp. 42–43. In describing the banana experiment, Lorentz says, “Robert M. Yerkes made the extraordinarily interesting observation that chimpanzees, animals well known to be capable of learning by imitation, copy only higher-ranking members of their species.” I believe this has now been established for certain species of birds.


30. ABM proponents were forced into their third rationale for the system. Having failed to sell an anti-Soviet (“thick”) system in the years 1959–1966 and the (“thin”) anti-Chinese system announced in 1967, they urged an ABM system to defend land-based missiles.


32. Earlier in May 1969, I had joined with the young liberal Republican Ripon Society to prepare a special “Ripon Forum Supplement on Safeguard.” This gave me ten thousand words and a handsome monograph to distribute. It concluded, “It appears that an emotional and divisive Senate confrontation on the Safeguard proposal is shaping up. The certain closeness of the eventual vote may have serious effects on the ability of the new Administration to negotiate around the world.” *Ripon Forum Special Safeguard Supplement* (May 1969).


35. Ibid., p. 279.


37. To the best of my knowledge, the only charge of espionage made against FAS or me in reverse (i.e., of working for the KGB rather than for the CIA) arose when a low-level Soviet defector claimed, in a little-noticed speech, “Leaders of your ‘peace’ groups, such as SANE and the Federation of American Scientists, came to Moscow for instructions.” *Alexandria Port Packet*, June 2 1982; my answer appears on August 4. When he refused to take my call demanding an explanation, I sent a Soviet émigré, whom I had befriended, to inquire.

The defector said the KGB had given him instructions, in 1967, to tell me, ask me, encourage me, or something like that, to support the invasion of Czechoslovakia—but that this was so absurd that he had never passed these “instructions” along. Thus the charge that an FAS official had come to Moscow for instructions was based on a twisting of words. A third émigré—whose father had been the defector’s professor in Moscow and considered the defector completely unreliable—advised me that the defector was telling such exaggerated stories that the CIA had warned those who wanted him to appear before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee that, if he did, the CIA would be forced to disavow him as “extremely unreliable.”

I wrote a letter to CIA director William J. Casey (July 22, 1982) denying this
charge and asking that its files reflect the fact that this defector was "extremely unreliable"; had been, in Moscow, "too frightened even to volunteer his own opinions much less to give anyone instructions"; and was, indeed, "precisely the kind of lazy and morally corrupt Soviet official which populates so much of that bureaucracy." (I also wrote the FBI.)

38. Technically, it was legal to take it out since it had been published in an obscure provincial newspaper. It finally appeared in The New York Times Magazine, February 15, 1970.

Chapter 4

39. The rule, in 1970–1971, read that unless otherwise expressly stated, "All proceedings at the Council's afternoon and dinner meetings as well as study and discussion groups are confidential; and any disclosure or publication of statements made at such meetings or attribution to the Council of information, even though otherwise available, is contrary to the best interests of the Council and may be regarded by the Board of Directors in its sole discretion as ground for termination or suspension of membership."

40. Indeed, as the council president, Bayless Manning, was interpreting the rule, it was completely unworkable because he felt it meant that council members were precluded from attributing statements made at a meeting even to other (absent) members. With his interpretation, many were in violation of the rule.

41. The new rule reads, "Participants are assured that they may speak openly, as it is the tradition of the Council that others will not attribute or characterize their statements in public media or forums or knowingly transmit them to persons who will."

42. The embarrassed council staff wanted to take the voting in the direction of Communist countries, in which no one would ever lose. Various rationales were provided: securing diversity, including youth; putting others besides famous wealthy persons on the board; securing the nominations of cautious persons who feared to lose; and so on.

43. I explained to the staff why, mathematically, Henry had lost. Consider that fame is, also, notoriety. So if council members are asked, in effect, to blackball just one of nine candidates, the famous are likely to lose—they have enemies. And under a system of nine persons running for eight slots, it does not take many blackballs to undermine a candidacy. I recommended that they move to twelve candidates for eight positions and assured them that if they did, all would be well.

44. A fig leaf that was often mentioned by die-hard supporters of this system was that any ten members could put up a "floor nomination." By 1991, in eighteen years of operating the system, only four persons had been so nominated and only two elected. (This was partly because the names of persons nominated this way were marked with, metaphorically speaking, a scarlet asterisk.)
45. I first threatened President Peter Tarnoff with a campaign against the rule if he did not have it changed. His response was to persuade the council board to preempt my campaign by voting unanimously that it did not want to change the rule—something I learned only on receipt of a round-robin letter to all members. I felt unfairly treated when I saw the letter and decided, characteristically, that I would not be squelched in this way.

46. It was the largest insurgency in the history of the council, I have no doubt, since CFR is an organization that runs not just on democratic principles but on consensual ones.

Warren Christopher, then a former deputy secretary of state, and later secretary of state, was put in charge of the committee. The bylaws were rewritten to permit a board that was half elected (in real elections) and half appointed. My opinion was then solicited, and I warmly approved on behalf of my flock. The board promptly voted unanimously again, but now for elections. (By early 1998, the council leadership was again considering abandoning democratic elections, but refrained from doing so after consulting the members.)


49. Manshel never made a secret of his having worked for the CIA from 1952 to 1954 and was self-described in his vitae as a “former analyst” there. See also “Head of Foreign Policy Magazine Named Ambassador to Denmark,” The New York Times, May 27, 1978.

50. Thus, at an off-the-record January 8, 1968, panel discussion on Intelligence and Foreign Policy, with a stellar cast of intelligence community attendees, chaired by former secretary of the treasury Douglas Dillon, Richard M. Bissell Jr., a former CIA deputy director, circulated a paper saying, “If the agency is to be effective, it will have to make use of private institutions on an expanding scale, though those relations which have ‘blown’ cannot be resurrected.

“We need to operate under deeper cover, with increased attention to the use of ‘cut-outs’. CIA’s interface with the rest of the world needs to be better protected.” See Richard Dudman, “More Secrecy in Spying by CIA Urged in Report,” St. Louis Post-Dispatch, September 26, 1971. See also James Doyle, “CIA Has Cover Problems,” The Washington Star, September 27, 1971.

51. Samuel Huntington, Warren’s Harvard classmate, told me in late 1992 that he considers it “plausible” that the CIA sent Manshel to the Congress of Cultural Freedom to be its “executive director” after his two years with the CIA in Washington, in light of Manshel’s “European background and language skills.” So I was right to be concerned that Manshel might have been working for the CIA undercover. Ironically, in 1996, while completing this memoir, I was told by Irving Kristol that the person to whom he was referring was the “executive secretary,” Michael Josselson, not the “executive director,” Warren Manshel. But in light of Manshel’s earlier
employment with the CIA, Josselson’s working for the CIA would have raised the same alarm bells for me with regard to both of them.

With regard to Foreign Policy magazine being subsidized by the CIA, Irving Kristol says that, in fact, it was Kristol’s idea that Warren start a foreign policy magazine because he, Kristol, advised Manshel that this was the best way to advance Manshel’s desire to become an ambassador. So perhaps the idea did not spring from any agency.

What about the money? If the money came from Manshel, he must have been much richer during his period as a stockbroker than he was after his stint as ambassador. He was, according to Sam Huntington, Manshel’s coeditor at Foreign Policy, providing $65,000 to $70,000, or about a quarter million in today’s dollars. If he gave 30 percent of his income to this charity—about the most one can expect to deduct—he would have to be earning about $800,000 a year in today’s dollars as a 1970s stockbroker. But Kristol, who was the executor of Manshel’s estate, says that Manshel did not die a wealthy man. (Incredibly, Kristol [Manshel’s close friend] says he did not know that Manshel had ever worked for the CIA, although this fact appears in Manshel’s biography with regard to his two-year stint with the CIA in Washington and, indeed, in news clips about Manshel’s confirmation as ambassador to Denmark.)

Chapter 5

52. It turned out, however, that the insurance company would not reveal the formula according to which the dividends were determined, which it termed proprietary. There was no “truth in dividends” rule, and one simply took what one was given. I complained to Senator Philip Hart, then chairman of a subcommittee governing insurance companies. He said the subcommittee had finally hired an actuary in its struggle to oversee the obscure calculations of the industry.

53. October’s newsletter was modestly entitled “New Improved Federation Management” (i.e., York and Stone); November’s newsletter was on “Unemployment of Scientists and Engineers” and on the Supersonic Transport debate.

54. Its other members were the FAS Vice Chairman Marvin L. Goldberger, who had been chairman of a Strategic Weapons Committee of the President’s Science Advisory Committee, and Morton H. Halperin, former deputy assistant secretary of defense for arms control and policy planning. This was a team of experts who had enormous authority and distinction.

55. Press conference of October 26; see the FAS newsletter of December 1970.
56. I also wrote to Mr. Frank M. Steadman, general counsel of the C&P Telephone Company, asking more than half a dozen questions about its cooperation with law enforcement. Letters of January 14, 1971, and February 26, 1971. No answer was ever received.

57. As Cotter later advised Science magazine, “The list of prominent scientists on the FAS letterhead” who might well be ready to compromise this program” was a
Notes


58. This CIA memo is printed in full in FAS *PIR*, December 1975, pp. 11–12.


60. Page 8 of its June 1975 report.

61. These charges were made in a press release of September 5, 1975. An interview on the subject with Orr Kelly of *The Washington Star* was published on July 23, 1975. See also *U.S. News and World Report*, August 11, 1975.

62. Title 18, Section 1001. Statements or entries generally. “Whoever . . . knowingly and willfully falsifies, conceals or covers up by any trick scheme, or device a material fact, or makes any false, fictitious or fraudulent statements or representations . . . shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than five years or both.”


Chapter 6


67. Marvin L. Goldberger was the chairman of the ad hoc committee, and the others were George W. Rathjens, Richard R. Nelson, and F. M. Scherer.


71. *The New York Times* entitled its report “The Age of Hebert: Dissent Now Fostered on Key House Panel.” *New York Times*, April 13, 1971. The report observed that a representative who had been on the committee for a decade could recall outside witnesses only once (and I believe it had happened twice). But these individuals were not representing outside organizations. Congressman Michael J. Harrington put my statement on ABM, MIRV, and the B-1 bomber, all fifty pages of it, in the *Congressional Record*, noting that the “potential value” of this new congressional tradition “was made evident immediately” from the quality of the FAS testimony. *Congressional Record*, March 29, 1971, pp. E2430–E2437. And *The Washington Post* entitled its report “Hebert Unit Ruffled by Witnesses” and said the committee’s decision to let in some peace advocates had been “an unsettling experience.” *The Washington Post*, March 24, 1971.

