

Defending Civilization Using Catalytic Ideas¹

Jeremy J. Stone

Jstone@catalyticdiplomacy.org

¹ This report has been sponsored by the Armington Fund and the Edgerton Foundation. The actions described in this report, which go back almost fifty years, were funded through either the Federation of American Scientists (FAS) (1970–2000), or Catalytic Diplomacy (1999–present).

During the FAS period, the Rockefeller Family Office and W. Alton Jones were especially important sources of funding. During the fifteen-year period, from 1999 to the present, of Catalytic Diplomacy, continuing annual grants were provided by the Armington Fund, the Edgerton Foundation, the Favrot Fund, and the Rockefeller Office. Grants were received also from the Carnegie Corporation, Knight Foundation, Ploughshares Fund, and the Soros Foundation.

Contents

PREFACE.....	4
I. Defending Humanity from Nuclear War with the Soviet Union	14
A. The Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty	14
B. Getting Ideas to the Summit: Carter, Reagan, Clinton.....	20
C. Efforts to Restrict Nuclear Weapons Use by Using Congress and the World Court.....	26
D. Using US-Soviet Dialogue: Congressional Travel and KGB-CIA Cooperation	29
E. Mobilizing Defense of Andrei Sakharov and Defending Human Rights in Russia.....	33
II. Working to Avoid War with China and to Prevent a Chinese Invasion of Taiwan	35
A. Catalyzing Scientific Exchange; Zhou Enlai’s Cancer	35
B. A New Method of Unifying China	36
C. High Level Meetings on Both Sides of the Straits	38
D. Persuading a Taiwanese President to Discuss a One-China Policy.....	41
E. High Level Meetings in Beijing; Tang Shubei's Proposal.....	43
F. Opposing Taiwanese Separatism: August 2002–June 2004	47
G. Blowing the Whistle on Nascent Nuclear Plans.....	51
III. Moderating US-Iranian Relations (1998–2006)	55
A. Reestablishment of Scientific Relations	55
B. Reestablishment of Political Relations (of a Kind for a Time)	56
C. Expulsion from Iran and the Election of the Wrong Man.....	57
D. Embedding the Fatwa in Iranian Domestic Legislation.....	58

IV. Working to Suppress Super-Maoist Threats in Cambodia, North Korea, and Peru	61
A. Cambodia.....	61
B. North Korea	66
C. Peru	71
V. Working to Avoid Ethnic Conflict in Serbia.....	73
VI. Defending Freedom In America	76
A. Critiquing the Pentagon, and White House Retaliation.....	76
B. A Last-Minute Key Role in President Nixon’s Resignation	77
C. Inadvertently Halting an Illegal CIA Operation	79
D. Protecting Freedom of the Press against Prior Restraint.....	80
E. Protecting the East Coast from an Earthquake Scare	82
PART II CURRENT PEACE-RELATED PROJECTS.....	84
VII. Burma Project	85
VIII. Health, Nutrition, and Disease Project	87
IX. Journalistic Independence Project	89
X. Religious Conflict Project	91
CONCLUSION	93

PREFACE

Modern civilization appears to be under constantly evolving threats of destruction as efforts to resolve old threats, combined with new technologies, produce new such threats.

Defeating Fascism in World War II led to the creation of atomic weapons and to a superpower nuclear-arms race with Communism. Attempts to prevent nuclear proliferation in Iran are exacerbating new threats of cyber warfare.

The threat of nuclear proliferation was also used to justify an invasion of Iraq that has importantly destabilized the region—destabilization encouraged by new technologies exploited by social media.

The resultant unrest has resurrected a primitive fundamentalist form of Islam based on the thirteenth-century religion. This Islamic State (IS, or ISIS, or ISIL) threat may now engulf Iran, Iraq, Lebanon, Jordan, Syria, and Saudi Arabia in a tremendous religious war.

At the same time, Jewish fundamentalism in Israel has made a two-state solution impossible by encouraging nonnegotiable settlements in the West Bank. Added to the historic determination of Israel's neighbors to eliminate the state, these fundamentalist elements portend disaster.

Meanwhile, efforts to control terrorism, combined with new technologies of surveillance, are producing a kind of latent turnkey totalitarian in even the most democratic societies. Underlying all these

strains of ideology and technology are entirely new developments, such as the dangerous warming of the planet and, in particular, changes in its climate and environment.

As Jared Diamond has pointed out in his book *Collapse: How Societies Choose to Fail or Succeed*, societies have collapsed in the past. The danger of a collapse of our civilization seems ever more present.

What can be done? Society needs to facilitate the functioning of people with the capacity and the freedom to propound new and workable ideas to resolve civilization-threatening political and social dilemmas.