378
I believe that my March 11, 1971, testimony before the Special Subcommittee on Bomber Defenses of the Preparedness Investigating Subcommittee of the Armed Services Committee was, similarly, the first testimony by a representative of a public interest group before the Senate Armed Services Committee. Chairman Senator John Stennis, startled at my youthful appearance, called me to the dais and said, “Your testimony is very interesting—surely not the work of one mind?” He was assured that I was not a stalking horse for anyone else.


76. A second smear occurred, twenty years later, in 1992, after his death, through the deliberate misinterpretation, by the far right press, of a speech by a former Soviet press attaché named Kalugin, a KGB functionary, who referred to his lunches with a “splendid American journalist.” According to the press attaché’s later book, what Stone had done, after the 1968 Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia, was to refuse to let Kalugin pay for Stone’s lunch by saying, “No, I will never take money from your bloody government.” The smear had arisen when one person deliberately took this to mean “never take money again,” the implication being that it referred to more than lunch. Oleg Kalugin, The First Directorate (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1994), p. 74.

77. Letter of August 16, 1971, from George P. Felleman.

78. In Alsop’s personal records, deposited in the Library of Congress, is his daily personal schedule card for June 10 on which, in his hard-to-read handwriting, he recorded personal information about me that someone was giving him—in such detail that it must have been read to him from a dossier rather than from memory.

It may have come from his luncheon partner, the late Andrew John Biemiller, an ex-congressman from Ohio who was, at that time, director of the Department of legislation of the AFL-CIO. The only other people on his printed schedule for that day were a caller for an oral history of Robert Kennedy and a representative from the Netherlands embassy. See the Joseph and Steward Alsop Collection at the Library of Congress.

79. Joseph Alsop, “The Balance of Power,” The Washington Post, October 27, 1971. The Los Angeles Times deleted two references to me before publishing this column, much as it had suppressed the entire first smear. But the syndicate sent the article out as drafted. Alsop repeated the idea that we were trying to “get” Foster in his national column of Wednesday, January 5, 1972, entitled “The Research Gap,” which appeared in The Washington Post.

Much later, in August, he did quote me accurately: “The Department of Defense has become an inventor and merchandiser of exaggerated fears,” which

Chapter 7

80. FAS newsletter of March 1972.
82. His study appears in UCLA Law Review 12, 1044, and was reprinted in a full 150 pages in the Ervin hearings.
83. The executive secretary position was set up by the National Security Act of 1947 and 1949 and was supposed to be held by a civilian.
84. FAS newsletter of March 1972.
85. Three weeks after our newsletter came out, The Washington Post’s Murrey Marder wrote, “That issue was not pressed very sharply in the recent hearings, but it is being pursued more openly by the Federation of American Scientists, who note that some presidential advisers who wear several functional hats do testify before Congress in capacities apart from their confidential relationships with the President. “The Budget for Foreign Policy,” March 23, 1972, editorial page.
86. According to Marder’s article, Kissinger “occasionally has met with Foreign Relations Committee members at Fulbright’s home and elsewhere—and plans to again.” So the meetings at Blair House were an upgrading and formalizing.
87. Letter of April 20, 1972, to the author.
88. See the newspapers of the next day; the use of the word “formal” was probably to protect Henry Kissinger’s informal meetings.
90. And, on March 25, a Washington Post article observed that Dean’s April 20, 1972, letter to me had been dated two days after the White House agreed to let the presidential aide Peter Flanigan testify on limited aspects of the ITT controversy then standing in the way of Richard Kleindienst’s confirmation as attorney general. George Lardner Jr., “Once Doubtful Executive Privilege Expanded in Scope,” March 25, 1975.
91. According to Lardner’s article, Nixon was demanding, on April 22, 1948, an FBI report on Dr. Edward U. Condon, former head of the Bureau of Standards. Condon had been emphatically cleared by the executive branch but denounced by the House Un-American Activities Committee. President Truman decided to forbid the FBI from providing reports on government employee loyalty to the Congress. Nixon had said this was untenable and would mean that presidents could “arbitrarily” do the same thing in case of corruption.
Notes

I had a personal reason for being content that Nixon’s harassment of Condon had come back to haunt him. Condon, a universally loved scientist, had, in his important capacity as director of the Bureau of Standards, given me a reference for admission to MIT. And it was later reported to me that his secretary had commented on typing the reference, “If he is so good, why doesn’t he go to Harvard?”

93. Dean, op. cit., p. 201.

Chapter 8

95. November 1972 was an exception devoted mainly to a report of the Ad Hoc Committee on Science, Technology, and Education, composed of Professors Herman Feshback and Jeffrey Steinfield of MIT and Harvard junior fellow Joel Primack.

The only other newsletter exception in the seventies was October 1979, after a staff assistant (Deborah Bleviss) was hired to work on conservation. The newsletter was a “Conservation Manifesto” organized by her and signed or prepared by Samuel M. Berman, Anthony C. Fisher, Jack M. Hollander, Arthur Rosenfeld, Marc H. Ross, Robert Socolow, Robert H. Williams, Robert Stobaugh, and Daniel Yergin.

99. Here the experts who had “reviewed and endorsed” were James A. Fay of MIT, Richard Garwin of IBM, Irvin Glassman of Princeton, and Harold Johnston of Berkeley.
100. This editorial was “prepared or reviewed by” Allen V. Kneese, James MacKenzie, Laurence I. Moss, and Philip Morrison.
101. I once asked a scientist why the brilliant Harold Brown, who had graduated from Bronx Science in only two years as a valedictorian and *wunderkind*, had not continued as a research scientist. “Oh,” the scientist said, “he made a mistake in his thesis.”
102. Letter of January 29, 1974, from Dean Harvey Brooks to S. David Freeman.
103. This quote is from my letter to Joseph L. Sax of February 11, 1974, and represents a reaction at the time.
104. Membership was, in fact, 1,500 in June 1970, 2,300 in June 1971, 3,600 in June 1972, and 6,000 in June 1973.
106. His key endorsement was, “Closer association with the FAS confirmed my prior
feeling that it meets the essential criteria of an effective organization; scientific objectivity in fact finding, analysis, and impartial but forceful presentation of evidence, together with demonstrated effectiveness in directing its efforts toward realistic and significant goals." Letter of September 14, 1972, from Edward L. Tatum to the author.


109. The $10,000 donation was from Max Palevsky, $5,000 was from Bernard Lee Schwartz, and another $5,000 was donated by Julian Price II, a young man who one year had sent us an unsolicited donation in the mail that was half of our annual $60,000 budget. In constant 1998 dollars, these donations are all worth more than four times as much.

110. As former presidential science adviser George Kistiakowsky put it, in accepting the Priestly Medal in 1972, “The Federation of American Scientists, for its small membership, plays a major role in challenging self-serving plans of the military-industrial complex. An increase in its membership and resources would enable the Federation to extend its sound political interventions into other socio-technological areas.”


Chapter 9


113. On June 19, 1973, in a most unusual situation, Metcalf refused to call me to the witness stand to present my scheduled testimony on the grounds that it represented a “rather vitriolic attack on the sponsor of this legislation” (himself) even though, as my testimony showed, he himself had called the legislation at issue “preposterous” when he introduced it as a sponsor! But I was supported in *The Washington Post* (“Battle Stirs over Seabed Mines Bill,” George C. Wilson) and in *Science* (“Ocean Technology: Race to Seabed Wealth Disturbs More Than Fish,” May 25, 1973, 851).


Chapter 10

122. The notion of a U.S.-Soviet ban on the first use of nuclear weapons was discussed in “A Proposal for a Ban on the First Use of Nuclear Weapons” by Morton H. Halperin (Journal of Arms Control 1, no. 2 [April 1963]: 112–123). And the notion of having the executive branch unilaterally forswear any plans for first use of nuclear weapons had also been long discussed.

123. This was the explanation provided to Congress in 1975 by Secretary of Defense James R. Schlesinger in “The Theater Nuclear Force Posture in Europe,” prepared in compliance with Public Law 93–365.


125. It would, we said, give the United States a new option, better than the oft-discussed “demonstration nuclear attack”—a vote warning that we were giving the president authorization to use nuclear weapons.

126. The amendment read as follows: “Sec. 3. In the absence of a declaration of war by the Congress, the Armed Forces of the United States may be employed by the President only—

(i) to respond to any act or situation that endangers the United States, its territories or possessions, or its citizens or nationals when the necessity to respond to such act or situation in his judgment constitutes a national emergency of such a nature as does not permit advance congressional authorization to employ such forces; but the President may not under any circumstances use nuclear weapons first without the prior, explicit authorization of the Congress.
Notes

127. First use meant, of course, the introduction of nuclear weapons into conventional hostilities, whereas first strike meant a preemptive nuclear Pearl Harbor. Congressmen in the know promptly introduced a joint resolution to "renounce the strategy of a first strike with nuclear weapons." (H.J. Res. 626, September 3, 1975; Bingham, Spellman, Solarz, and Dodd were cosponsors, among others.)


129. Based on our having raised this question during the War Powers debate in 1971-1972, an eminent authority on the commander-in-chief clause, Columbia University law professor Louis Henkin, wrote, "In my view, [the President] would be bound to follow congressional directives not only as to whether to continue the war, but whether to extend it to other countries and other belligerents, whether to fight a limited or unlimited war today, perhaps even whether to fight a 'conventional' or a nuclear war [italics added]." ("Foreign Affairs and the Constitution," 108, and footnote 49, pp. 351-352 [Norton Library, W. W. Norton and Company, 1975].)

130. Letter of October 1, 1975, from Thomas A. Halsted, executive director, reporting on the September 30 meeting of the board of directors of ACA.


134. For example, on July 21, 1954, Chet Holifield said, "That particular provision was written in especially so that no trigger-happy general could take one of these atomic bombs and start dropping it anywhere in the world and start an atomic war. We wrote that provision in because we . . . must put a solemn obligation on the President that the President and the President alone can designate when and where an atomic weapon is to be used." 110 Cong., Congressional Record, 10687.


136. Press release, embargoed for September 9, on the September 5 press conference on "Presidential First Use Is Unlawful."

137. They referred to the St. Petersburg Declaration, the Hague Conventions, the Geneva Gas Protocol, the Genocide Convention, and the Geneva Conventions.

138. They warned soldiers that refusal to obey could involve severe penalties, urged them to take legal advice, and invited them to write the group at "Nuremberg, BM Box 8072, London WC1N 3XX."

139. Louis Henkin wrote me later, during the 1984 debate, that one who urged disobedience could raise a free speech claim. "But the court might not give him/her standing to challenge the constitutionality of Presidential use of nuclear weapons; that would depend on whether that question is deemed relevant to the free speech claim. Also, the court might not reach that question if it decided that the national interest in military discipline outweighs the free speech interest, whether or not the order is constitutional." Letter of July 9, 1984.
Notes


145. See Senator Byrd’s submission to the Congressional Record, April 15, 1986, S4316.

146. This letter, of which I have a copy, is undated, but I received my copy before April 22, so it was sent in the week after the Libyan raid.


148. Opening page of Senate Congressional Record, October 2, 1990.


Chapter II

There is a school of thought that strongly opposes any suggestion that first use of the already banned chemical and biological weapons be linked to the use of nuclear weapons—even to the point of questioning whether chemical and biological nuclear weapons are really weapons of mass destruction in the same sense as nuclear weapons. (See Wolfgang K. H. Panofsky, “Dismantling the Concept of ‘Weapons of Mass Destruction,’” Arms Control Today [April 1998].) While it might well be preferable, from the point of view of nuclear arms control per se, to have all countries assert “no first use” of nuclear weapons themselves if this could be obtained—it thus far has not. Under the circumstances, a World Court opinion that first use of nuclear weapons was banned—with the possible exception of a response to chemical or biological weapons—would have been, it seems obvious to me, a step forward. And this is most emphatically so if that opinion was drafted in the way I had in mind, as a flat ban—a way that minimized the significance of the exception and left it as a matter of debate whether the exception existed at all, indeed, whether any use was permitted at all! But others disagree.

The idea of a “request for an advisory opinion from the International Court of Justice on the legality of the threat or use of nuclear weapons” was a part of a draft resolution introduced by Indonesia on behalf of the Movement of Nonaligned Countries in November 1993 at the forty-eighth session of the United Nations in its First Committee. And it was raised at the General Assembly itself in 1994. But according to World Citizen News (December/January 1996), the nonaligned members of the General Assembly were “successfully lobbied” to do so by several nongovernmental organizations that established the World Court Project in order to establish, according to customary international law, the “illegality of nuclear weapons.”
Notes

152. Experts endorsing the proposition included such key former officials (with their former titles) as the secretary of the Smithsonian, Robert Adams; the editor of the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, Ruth Adams; the Nobel laureate and head of the theoretical division at Los Alamos, Hans Bethe; the author Ann Druyan; the Nobel laureate and head of the Atomic Energy Commission, Glenn Seaborg; the president of the California Institute of Technology, Marvin Goldberger; the deputy national security adviser to President Kennedy, Carl Kaysen; the award-winning astrophysicist Richard Muller; the World Federalist president, Charles Price; the assistant director for national security in the White House Office of Science and Technology, Frank von Hippel; and the ambassador to the Comprehensive Test Ban talks, Herbert F. York.

153. Since the court had, earlier, decided not to invite amicus briefs for this occasion, it decided not to accept an unsolicited one. In fact, fearing a deluge of amicus briefs arising from my reference to ours in the Tribune, the president of the court, Mohammed Bedjaoui, instructed the court secretary to write The International Herald Tribune assuring the readers that "all such documents are given consistent treatment" and that readers should not think that it had been made part of the record. (The International Herald Tribune, November 15, 1995.)

154. It read, "The United States will not use nuclear weapons against any non-nuclear-weapons state party to the NPT [Non-Proliferation Treaty] or any comparable internationally binding commitment not to acquire nuclear explosive devices, except in the case of an attack on the United States, its territories or armed forces, or its allies, by such a state allied to a nuclear-weapons state or associated with a nuclear-weapons state in carrying out or sustaining the attack." (Department of State Bulletin, August 1978.)

155. It said the court was trying to answer four distinct questions, which no one pleading before it had bothered to distinguish. The legality of "threat or use" was, already, two questions, and considering that the circumstances might be retaliation for nuclear use or just "first use," this was really four questions. The paper argued that "threat or use" in first-use circumstances had already been abandoned by the nuclear powers. But threat of second use to deter nuclear use by others kills no one and even helps prevent nuclear attacks; ruling this out, in this time period, seemed politically and morally inappropriate. Carrying out retaliatory threats was quite a different matter—it needed to be questioned.

156. These several papers can be found in FAS PIR, January/February 1996.

157. Paragraph 95 of the decision of Judge Bedjaoui.

158. The court did say, unanimously, that threats or use of nuclear weapons must be consistent with not only treaties but also "other undertakings which expressly deal with nuclear weapons"; in that capacity, it presumably included the negative security assurances noted earlier.

159. Section 48 of the Advisory Opinion.

160. This assumes that the United States considered such a response consistent with its "undertaking" in its negative security assurance because the court ruled that such
undertakings had to be maintained. This question also turns on the issue of “bel-
ligerent reprisal,” in which a state reserves the right to do prohibited things to
deter or respond to prohibited acts of another state. Of this the court explicitly
said little except that such reprisals would have to be governed by the principle of
“proportionality.”

Section 47 of the Advisory Opinion comments that “no State” had suggested oth-
erwise.

Chapter 12

163. Letter of September 13 from Henry Kissinger to the author.
164. I knew that from 1935–1939, NAS was listed in organization charts as part of the
legislative branch. From 1939–1940, it was listed in the U.S. Information Service
records as part of the executive branch. From March 1941 to the present, it
appeared in the Federal Register as “quasi-official.” (Asked to explain this drift,
the director of the Federal Register threw up his hands, said he could find no
records for the "several changes of treatment" of NAS, and said the “best answer"
he could give for NAS being listed among "quasi-official" agencies was “for want
of a better place to put it.” (Letter of June 26, 1974, from Fred J. Emery to the
author.)
Post, June, 1972.
166. Nancy Tang, their best translator, had great stamina; she had translated for four
hours in the morning at our meeting with the vice foreign minister and for four
hours that evening with the prime minister. She had grown up in New York as the
daughter of a Chinese UN undersecretary. At the first meeting, I learned to my
great surprise that she knew my uncle, the late Leonard Boudin, a famous consti-
tutional lawyer in New York. (In the 1920s, I. F. Stone and Leonard Boudin had
married two sisters, Esther and Jean Roisman.)
168. Percy Jucheng Fang and Lucy Guinong J. Fang, Zhou Enlai—A Profile (Beijing:
Foreign Languages Press). They say that Zhou was discovered to have cancer “in
1972.”
572.
170. Ibid., pp. 572–573.
171. Ibid., pp. 582.
172. Ibid., pp. 583.
173. Ibid., p. 609.
174. See October 20 announcement of the NAS. According to Science & Government
Report, NAS had lobbied the Chinese in a variety of ways and, in particular, had advised the Chinese that their medical delegation to the Institute of Medicine (IOM) had, in effect, already been hosted by NAS since, unbeknownst to the Chinese, IOM was part of NAS. The Science & Government Report gave the Chinese eagerness for science and technology as the reason why Beijing found "the quasi-official Academy preferable to the semi-dissident Federation." December 15, 1972.

I wrote Henry Kissinger on September 7 saying we had a "firm and repeated oral agreement with the PRC" to receive ten Chinese scientists. The government was in the process then of giving us the bad news. (Letter of September 11, 1972, from John H. Holdridge of the NSC staff.)


See, for example, "A Chinese View of U.S. Technology," San Francisco Chronicle, December 15, 1972, or "Chinese Students Learn to Serve," Washington Evening Star, November 22, 1972, and, especially, the official Peking Review, no. 5, February 2, 1973; at the November 21 banquet given at the National Academy of Sciences for the delegation, the CSCPRC chairman, Emil Smith, gave a toast acknowledging its debt to FAS for helping to make the visit possible.

This, I believe, was suggested by the CSCPRC's staffer Ann Keatley to salve the FAS's wounded feelings.

Letter of September 13, 1973, from the author to Goldberger asking, "Is there some political reason why we have not gotten any report on your trip?"


Chapter 13

189. From 1972 to 1982, the average annual number of U.S. passports shown at the
Soviet border was 78,000. If each of these represented a different person, and if this went on for seventy-five years—the average life expectancy of an American—the number of people in this period visiting the Soviet Union would be 6 million, and the percentage of the U.S. population that would have experienced the Soviet Union would stabilize at no more than 2.5 percent. Statistics supplied by Sidney Reiner of Cosmos Travel Service in New York.

In badly overestimating the prospects for such a vast program, Gravel was showing a characteristic impulsiveness combined with an instinct for the main chance. This showed itself the next year when he became famous for abusing his prerogatives as chairman of a Public Works Subcommittee to release the secret Pentagon Papers in a late-night, hastily called meeting. (Earlier he had sought to involve me in this by saying, in the privacy of his office, “I want your soul”; I immediately indicated that my soul was not available and departed, happily, without being burdened with the knowledge of what the hell he was talking about—characteristically, I wanted nothing to do with anything that was improper or illegal.) Gravel was protected from Senate expulsion by Democratic Majority Leader Mike Mansfield, but his aid Charlie Ferris, who knew I was appalled by this, said to me later, “Jeremy, I have assured those who have asked me that you had nothing to do with this, but you must face the fact that the horse you have been riding [Senator Gravel] has gone underground.”

These are average estimates based on the annual Congressional Quarterly tabulations beginning in about 1965.

In 1971 Gravel was persuaded to strip the bill down (abandoning the mayors, governors, and so on). But it was never reintroduced. Why I do not know.

Letter of November 15, 1971. This letter said that it required no answer, and I do not think it received one.

“Second, we hope out of this visit [to Beijing] could grow at least a beginning of some exchanges in other than political fields that would permit the two peoples to get to know each other better.” November 30 press conference on upcoming trip to China in the Congressional Record, Senate, December 1, 1971, S20078.

For our analysis, we used their votes on such issues as the B-1 bomber, the confirmation of Paul C. Warnke as SALT negotiator, and the Jackson resolution on missile parity.


His letter of January 10, 1983, said in part, “I believe members of the United States Congress should visit the Soviet Union, providing they have an objective of specific information relating to their legislative responsibilities, are fully briefed in advance, and are organized to carry out the purpose of the trip.”

Former secretary of state Dean Rusk was an exception, saying facetiously that he was not sure that the Soviets would “recover from such a traumatic event” as 535 con-
gressmen turned “loose” in the Soviet Union. He doubted that a “few days’ visit could provide any more than a very superficial impression.” Letter of January 6, 1983.

In a subsequent letter of February 10, 1983, he raised the issue of congressmen getting “quite miffed” if they were not received by top officials. But, he said, “These leaders in other countries are busy people and simply cannot take the time to visit with a continuing parade of American senators and congressmen, nor would our President meet with considerable numbers of parliamentarians visiting from other countries.” (Evidently, Rusk visited the Soviet Union only once, in 1963, for the signing of the Limited Test Ban Treaty. I considered these letters as indications that he was of a very pedestrian turn of mind.)