I call such people and their ideas “catalytic.” In chemistry, a catalyst is a substance that speeds up a chemical reaction. By analogy, in political life, it is a person or idea that precipitates an event, a stimulus, a spark, or an impetus.

To spread a new idea in the modern world, independence is critical. A staffer in Congress or an official in the executive branch can offer his or her suggestions only to a superior. If that superior is not persuaded, the idea will likely immediately die.

A more independent agent, perhaps in the public sector, will just take the idea somewhere else. If an official central to adoption of the idea opposes it, he or she can try to work around the official or lobby others to do so.

It has been my good fortune to have this independence and, in this stage of my life, to offer it to a few others working in peace-relevant fields while continuing my own work.

Defending Humanity from US-Soviet Nuclear War

I have been privileged to work on one such danger to civilization: that of thermonuclear war. Indeed, this is the greatest danger mankind has ever faced in its entire existence. I actually made some important progress in containing this danger by inspiring and stimulating the creation of the single most important agreement reached in the Cold War, the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty.

On three different other occasions, my ideas for major US-Soviet disarmament agreements were discussed at summits involving presidents Carter, Reagan, and Clinton. Sustained efforts were made to encourage the Congress and the World Court to make decisions that would discourage the use of nuclear weapons.

I worked on closing the political gap between America and the Soviet Union by working on human rights in Russia (especially the defense of nuclear physicist, Soviet dissident, and human-rights activist Andrei Sakharov), by stimulating CIA-KGB dialogue, and by pursuing congressional travel to Moscow.

Reducing the Risks of War with China and Iran

With regard to relations with China, I played a role in catalyzing scientific exchange with the People's Republic of China after two

decades of disruption. I worked intensively for six years, and produced successful ideas for discouraging a Sino-American war over Taiwan.

I succeeded in establishing a scientific exchange with Iran after decades without significant contact and even had some success in Iranian-American cultural/political relations for a time.

Suppressing Three Extreme Forms of Maoist Marxism

I worked effectively to suppress two offshoots of Maoist Communism—Cambodia’s Khmer Rouge and Peru’s Sendero Luminoso—and to contain a third, the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (a.k.a. North Korea), ruled by Kim Il-sung and his descendants.

I foresaw and tried to prevent the NATO war against Serbia by working on an agreement to “rent” Kosovo . As an outgrowth of my trip to Burma, I developed an idea and found a specialist (Priscilla Clapp) to lead a Burma project.

Defending Freedom In America

In the process of working on foreign conflict, sometimes by happenstance, I played a small role in the maintenance of American democracy itself—so critical to civilization. I was instrumental in stopping the CIA’s illegal project of mail opening (HTLingual). I persuaded a federal judge to accept my approach to avoid prior restraint of the press. I even played a somewhat inadvertent role in the resignation of President Nixon when he misused his office.

I’d had personal experience with the dangers of misuse of presidential power by having earlier been placed on President Nixon’s

secret “enemies list” in retaliation for criticizing one of his officials. So I understand the danger of a chief executive armed with the modern methods of citizen surveillance. This is all connected with war.

Connected to it, also, is journalistic independence. After four years of effort, progress has been made in using the career of I. F. Stone as a fulcrum to defend journalism in America. A short video has resulted, and a longer documentary is in the wings.

In recent years, as an outgrowth of inventing a diet (carbohydrate concentration) in 2010, and finding a brilliant colleague, Mark McCarty, a small but powerful project on nutritional biochemistry has been created and made available at www.catalyticlongevity.org.

More recently, I became focused on issues of religion and religious war. I discovered and documented that the largest three Western religious communities, Christianity, Islam, and Protestantism, were all inspired by individuals (St. Paul, Muhammad and Martin Luther) with a mental disorder—indeed, the *same* mental disorder, and one that lends itself to and encourages the creation of new religions. In other words, these religious communities were not inspired by God but by compulsions induced in epileptics of a particular kind; they had Geschwind's syndrome. They were epileptics obsessed with religious issues and determined to write and preach about them.

Looked at from this point of view, religious wars, including those in the current Middle East, are the direct result of absurdly excessive adherence, by religious fundamentalists, to the often-weird and ancient ideas of men who were not mentally normal. This discovery is soon to

be posted at www.catalyticreligion.org and will discuss the dangers of fundamentalism in Judaism, Islam and Protestantism.

Reviewing Half a Century of Activism (1962–2014)

Now, at age seventy-nine, in an effort to inspire others to try to play a similar role dealing with the constant threats to mankind, it seems appropriate to review, condense, and analyze this half-century of activism. The goal is to distill lessons learned, and, above all, to brainstorm about persuading others to try.