201. Quoted from Arizona Daily Star, March 27, 1983.

202. Of twelve full members of the Politburo and thirteen candidate and secretariat members, only the full members—Gromyko, Kunayev, Shcherbitskiy, and Tikhonov—and four candidate members had been to America.

203. They came from newspapers in Los Angeles, Denver, Hartford, Washington, Detroit, Pittsburgh, Wilmington, Phoenix, Tucson, Memphis, Houston, Milwaukee, Spokane, Newport News, and so on.


208. H. Res. 116 had sixty-one cosponsors and was introduced on March 27, 1985.

209. “Raising the Rate of Exchange,” FAS Report, p. 27.

210. The percentages were up to 56 percent of the Senate and 36 percent of the House; a major problem in getting these percentages up was the continuing electoral process that produced new members—few had ever been to the Soviet Union before their election. Updated internal memo, “US-Soviet Parliamentary Exchanges.”

211. This formulation, which I wish I had thought of earlier, came to me during a panel debate with Paul C. Warnke and R. James Woolsey when a woman in the audience asked what she could do. The idea came to me on the spot that she could, with just a little courage, stand up at a meeting when her congressman next spoke and ask this embarrassing question.

212. FAS PIR, May 1985, p. 5.
Notes

217. I had hoped they would take me along, but they took Alton Frye! This is the trip referred to in Chapter 28; Cohen and Frye used the trip to promote build-down.
218. When I asked for a copy of this poem, an aide in his office reported that Senator Cohen did not remember writing it. But I saw it.

Chapter 14

219. This paper appears in the FAS newsletter of October 1973.
220. Cable of September 8, 1973, from Philip Handler to Academician M. V. Keldysh, the president of the Soviet Academy of Sciences.
221. Deborah Shapley, “Sakharov: Teetering at the Brink: Part II: How NAS Stepped into Furor over Soviet Dissident,” Science (September 1973): 1231–1232. The key figures preparing the letter were the NAS foreign secretary, Harrison Brown, and, from Harvard, Dean Harvey Brooks and Paul Doty. And, of course, it needed and received the support of President Philip Handler.
222. The reporter continued, saying that American scientists “interpreted this as a sign that open discussion of the Sakharov case would not imperil him further.” More likely, they concluded that their intervention would not produce an explosive Soviet reaction since my intervention had not.
223. This is similar to the remarks made by Sakharov two years later, when he received his Nobel Prize: “I am likewise convinced that freedom of conscience, together with the other civic rights, provides . . . a guarantee that scientific advances will not be used to despoil mankind.” Nobel Prize Lecture, 1975.
224. “Dr. Jeremy Stone, director of the FAS, acknowledged the apparent contradiction of the scientific community’s traditional support of an easing of relations with communist nations. However,” he said, “military détente is only a temporary and fragile solution to the arms race, too easily reversible in the absence of internal criticism.” The Washington Post, September 18, 1973.
225. The petition read, “Mr. Ambassador: I wish to join with FAS in endorsing this statement: Co-existence and détente between East and West make it all the more important that we, as scientists, insist on the right of our Soviet and Eastern European colleagues: to communicate and travel freely for scholarly purposes; to function as scientists inside their countries (or, if not so permitted, to leave them to function as scientists elsewhere); and, in general, to debate their views inside their countries and abroad.” See FAS PIR 7, September 1974.
226. Hearing before the Committee on Foreign Affairs, House of Representatives, June
5, 1974, on “Déjà-Tente—Scientific and Technological Relations.” By this time there was a group specializing in the problems of Soviet Jewish scientists called “Committee of Concerned Scientists”—not to be confused with Union of Concerned Scientists (UCS)—and they joined me and another witness.

227. This was Chairman Philip Morrison, the most left of all the dozen chairmen I have had and the one who felt most strongly that this would simply ally us with anticommunists and, in other ways, would detract from our main goal of disarmament and peace.

Other senior officials were initially uneasy but saw the light. Thus former chairman Herbert F. York wrote reminding me that he had “expressed some concerns” about this work but that he was “especially moved” by what I and FAS were doing for Russian dissidents and refuseniks and thought that the new policy “makes sense” if we restrict our concern on human rights to “fellow scientists.” Letter of December 8, 1975.

228. Andrei Sakharov’s first hunger strike—and the only hunger strike that was not in defense of his family—began on June 28, 1974, “in protest against illegal and cruel repression of political prisoners.” It was staged to coincide with the visit of President Nixon to Moscow, and it focused on Vladimir Bukovsky and eighty-two others. This is the only Sakharov hunger strike in which FAS was not involved.


230. See FAS PIR 8, September 1975.

231. In the Soviet system a Ph.D. would be a “candidate.” After passing further examinations, one became a (full) doctor. The next level would be election to the Academy of Sciences as a “corresponding member.” The highest rank would be “academician,” and only a few hundred reached that level.

232. We had written to the Soviet Committee on Human Rights, care of Sakharov, its chairman, on January 9, 1973, to “describe our sympathetic interest in creative and constructive contacts between our two organizations” in an effort to provide Sakharov and his two or three colleagues with foreign support. It was, perhaps, the first Soviet organization that was independent of the Soviet government.

233. While staying at our home in Washington, much later, the eighty-year-old elder Mrs. Bonner described her sufferings in a Stalin-era prison camp, one located in a desert, where thirst was constant and water was rationed. She was released after Stalin’s death but was not permitted to return to a major city and was forced to go with her granddaughter Tanya to small towns, where life was very hard. (These restrictions were designed to prevent the bulk of the citizenry from hearing about conditions in the camps. Accounts like these from Elena and her family had had a profound effect on Sakharov.)

234. Recognizing that he would be “snubbed” by his “national delegation”—Pugwash participation is normally decided by each national delegation—we suggested a quota of invitations for persons on an extraordinary basis “at the discretion of the secretariat.” Letter from the author to Pugwash Continuing Committee members, December 8, 1975.

Notes
Notes

235. The text of this five-hundred-word “Sakharov Statement to FAS” appears in FAS PIR 7, December 1975.

236. After he finally emigrated to Israel, Azbel published Refusenik: Trapped in the Soviet Union (Houghton Mifflin, 1981), in which he wrote, “[Stone] ventured little comment on our Seminar, and we had no way of knowing what he thought of us until, after his return to America, we found he had energetically taken up our cause and become one of our most effective supporters” (p. 429).

237. This statement was made on April 21, 1933, less than three months after Hitler came to power.

238. In accordance with our “adoption” strategy, I personally adopted Turchin and sent him one of my books to translate to prevent him from being charged with “parasitism” (i.e., unemployment). He eventually migrated to the West, but only after being required to say he was Jewish—which he was not.

Our March 1980 newsletter contains his testimony to the House of Representatives on January 31, in which he argues for “antisymmetry,” that is, that the Soviet hawks were emboldened by the existence of Western doves (in arguing for Kremmlin adventures) and that the Kremlin doves found useful the existence of Western hawks (in discouraging Kremlin adventures).

239. The last two pages of the newsletter were occupied with publishing the supersecret CIA memo in which its highest officials had tried to keep secret their mail-opening project. (See Chapter 5.) It seemed highly appropriate that our newsletter show us agitating for civil liberties and freedom in both countries.

240. We also listed two hundred names of refuseniks and asked members to propose which of these they would be willing to become pen pals with so as to organize some lifelines of correspondence.

241. Direct-mail letter “Dear Member of the Academy of Sciences” of December 17, 1975. I signed this letter.

242. I think it was Gordon MacDonald who confided this to me. I know that when Handler learned that MacDonald was chairman of an environmental committee for FAS, as well as for NAS, he demanded that MacDonald resign from the FAS position and, indeed, asked him to secure a letter from me confirming that MacDonald had resigned.


245. This was also our expectation, based on which we had urged that this study be done. (See my letter of March 11, 1982, to Robert Ehrlich of George Mason University, saying we may have been the “catalyzing agent” in having the study done.)

246. Much later, a group around Carl Sagan had concluded that “nuclear winter” would be induced by a nuclear war and that temperatures would drop enormously because of the smoke produced from nuclear war detonations and fires. This was a possible “killer” mechanism that NAS either had overlooked or did not agree with.

Notes

248. This was Marvin Goldberger, later the president of the Institute for Advanced Study and still later of the California Institute of Technology. He is now a dean at the University of California at San Diego.


251. Science had it exactly right when it reported, “What happened was that Stone had called Howard J. Lewis, the NAS director of information, to say he had picked up complaints about Handler and the academy in Moscow. But Lewis, who had not been with Handler in Moscow, did not want to hear or to respond to them, and suggested that Stone call Handler directly. Stone countered with the suggestion that Handler, whom Lewis soon told of this conversation, could call him if he wished. This is where the matter was left—neither principal called the other. Most reporters would probably agree that Stone fell short of a good-faith effort to elicit Handler’s reaction to the complaints made about him and that the academy made no real effort to provide Stone with Handler’s reaction.” Luther J. Carter, “Academy v. Federation of Scientists: Handler Accuses Stone of ‘Ugly Act,’” Science (January 16, 1976).

252. In a letter of January 5, 1976, Chairman Morrison said the comments on nuclear war had been “approved by us in advance with virtual unanimity.” A placating offer was made to publish, in our newsletter, more about what NAS had done on Soviet scientists. But Handler was told that “we cannot accept certain complaints made about our Director, to whom we are indebted for the rejuvenation of our organization and in whose integrity we have full and tested confidence.”

I had already written Howard Lewis on December 24 to confirm that we were offering him space in our next newsletter to repair any injustice, but NAS never responded to that letter. In April an NAS spokesman told Science & Government Report that NAS was “reluctant” to have details published in the FAS newsletter since most of the negotiations with the Soviets “took place in confidence.” (Daniel Greenberg, April 1, 1976, issue.)


254. Ibid.

255. I was nervous about how this would come out. But a journalist whose opinion I respected read the article and said, “You won.”

256. More than eight hundred members joined us and this paid for the mailing. The 125,000 scientists were the subscribers to Science (i.e., essentially the members of the American Association for the Advancement of Science, and the members of the American Physical Society).

257. It concluded, “In short, public representations would strengthen the NAS private representations; would do no serious damage to NAS goals; would not lead to serious Administration chastisement; have no substitute in the activities of other organizations; would not be undermined by repetition; and would not importantly poison the international atmosphere.” Undated analysis of eight relevant questions on FAS stationery by the author.
On January 21, 1976, Victor Franzusoff sent us a Russian-language broadcast on the recent article of Science magazine; it contrasted Handler’s approach to mine.

FAS press conference of February 20, 1976. To our horror, the American Institute of Biological Sciences (AIBS) and the Federation of American Societies for Experimental Biology (FASEB) both refused to let us rent their lists, at commercial rates, to defend their biologist colleague. It took a while for the societies to get the message.

Through the help of Lipman Bers, then president of the American Mathematics Society and a leading FAS member, we had access to its mailing list at a reduced rate. Bers later became the first chairman of the NAS Committee on Human Rights.


For example, the Nobel Prize winner Howard Temin announced he would not receive Soviet visitors in his laboratory until such time as Kovalev was given a needed operation in the Leningrad prison hospital. This was described to suitable authorities and came, as I recall, at a time consistent with the possibility that it might have been effective. (See the author’s FAS Activities in Defense of Soviet Colleagues: 1973–1977 [a report to the Symposium on Freedom of Science: La Biennale di Venezia, December 1977].)


But it did take a while. For example, Sakharov had appealed to Handler about the Kovalev case in February 1975, almost a year before we sent NAS members our trip report. By March 18, 1976, a few months after our uprising, he was still writing FAS sponsors that Kovalev “knew what he was doing and what penalty to expect” and had not gotten in trouble for his scientific activities. Was it, he asked, “appropriate that the Academy support, in another country, some forms of what is there deemed to be political dissidence?” In April 1976 NAS put out new guidelines, which were Delphic in significance. (See Barbara Culliton, “Academy Adopts ‘Affirmation of Freedom,’” Science [May 21, 1976]. This article errs in describing the Handler-Stone flap; see FAS PIR 4, June 1976.)

We learned of the creation of the Committee on Human Rights only after inspiring thirty NAS members to write to Handler in defense of the Moscow scientific seminar; to these members he wrote that a committee had been set up for such matters and that the NAS president would abide by its decisions.

On May 12 we wrote leading scientific societies asking them to create some kind of committee inside their society that would maintain data on the human rights problems of foreign colleagues—a committee to which interested members could repair for information. We sent copies of the newly adopted NAS guidelines for its
Notes

foreign secretary and asked whether these could be adopted as well. (See FAS PIR 8, September 1976.)

268. The letter, on the stationary of the Horton Hospital, Epsom, Surrey, England, said she had asked that he write "in a similar vein" to Victor Weisskopf but that Low-Beer did not have the address.


270. Ibid., p. 473.

Chapter 15


273. Letter of July 11, 1976, received on August 4, 1976, appealing for help for Sergei Adamovich Kovalev, then in prison and needing an operation.


276. The Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, famous for its “doomsday clock,” was the educational arm of the movement of atomic scientists, while our Federation of American Scientists was the political action arm. The bulletin was created in Chicago, on November 24, 1945, three weeks after our Federation of Atomic Scientists (FAS) was founded in Washington, D.C., on October 31, 1945. (Our name was later changed to the Federation of American Scientists [FAS].) So we were the two original arms of the same atomic scientists’ movement.


278. On January 31, we released the names of six Nobel Prize winners who agreed to our (refusenik) pledge not to work with Soviet scientists until Sakharov was released from internal exile. (See Washington Post, February 1, 1980.) And we began mailing the “Refusenik” pledge to NAS members as part of a poll. On that same day, January 31, Philip Handler testified that NAS would follow the lead of the State Department in a strategy of deferring “all bilateral seminars and the like, while permitting the activities of individual scientists to proceed on our usual basis, leaving decision to the individual consciences of American scientists.” A few days later, on February 5, he sent a private communication to Soviet Academy president Aleksandrov warning that “any further deterioration” of Sakharov’s position is “sure to result in termination of all forms of exchange between the U.S. and USSR scientific communities.” To meet this problem, on February 26, we released the results of our poll of 1,280 NAS members and sent it to the Soviet Academy; it showed that 75 percent of the 20 percent who responded had chosen the FAS pledge. (See FAS PIR, March 1980, and letter of February 12, 1980, from Handler to Frank von Hippel.)
Notes

281. We were advised that the jamming in the apartment was so severe that Sakharov had to travel to a local park with a portable radio to hear Voice of America.
286. By this time, stepson Alexei Semyonov had been permitted to emigrate and had been married by proxy, in one of the few states that permitted such marriages (Montana); this is why Andrei could use the word “daughter-in-law.” The proxy marriage was performed to strengthen Semyonov’s case, under the Helsinki Accord, for reunification of families. In Sakharov’s letter he noted that the Soviet authorities did not acknowledge the validity of the proxy marriage—though he argued they could if they wished under Article 32 of the Soviet Matrimonial Code. In the end, the Soviets let her leave on a Soviet passport, with the right to travel abroad, rather than on an emigrant’s exit permit, precisely because they feared the gimmick of a proxy marriage might spread. (See p. 3 of FAS PIR, January 1982; we learned this from a diplomat who, at our request, had taken the matter up with Dobrynin personally.)
287. In a two-inch article, The Washington Post announced, as early as November 10, that Sakharov had released an open letter to scientists in the West that he would begin a hunger strike on November 22. (“Sakharov Sets Hunger Strike,” The Washington Post, November 10, 1981.)
289. This telegram was sent to Lisa with instructions to relay it to Alexei, but it was also copied by Sakharov, in tiny script, with a magnifying glass in an effort to smuggle it out of the Soviet Union through intermediaries. (See Sakharov, Memoirs, p. 365.) It was sent not only to me but also to Joel Leibowitz of Rutgers University, who had also sent a telegram to Sakharov urging him to discontinue the hunger strike.
291. FAS press release of December 1, 1981.
292. I authored a three-part series of op-ed essays, “The Lonely Battle of Andrei Sakharov,” for The Los Angeles Times on May 27, 28, and 29, 1984. I did not feel free, however, in those reports to indicate the names of the persons we had rounded up to support Sakharov, but only the titles. Now that fifteen years have passed, it seems appropriate to recognize their good will. Few hesitated at all. Pamela Harriman refused for her husband, with a fairly common reservation—that Sakharov was engaging in a hunger strike to get an exit visa for a relative in a country that
gave nobody exit visas. (This is mentioned in a letter to Paul Warnke of November 30.) But later, on Marshal Shulman’s intercession with Averil, he agreed. The three retired presidents were approached through intermediaries. President Nixon took the matter under advisement. (Sakharov had staged a hunger strike in 1974, during Nixon’s trip to Moscow, to call attention to the mistreatment of political prisoners.) I believe it was President Carter who sent back word that he would make the call, much as he had supported Sakharov by writing him as president.


Chapter 16


296. Actually, in 1975, as noted in Chapter 13, after asking Sakharov’s permission in personal conversation at his dacha, I had indeed written the Central Committee of International Pugwash with just this suggestion for Soviet-based Pugwash meetings. Later, the head of the Soviet Academy’s Pugwash group advised me, in fatherly fashion, that the academy group had discussed my request and decided that if Sakharov attended, none of them would.

297. The chairman of the NAS delegation, our own former chairman, Marvin Goldberger, denied that they had applied to see her in the first place. And he said they broke off the lunch after hearing that she was planning to hold a press conference at it. In addition, it was the first day of their talks, and they felt it was inappropriate to start off their meeting in such a provocative manner.

298. Looking at Andrei’s memoirs, I see that I arrived on the scene in late November, only a month after they began such thinking. Elena had had a heart attack in April. (Memoirs, p. 582.) On October 17 her condition had not stabilized. And around noon she said, “I think it’s time we had a talk.” After the talk, Andrei said, “I’ll never betray you, myself, or the children.” (Memoirs, p. 598.) This was the genesis of the hunger strike idea. But, interestingly, in Elena’s talk with me—the last published interview with a foreigner before the hunger strike began May 2—the three conditions that she wanted Sakharov supporters to consider had nothing to do with her health. They were (1) improving his medical treatment through access to Moscow medical attention; (2) returning Sakharov to his Moscow dacha, where he could have regular contact with Soviet scientists; and (3) defending his right to emigrate.


300. After thanking me for the present sent via Elena, he said, “Now in the evenings I am getting acquainted with the computer, writing programs for more complicated problems, finding in this not an unconsiderable pleasure.” (I knew he would!)

The letter in support of Elena Bonner’s trip abroad twice repeated a curious combination of medical need and human desire that cropped up in all subsequent...
appeals for Bonner thereafter. He said, "You are aware already of the struggle that we started for Elena's trip abroad for the sake of treatment and to see our dear ones."


303. Cables to Sakharov were sent directly to Gagarin 214, Apartment 3, Shcherbinka, 2, Gorky. But, of course, he was in a hospital. We thought the KGB might let this one through.

304. Cable of May 28, 1984, 12:06 P.M. EDT to Vice President E. P. Velikhov from the author.


308. About that time, there were stirrings of the possibility that Sakharov might be allowed to leave. The Soviet justice minister, then in Sweden, said that if Sakharov asked to leave he could go. When this was repeated in Moscow, Bonner told the press that she and her husband indeed wanted to leave. There were subsequent rumors that Sakharov was about to be given to Austria. But, as a key West European figure later told one of our scientists (Weisskopf, I think), the Soviet army vetoed Andropov's effort to send Sakharov abroad because Sakharov knew too much about the internal politics of the Soviet Union.

309. Kennedy said some very nice things about me to the throng and then, taken aside by his staff, was advised that he had better say something nice about the president of the National Academy of Sciences or there might be trouble. He did so.

310. In 1978 an advance team for a Kennedy visit persuaded the Soviets to put eighteen families on a list for "favorable consideration" for emigration.

311. And they were, in May 1985.

312. E.g., "I too have the right to say to Lusia: 'You are my self' (and 'my queen' as well)." (Memoirs, p. 576.) "My usual lack of assertiveness and my rather slow reaction time in debates may also have caused me to miss out on several opportunities. Lusia was sorely missed; in these respects, as well as many others, she has a definite advantage over me."

313. I also asked him about a December 7, 1984, Wall Street Journal article in which "Soviet émigrés" charged that Velikhov, Yuri Ovchinnikov, and Nikolai Basov had "conspired to misinform the political leadership about the consequences of letting Mr. Sakharov emigrate" because they "apparently have personal reasons to fear that Mr. Sakharov's release could damage their reputations." Velikhov said he had written memos about Sakharov's release but not of that nature. Time has proven that he was right, since Sakharov was eventually released and nothing of this kind happened.

314. Sakharov, Memoirs, p. 598.

315. Ibid., p. 600.

399
Notes

316. When Sakharov disappeared from his home on June 7, Larry said, “Imminent.” On June 14 Larry received a cable and said he would visit Moscow in July—with the possibility of the senator making his trip in September. On June 25 he said, “Some of our guys demoted, looks bad.” On June 28 it was, “cable reports things taking on even more serious aspects than before. Very important that Larry come.”

320. Ibid., p. 615.
321. Efrem, always relentlessly logical and very hardworking, justified asking me to make this request on the grounds that he was the best possible translator for Sakharov, and he felt there was no harm in asking. But, of course, my purpose for going to the forum was not just to talk to Sakharov. I was always very fond of Efrem. Once he explained to me how I could avoid the police around Andrei’s Moscow apartment and see Elena Bonner by climbing in the window in the off-hours, when they were not around. I decided not to try.


Chapter 17

324. Indeed, our very precise correlations showed, for example, when Air France arrivals at JFK airport would boom Nova Scotia directly before JFK arrival. And after their departure from JFK, the secondary booms would be felt in Nova Scotia at predicted times. We found the same thing for British Airways Concordes. (See appendix to FAS press release of March 15, 1978, “FAS Relates Concorde to Mysterious High Altitude Explosions.”)

326. Ibid. He later concluded that too much of the boom’s energy would be dissipated before it even reached the thermosphere, based on further studies of his own and the Defense Department.
328. In an interview in July, 1998, Hattie Perry provided this further information: She had been credited, in the early 1970s, with preventing a 12,000 megawatt nuclear station from being built on Stoddart’s Island, Shelburne County, near her home and so was well known in political circles. Using this political standing, she had written to (among others) her member of Parliament, Lloyd Crouse, raising the issue of sonic booms based on a contact she had in England. This contact warned her that the Concorde was entering Canada’s airspace illegally. Indeed, Crouse
raised the issue of sonic booms in the House of Commons on March 6 (the same
day I was calling the Canadian embassy in Washington to advise it of my calcula-
tions and conclusions) but, on March 7, officials from Transport Canada called on
her and tried to convince her that the booms were caused by military planes and
that she should not tell anyone. She was therefore under considerable pressure and
writes that my subsequent visit to Barrington on April 12 gave her “additional
information and the support I so desperately needed.”

Chapter 18

329. The Pentagon Papers received temporary restraining orders—something short of
a preliminary injunction. Before World War II there were cases of state courts
issuing preliminary injunctions, later found unconstitutional, in support of laws
against sedition.
330. This is drawn from the amicus brief submitted to the U.S. District Court, Western
331. Howard Morland, “Judge Bars Hydrogen Bomb Article After Magazine Rejects
Mediation,” The New York Times, March 27, 1979; quotes from the court’s opinion
are drawn from U.S. of America, Plaintiff, v. The Progressive, Inc., No. 79-C-98,

Chapter 19

333. Letter of August 12, 1980, signed by the author, to Governor Ronald Reagan with
an enclosure, conveying these sentiments, signed by Nobel Laureates Julius Axel-
rod, Owen Chamberlain, Robert Holley, Salvador E. Luria, and Burton Richter—
and by George B. Kistiakowsky, science adviser to President Eisenhower, and
Herman Feshbach, president of the American Physics Society.
335. This affair is referred to in the June 1989 Washingtonian, “Bush Can Thank His
Lucky Stars That Reagan Picked Him for Veep.”
338. See the review of Nancy Reagan’s My Turn by Donald Regan in the December
1989 Washingtonian.
339. Deaver may not have been much troubled by this, since he had sympathies for
astrology; according to Quigley, he called for help, at Nancy’s suggestion, when he
was being investigated by Congress for lobbying activities (Quigley, p. 121). And
Howard Baker, Reagan’s later chief of staff, is portrayed as used to this because his
father-in-law, Senator Everett Dirksen, “never made a move without first consulting his astrologer” (Quigley, p. 163).


Ibid., p. 137.

Chapter 20

Testimony before the General Advisory Committee of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, Thursday, November 9, 1978, 9:00 A.M., on the subject “After SALT, What?” by the author.

I was well prepared for this because the November 1978 FAS newsletter, then being printed, had listed “Seven Approaches” to “After SALT II, What?: Cutting Back to What We Really Need; Buying Only What We Need; SALT III with Reductions; SALT III Without Reductions; “Mission” Control; Swaps of Restraint; Strategic Persuasion.

When I explained this idea to Alton Frye, he had suggested this excellent slogan.

“Despite all that might be said for the usefulness, and indeed necessity, of reductions, it must be admitted that this mode of arms control is certain to encounter strong resistance. The destruction of expensive weapons has about it a touch of the futile and the tragic. This view is strengthened by the very short life of the SALT I option.” Paul Doty, “Strategic Arms Limitations After SALT I,” Daedalus 19 (1972): 72.


Letter of December 8 from Thomas J. Watson Jr. to the author.

This letter appears in FAS PIR, January 1979, p. 1.


This was described in FAS PIR, February 1979, p. 6.

In an interview in 1996, General Welch said that he had had access to General Jones, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and that Jones also “saw the merit in the idea.”


Ibid., p. 251.

Dobrynin, In Confidence, p. 424; Much later, in 1985, when, as will be seen later, I tried to revive the idea, I wrote President Carter a letter about it. He wrote a note on the bottom and sent it back: “Jeremy—I still think this is a good idea. Best Wishes, Jimmy.”


Stone, “SALT, In Perspective.”
Notes

358. According to President Carter's memoir, “We decided that rather than have the treaty defeated or for me to withdraw it from consideration, it would be better to leave it in the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, postpone Senate action on it, and work with the Soviets for maximum observance of its terms by our two countries. By doing this we would be able to keep its provisions intact. With the exception of achieving the requirement for unilateral Soviet dismantling of 250 of their missile launchers, both the United States and the Soviet Union continued to honor the agreement.” Carter, Keeping Faith, p. 270.


360. Private communication from a reporter.

361. Reprinted in FAS PIR, May 1979, p. 6, it appeared in The New York Times on April 30, 1979; other signers were Nina Byers, John T. Edsall, Denis Hayes, George Silver, Arthur Rosenfeld, Howard M. Temin, and Arch L. Wood.

362. Printed in FAS PIR, May 1979, as “Response from Jeremy J. Stone.”

363. This release had, as contact person, John Holum, now the director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, and a key adviser to Senator McGovern for many years.

364. For an analysis supporting the last two paragraphs, see FAS PIR, September 1979.

365. According to an informed committee source, speaking in 1996, Senator Church was intensely annoyed with Senator McGovern's persistent criticism of SALT II and felt that the last thing he needed or wanted was a hearing to criticize SALT II from the left (or any other side). This confirms my impression at the time that there was high-level reluctance to hold the hearings. Whether the committee cared, in particular, what I said is not certain.


367. The formulation agreed upon was “to pursue continuous year-by-year reductions in the ceilings and subceilings under the Treaty so as to take advantage of the Treaty already negotiated and to begin a sustainable and effective process of reductions in strategic arms which promotes strategic equivalence and strategic stability.” FAS PIR, December 1979, p. 3.

368. McGovern and Chafee put in the record numerous examples of what they had in mind—with Library of Congress studies applying the notion of shrinking SALT II all done with a single percentage, of course. Congressional Record, October 31, 1979, Senate, pp. S1563–1573.

369. As of 1996, it seems they did not know. Roger Molander, then a White House coordinator for SALT II, says he remembers my visiting him at the White House to advance “Shrink SALT II” and considered it an “interesting proposal among other interesting ones” that had promise for its “simplicity, indefinite continuation, and ease of negotiation.” But he says he did not know Carter had made this proposal and is “surprised but not shocked” at not knowing. Asked, in 1996, if he had shared with Senator McGovern the knowledge that President Carter had already proposed this notion at the Vienna summit, General Jones said that, although he
remembered President Carter raising this with him on the plane, he was not later told that it had, indeed, been proposed to the Russians. This was, he said, not so unusual considering the confusion at the summit. But it tends to confirm that the White House staff, negotiating with McGovern, did not know either.

372. But Dobrynin, who considered the whole invasion a “gross miscalculation,” says that the invasion was “not the result of a conscious choice between expansionism and detente.” At the December 12, 1979, secret Politburo meeting at which the decision was made, Foreign Minister Gromyko said nothing about the possibility of a strong reaction in the West. Nor was Dobrynin consulted, even though he was in Moscow having a medical checkup, as would have been the case if they were interested in what Washington might do. It was, instead, the KGB chief, Andropov, the defense minister, Ustinov, and a Politburo member, Chernenko, who really pushed the invasion—to prevent Western expansion along their southern border with troubled Afghanistan—along with the support of chief ideologist Mikhail Suslov and other ideologues who wanted an expansion of territory under “socialism.” (See Dobrynin, p. 442.)

Chapter 21

374. “But what if the Soviet Union decided to try to preempt and preclude Star Wars deployment through an agreement on reductions of offensive weapons. For example, the Soviets might propose a program of continuing, progressively deeper cuts in offensive weapons that would continue only as long as the United States refrains from field testing or deploying Star Wars systems prohibited by the 1972 treaty banning anti-ballistic missile systems.” I was talked into the formulation of “field testing” and/or “deployment” rather than “compliance with the ABM Treaty” by experts who insisted that the ABM Treaty now had several different interpretations. But in other discussions, I just used compliance with the ABM Treaty and assumed that the differences in interpretation would be one of the issues resolved in the Soviet decision to abrogate.
376. I recall later telling Nitze that Vasiliev, who is now dead, was a very honest and brave man; he said he would like to meet him, and this was arranged when Vasiliev was next in town.
Our George Rathjens had written defending him with George’s memory of the meeting with the National Council of Churches in 1958 at which Nitze made the relevant remarks. See “Nominations of Paul H. Nitze and William P. Bundy Before the Committee on Armed Services,” November 14, 1963, p. 27.

According to Strobe’s account, “As soon as he returned to Washington, Nitze went to work. The plan he eventually assembled provided for a ‘schedule’ of percentage reductions in strategic offenses every year for ten years, so that by the end of 1995, each side would have come down by approximately 50 percent from a 1986 ‘baseline’ derived from the various SALT II ceilings and subceilings.” (I had given Nitze supplemental testimony which I had provided on May 13, 1982, before the Foreign Relations Committee, showing, three years earlier, that a 50 percent reduction of SALT II limits and sublimits would produce most of the Reagan administration goals. Talbott, Master of the Game, pp. 261–262.

Ibid., p. 265.

Ibid., p. 286.

Ibid., p. 287.

Ibid., p. 316.


My specific proposal, the first of my six points for the forum was the following:

(i) As a way of holding the door open in Geneva and to avoid letting itself be provoked by those officials seeking to sabotage agreement by undermining the ABM Treaty and, above all, to get the world on the disarmament road and off the Star Wars road, the Soviet Union should consider announcing its willingness to begin disarmament of offensive weapons without further agreement on Star Wars but with the all-important condition that the Soviet Union would stop its disarmament if and when it saw the United States actually violate the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty in ways that could not be resolved through the Standing Consultative Commission.

Point 2 proposed the appointment of negotiators who would attempt to resolve the ABM issues ad referendum (i.e., without instructions). Number 3 proposed Shrink SALT II by a fixed percentage either on agreed levels or force levels in being. Number 4 encouraged initiatives in openness. Number 5 urged more official travel and a new institution to manage it. Number 6 concerned confidence-building measures in the field of verification.

FAS PIR 1, October 1987.

This seminal paper, “Arms Races: Prerequisites and Results,” was reprinted in full in FAS PIR, February 1987.

He noted that the “formulation by a state of its armaments goal in absolute terms is more likely to reflect the desire to obscure from its rivals the true relative superiority which it wishes to achieve or to obscure from itself the need to participate actively in the balancing process [for which, read, arms control].” In other words, in 1958 he described, very precisely Ronald Reagan’s approach to Star Wars in 1983! (See reprint of this absolutely splendid paper in FAS PIR, February 1987.)
Notes


390. For example, Talbott recounts how the RAND team called on Nitze on May 14, 1986: “Bud McFarlane asked us to do some work last year on possible tradeoffs between offense and defense. . . .” “Oh?” said Nitze, “tell me about it.” I had been talking to Nitze about this on May 3, 1985. As a former RAND consultant myself, this simple fact gave me considerable food for thought. The larger think tanks can be ponderous.


392. For example, Talbott talks of a Gorbachev Time magazine interview in August 1985 in which, based on talking points from his advisers, Gorbachev moved toward making violations of the ABM Treaty the key desiderata rather than just any ABM research (which would be unverifiable). This was the final position.

According to Strobe, however, their negotiating team got the message only much later. (Master of the Game, pp. 277–278, and see also the discussion on p. 295, where he says, “Gorbachev seemed to be relying increasingly on a flying squad of academicians and instituchiki.”) The situation in the two countries was humorously parallel. Just as Nitze could not trust interagency discussions to work—fearing sabotage by Pentagon civilians, so the Soviets were unable to trust the usual channels to deal with us because the whole fractured U.S. administration was listening in. And this is exactly what they told Max Kampelman. (Talbot, Master of the Game, p. 293.) And it is exactly what Dobrynin told FAS when asked about talks ad referendum; he said (confusing them with back-channel discussions): “There are plenty of back channels. The trouble is that we don’t know with whom we are dealing in Washington. Everyone is at everyone else’s throat.” (Letter to Paul Nitze of March 25, 1987, reporting on a conversation that Frank von Hippel had with Ambassador Dobrynin.)

393. Stone, Strategic Persuasion.

394. Stephen S. Rosenfeld decided to “say a good word for . . . the Cold War”; Dimitri Simes said we should give Gorbachev “grudging admiration” but not “the support one would give a new-found friend”; Charles Krauthammer said he was the “greatest politician of our time” and called the speech a “masterful mixture of beef and guff”; and George F. Will warned that Gorbachev’s rhetoric might produce a “pell-mell, bipartisan U.S. retreat from defense spending,” thus achieving a “relative enhancement of Soviet military power.”


396. Leslie H. Gelb wrote that the piece was “terrific, well-read, and well-received.” Letter of March 27, 1989.
Notes

Chapter 22


400. It was resent on November 14, 1988.

401. I reported all this to Gates in a letter of December 19, 1988.

402. Five days later, he gave a speech on terrorism with a line I loved: "Perhaps most important, we must work with our Allies and with the Soviets [emphasis added] to develop a unified front to deal with this growing problem." ("The Sounds of Silence," statement of Senator William S. Cohen, January 3, 1989.)

403. Letter of January 3, 1989. My first and only visit to the agency was on the occasion of the swearing-in of R. James Woolsey as director of the CIA in 1993.


405. See typed and added footnote on the computer-prepared letter by the author to Ambassador Dubinin, February 6, 1989.

406. Ibid.


410. Quoted from my letter to Gates of January 9, the same day.


412. Letter of February 5, 1992, to Robert M. Gates with enclosed letter of January 29 to Primakov. I also wrote the FBI (Wayne Gilbert, the assistant director for counterintelligence) a letter of January 30, 1992, saying that I was in correspondence with the head of the foreign intelligence operation of the Russian government and would keep in touch via an agent, Robert M. Kelley, who, for one reason or another (which I have forgotten), knew of FAS.


415. According to an October 19, 1992, report, the U.S. embassy released a statement saying, "Possibilities of contact and joint activity" between the two services were discussed. "The talks were cordial, and both sides were satisfied with the results." This subject is still sufficiently sensitive that the meeting is not discussed at all in Gates's 1996 memoir. Dr. Gates also met President Yeltsin, and guess what he talked about. It was the raising of the Soviet submarine with the *Glomar Explorer*. Readers will remem-
Notes

ber, from the last section of Chapter 12, on the Mining Bill, that the CIA’s cover story for this dramatic success inadvertently helped the American Mining Congress in its effort, in effect, to seize the ocean bottom and disrupt a Law of the Sea Treaty. (Janet Guttsman, “CIA Director Seeks Russia’s Assistance on Terrorism, Drugs,” The Washington Times, October 19, 1992.)


Chapter 23


421. Mailgram sent July 6, 1979, signed by the author.

422. Statement on Starvation in Cambodia by Jean Mayer, president, Tufts University, and vice chairman, Presidential Commission on World Hunger, October 18, 1979.


426. This trip report is drawn from the twenty-page FAS PIR, April 1989, which includes the text of the interview with Hun Sen on pages 16–19.


428. Ambassador Yuri V. Dubinin sent a letter of the same date, May 16, 1989, saying he was “pleased to confirm” that the letter had been “received by General Secretary M. S. Gorbachev.”


Chapter 24

430. Even King Mongut, I noticed, who was the hero of “Anna and the King of Siam” and who was very scientifically inclined, seemed to consider corruption of one’s office as natural. When, in 1864, Anna Leonowens approached him for a raise, he said, “Why you should be poor? You come into my presence every day with some petition, some case of hardship or injustice, and you demand ‘your Majesty shall most
kindly investigate and cause redress to be made; and I have granted to you because you are important to me for translations, and so forth. And now you declare you must have increase of salary! Must you have everything in this world? Why you do not make them pay you? If I grant you all your petition for the poor, you ought to be rich, or you have no wisdom.” The English Governess at the Siamese Court (Oxford University Press, 1870). King Mongut did not, in fact, die of a heart attack, as the movie suggests, but of malaria while in the jungle in Southern Siam trying to observe an eclipse, so as to persuade his people that such events were natural phenomena.

431. See the September hearing before the House Subcommittee on Asian and Pacific Affairs, as reported in FAS PIR, October 1989. The policy was, as Richard Solomon later wrote me, to “(1) stop the fighting and (2) get a neutral international presence in Cambodia to stabilize the situation—i.e., to get the Chinese and Vietnamese out, and with it aid to the Khmer Rouge and Hun Sen’s faction.”

432. Michael Haas observes in his book, Cambodia, Pol Pot, and the United States: The Faustian Pact (Praeger, 1991), that CORKR was formed “after a meeting [of NGOs] organized by John McAuliffe” and that “the group was formed by Jeremy Stone . . . after a trip to Phnom Penh in 1989” (pp. 104–105).

433. Muskie was kept in play on this issue by the Center for National Policy, of which he was the chairman, and whose vice president, Maureen (Mo) Steinbruner, was a skillful and interested party. Mitchell’s success was announced in a newspaper article: Al Kamen, “Senators Seek About-Face in Policy on Cambodia,” The Washington Post, July 14, 1990.


435. H.R. 2655. (b) “Prohibition on Certain Assistance to the Khmer Rouge—Notwithstanding any other provision of law, none of the funds made available to carry out this section may be obligated or expended for the purpose or with the effect of promoting, sustaining, or augmenting, directly or indirectly, the capacity of the Khmer Rouge or any of its members to conduct military or paramilitary operations in Cambodia or elsewhere in Indochina.” And the House of Representatives’ committee report urged the president to secure “firm and reliable assurances” from the noncommunist forces in Cambodia that they “will not use U.S. assistance in cooperation or coordination with the Khmer Rouge or to benefit the Khmer Rouge in any way.”

436. See FAS PIR 8, November 1989.

437. I was told this by an involved newspaperman.

438. These included, besides Secretary of State Baker, Deputy Secretary Lawrence S. Eagleburger, Under Secretary Robert M. Kimmitt, and Assistant Secretary Richard Solomon.

439. The first five points in the nine-point bill of indictment read as follows:

(i) Not only has the Department of State made no substantial effort to prevent the return of the Khmer Rouge but it has worked actively and energetically to force the Vietnamese Army out of Cambodia, thus removing the main bulwark of the Cambodian people against the return of the Khmer Rouge.
(2) Not only has the Department of State failed to oppose Pol Pot's Khmer Rouge but it has strengthened it politically by working to combine the noncommunist resistance in Cambodia with the Khmer Rouge in a so-called Coalition Government of Democratic Kampuchea.

(3) Not only has the Department of State failed to support peaceful initiatives of the Thai government to end the conflict but it has actively tried to sabotage those initiatives by intervening in Thai politics against the prime minister.

(4) Not only has the Department of State failed to support Hun Sen's government against the Khmer Rouge but it is the main element in an economic embargo that denies Cambodia help from the West.

(5) Not only has the Department of State failed to prevent Pol Pot's government of Democratic Kampuchea from holding Cambodia's UN seat, it has—for ten years and still today—supported the Khmer Rouge's retaining UN representation.

The last point, number 9, complained that the department avoided exchanges of views with its critics to maintain a more defensible "low profile."

440. Letter of December 7, 1989, from Charles H. Twining. Richard Solomon observes, "By this time, we had laid in place the game plan to get the UN into Cambodia as the basis for getting all the other foreign presence out and as a vehicle for restoring Constitutional Government and blocking Pol Pot." Private communication to the author, September 6, 1996.


Chapter 25

442. I later learned that Li Peng had sent a representative of his office to the disarmament conference organizers to find out what was up. One consequence of this decision was to put off, for a few years, a planned visit to North Korea that was scheduled to occur at the same time. And, no doubt, it impaired my relations with the Chinese leadership.

443. It included, in particular, a statement from the Cambodian Defense Ministry, news reports, op-ed essays, excerpts of legislation, and letters from the State Department asserting its position.


445. Letter of June 4, 1991, enclosing a "quiet copy" of the letter I had sent Minister Evans "incorporating ideas which I suggested to you in our recent meeting in Moscow."

446. Letter of September 11, 1990, to Peter Wilensky, ambassador of Australia to the United Nations; letter of September 11, 1990, to Mr. Jean-Marie Guehenno, Chef du centre d'analyse et de prévision, Ministère des affaires étrangères, Paris, France;
Letter of September 11 to Pansak Vinyarat, chairman, Council of Advisers to the Prime Minister, Bangkok, Thailand; Letter of September 11, 1990, to prime minister Hun Sen. These letters said the embassies could be established “with the understanding that the states were recognizing Cambodia, as a State” and would be useful in case the diplomatic process broke down.

“Especially because I have been an early and persistent critic of the UN plan for Cambodia that you have championed, I want to be sure you understand that I do, and I will, strongly support the funding of that plan. I congratulate you on having brought your plan this far, and I certainly share your hope that it will now succeed.”


Pell’s letter was dated March 6, 1989, and Cranston’s January 25, 1989.


They said it “clearly constitutes an activity which would be prejudicial to the public interest.” But how? It would “compromise important United States policy objectives and weaken ASEAN’s and our position regarding the legitimacy of the People’s Republic of Kampuchea.” Letter of March 24, 1989, to the author from Michael W. Marine, acting director, Office of Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia Affairs.


And some people knew it. On April 6 former senator Dick Clark, who had been watching this closely from his perch at the Aspen Institute, wrote these words to me: “Your promotion and management of Hun Sen in Washington is one of the most successful, professional, and inspiring performances in my memory. You are truly to be congratulated. If U.S. policy moves in the direction it now seems to be headed, it will be due in no small part to your efforts.”

On April 16 I even got a letter from the Australian foreign minister, Gareth Evans, saying he had been “following with great interest the reports of Hun Sen’s successful visit to Washington which, I understand, was organized by the Federation of American Scientists.” This letter was in response to a letter of mine of March 30 urging that the Australian government invite Prince Sihanouk to agree to send an ambassador to South Korea—something that was not done until after the prince’s friend, President Kim Il Sung of North Korea, died.

This was a memo of August 25. It suggested announcing that since the threat of civil war was over, “a new era in human rights” would be at hand. It recommended disciplining certain murderous elements, lowering the government’s voice, offering a reward for information leading to the apprehension of the Khmer Rouge leaders, hiring more foreign advisers, avoiding the drug traffic, and announcing that it did not intend to purge the CPP or overthrow the monarchy.
Chapter 26

457. Letter of October 27, 1977, from Joe Eldridge, Bill Brown, and Jo Marie Griesgraber and signed "Jo Marie."
459. Clovis, a brilliant engineering student, had led the student opposition to Air Force efforts to turn an Air Force–supported technological institute into a true military school.
460. There were a few other activities in South America outside Peru. In 1987 we had organized a meeting in Chile between Chilean and Argentinian defense experts to help paper over the antagonisms of those countries (FAS PIR, June 1987). In 1989, in the interests of nonproliferation, I threatened three world-famous U.S. banks with a stockholder resolution requiring them to advise Brazilian and Argentinian officials that a nuclear arms race in Latin America would complicate each bank's ability to sustain its financial links to that region. (Two had agreed on the condition that we drop the stockholder resolution and keep it private, and one, Citicorp, put it on the ballot and voted it down at its April 1989 stockholder meeting.)
461. FAS PIR, April 1986.
463. The resulting FAS PIR was entitled "Peru: Desperately Ill and Confronting a Maoist Mafia" (July/August 1992).
464. My caution in sharing what I was doing with Michael was my fear that, Latin America being what it was, it would leak, through him, that I was somehow “working for the CIA,” or something like that. And, in addition, since we would be returning to Latin America, I feared being targeted by Sendero if they believed that I was, somehow, linked to the intelligence community.
466. This letter, dated June 29, 1992, said there was "good reason" to believe we could save “millions of lives, and endless trouble” in the hemisphere by providing the Peruvian government with intelligence. I advised him that I was also making the same “quiet appeal” to Gates and Assistant Secretary of State Bernard Aronson.
467. See letter to him dated June 23, 1992, asking for an appointment on a "matter of some sensitivity."
469. The chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Senator Pell, reinforced my conclusion by putting this in the Congressional Record and saying that “it is incumbent upon international organizations, the Department of State, and other relevant organizations to begin thinking now about just such potential disasters, and calls for international help, from Peru and others.” August 6, 1992, p. St1760.
Notes

470. Letter to the editor from Anne Manuel, associate director of Americas Watch, August 1, 1992. She concluded, “Abandoning scrutiny of the human rights record of government forces in Peru is not only morally unacceptable but entirely counterproductive in the struggle against Sendero.”


473. Paragraph 2.11 of Executive Order 12333 states, “No person employed by or acting on behalf of the United States Government shall engage in, or conspire to engage in, assassination.”

Chapter 27


475. I had earlier befriended Macedonia’s representative in Washington, Ljubica Acevska, and helped set up a meeting for a Macedonian official with Foreign Relations Committee staffer John Ritch. Discussion focused on various names for Macedonia and the Macedonian reluctance to accept “New Macedonia,” which denied its ancient origins. I suggested having the “new” transposed to modify the word “republic” as in “New Republic of Macedonia.” Impressed with this legerdemain, she helped me set this appointment up with her president.

476. FAS PIR, May/June 1993.

477. Letter of March 25, c/o Alush A. Gashi.

478. See FAS PIR, September/October 1993; see also letter of August 11, 1993, to Philip B. Heymann, deputy attorney general.


480. Letter of February 25, 1993, to Stephen J. Del Rosso Jr., Pew Charitable Trust. This approach was never funded.

481. Letter of June 2 to the two presidents from the author.

482. I prepared a relevant paper of August 10, 1992, which was reviewed by a UN expert, Bertrand Ramcharan, but which I ceased to advance when Peru’s Guzman was captured.

483. Press release of the Republic of Kosovo, “Kosovo Prime Minister Calls for U.N. Trust Territory of Kosovo.”


485. The “Treaty of Peace Between the State of Israel and the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan” of October 26, 1994, permitted certain Israeli settlers special rights for a twenty-five-year, renewable period during which Israelis had special rights of
access to the Jordanian territory; protection from discriminatory taxes, harassment, and the dumping of wastes; and certain extraterritorial rights to be free from the application of Jordanian criminal laws. Israel hoped that the “lease innovation” would be taken up by Syria.

486. In July 1996 The New York Times reported on a recent paper by a member of the Serbian Academy of Science and Arts, which argued that the Albanians and Serbs should “share power in Kosovo or divide the province into two ethnic enclaves.” The dispatch argued that this was significant since “in the past, Mr. Milosevic has often used the academy as a harbinger of policy shifts.” Even if the outcome turned out to be “two ethnic enclaves,” the lease approach might find utility, as it did with Israel and Jordan, in smoothing anomalies of population location.


Chapter 28

488. President Jiang Zemin had said that “on the premise that there is only one China, we are prepared to talk with the Taiwan authority about any issues including all matters of concern to the Taiwan authority.” (China Daily, February 2, 1995; quoted from a paper of the PRC’s Qimao Chen, senior fellow, Institute of Peace.)

489. Chi-June Liu, World Journal, April 24, 1996. This article also appeared in the Economic Daily News of April 22 and in the United Daily in Taiwan. (These three journals are owned by the same syndicate.)


491. A letter to the deputy foreign minister (Tzen Wen-hua) of February 20, 1997, went unanswered, as did a letter of February 19, 1997, to Ambassador Chang Ping-Nan, then in retirement.

492. Thus, in 1998, the former undersecretary of state Joseph S. Nye Jr. prepared a piece “A Taiwan Deal” (according to The Washington Post) that incorporated a Northeast Strategy. (The Washington Post, March 8, 1998.) Asked on December 7 whether there was any connection, he said, “Yes, I read and learned from your piece, but there are no footnotes in op-eds.” He said his article was “read with interest at high levels in Beijing, Taipei, and Tokyo.”

Chapter 29


Notes


500. Ibid.

501. Lansdale gave me a manuscript that showed the kind of person he was and the approach he took: “One problem, the most difficult of all and never satisfactorily solved, was to keep the military establishment from drawing unreasonable conclusions from insufficient facts.” He went on to say that members of the Communist Party or persons “clearly in sympathy with it” were security risks. But “it was difficult to make people understand, however, that membership in communist front organizations or extremely liberal political views were not of themselves evidence of membership in the communist party or sympathy with the communist party.” (John Lansdale, Jr., “Military Service,” p. 7.)


503. Ibid., p. 191.

504. He mentioned that clients in such cases are often advised to limit the documents they keep since these can be requested or seized.

505. And Justice could, if it wished, put its evidence in a so-called can—which is to say that it could date-stamp the information to be able to establish, if it did indict, that its evidence had not arisen from information in the hearings for which the immunity had been given.

506. Letter of July 18 to Scientist X from the author.


508. A basic source on World War II summarizes the fears of the German bomb as follows: “By the summer of 1942 the critical resource allocation decisions had been made; there would be no German atomic bomb. In the summer of 1943 the British were convinced of this, and by the summer of 1944 the Americans had come to the same conclusion, a view reinforced by the special ‘Algos’ mission, whose task it was to check on German atomic bomb progress.” Gerhard L. Weinberg, *A World at Arms: A Global History of World War II* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994), p. 570.

509. Private communication from Arnold Kramish, author of *The Griffin*, who was told this by Perrin before Perrin died.


511. Even in late 1944, when, at Strasbourg, the papers of a key German physicist, Carl Friedrich von Weizsäcker, were closely examined and found to show that the Germans had gotten nowhere, General Groves said, “Unless and until we had positive
knowledge to the contrary, we had to assume that the most competent German scientists and engineers were working on an atomic program with the full support of their government and with the full capacity of German industry at their disposal."

512. I had asked to see him, on Colby’s suggestion, in a letter of August 4, 1994. Rogovin was a perfect selection. He had worked for the CIA as general counsel and would have real credibility in a case of this kind.


514. Completing the manuscript, seeking a publisher, and, in the end, deciding to work with PublicAffairs, which was just being conceived, explains the three-year delay.


516. In the meantime, I fully expect my analysis to be critiqued and denounced from a number of friendly quarters and my motives impugned. But this memoir constitutes the last clear chance for me to “commit truth” in this matter, as in other corners of my life, and so I am doubly determined not to bury this episode.

Chapter 30


518. This was I. F. Stone.


520. As we were investigating this in August and September, creating waves in the Senate, but before the newsletter was released, we learned that the House of Representatives, on October 8, 1974, approved the complete abolition of proxy voting in committee.