So what appears here is a reduction and summary of the most interesting events of my career. Readers who want to know more about the events from 1962 to 2006 can repair to my two life memoirs: *“Every Man Should Try”: Adventures of a Public-Interest Activist* (PublicAffairs 1999), covering the period 1962–1999, and *Catalytic Diplomacy: Russia, China, North Korea, and Iran* (BookSurge Publishing 2006) covering 1999–2006. For the more recent projects (2006–2014), much is available at the above-mentioned websites on health and, in due course, religion.

While many of the things attempted over this half-century did not pan out, from time to time they did, and often when they didn’t succeed, they were at least “good tries” with possibly useful lessons.

How successful were they, and what did their success depend upon? A relevant comment is appended to each report. But readers can decide. And of course many other people tried to influence the same events on which I am reporting.

Some colleagues have been generous in their assessments of my work, and their explanations of it tend to be interesting but incomplete. A former director of the State Department, Office of Policy Planning, Morton Halperin, said my “influence has been as great as that of all but the most senior figures in government.”²

Asked how Stone did this, he told a reporter that Stone, in coming up with ideas to bridge a gap, “[He] first read everything and knew everything about it, and then stayed with it for a very long time.”³

Furthermore, he said elsewhere that Stone had learned that bureaucracies could not be induced to accept an idea unless it could be “stated in one simple declarative sentence, and, once stated, was obviously true.” He observed that Stone often worked hard “to reduce proposals to something that could be described on a large button,” which Stone could then wear and pass out.⁴

The most famous Russian scientist, Academician, Academician Evgeny Velikhov, president of the Kurchatov Nuclear Institute, wondered in an introduction to the Russian edition of *“Every Man Should Try”* how I had been able to “compete—in influencing the political life of his own country and of the whole world—with the most powerful governmental entities and with non-governmental organizations whose budgets were many times higher than his own.”

² See the introduction to *Catalytic Diplomacy*, BookSurge Publishing, 2010.

³ Pam Kragen, “50 Years on, Activist Still Working for Peace,” September 7, 2014, *San Diego Union Tribune*.

⁴ *Catalytic Diplomacy*, preface, available at www.catalyticdiplomacy.org.

He concluded that I was showing “entrepreneurial activism” and that the victories of the West in World War I, II, and the Cold War could be importantly attributed to the Western entrepreneurial view that “One man can make a difference, and every man should try.”⁵

But how were the successes possible? Velikhov said it was because “Jeremy was then, and is continuing to be, one of the most connected nodes in a powerful national and international net—a net that is self-organized and self-developing, dealing with public benefits, and, especially, with the issue of the survival of modern civilization.” This, he felt, was the logic of the Internet.

A book reviewer wrote, “Jeremy Stone seems to have gotten involved, Zelig-like, in almost every major issue of arms control, national security, or global conflict over the last several decades.”⁶

Another book reviewer called Stone a “political Archimedes who finds the leverage to move issues of historic import.”

A high-level Russian official in the foreign ministry said he and his colleague had wondered how I have been repeatedly able to change Moscow’s policy when they could not. Andre Sakharov, the Nobel Peace-Prize recipient called me “articulate, creative, and brave.”

How much of this is deserved the reader can decide. In the commentary at the end of each section, and in the final summary of

⁵ See Introduction to the Russian edition of *“Every Man Should Try,”* available at: www.CatalyticDiplomacy.org.

⁶ Amazon.com reviewer listed under *“Every Man Should Try,”* <http://www.amazon.com/Every-Man-Should-Try-Adventures/dp/1891620142>.

this work, I try to make relevant comments labeled "In Retrospect". For the purposes of this introduction, however, I want to list some of what has shaped me.

Origins of This Particular Activist

My father was I. F. Stone, a legendary journalist who stood up to the pressures of McCarthyism during one of the most repressive periods of American life in the 1950s and '60s. Among best works of print journalism, *I. F. Stone's Weekly* was voted second in quality for the entire 20th century in a vote of journalists held by New York University.⁷

My personality and mental qualities are a watered-down version of his.

For example, while he was a radical, I am a mere pragmatic liberal. And while he was, in social terms, occasionally an *enfant terrible*, I have a personality that is merely "difficult." My intellectual skills, memory, and determination, though greater than average, are also lesser than his.

But above all, I was shaped by genes, environment, and example to be independent-minded and skeptical. In particular, I was not taught in childhood to believe in miracles or to obey authority unquestionably or to be faithfully obedient to traditional values. I question whether anyone whose genes or upbringing encouraged either of these could

⁷ "THE TOP 100 WORKS OF JOURNALISM IN THE UNITED STATES IN THE TWENTIETH CENTURY," [HTTPS://WWW.NYU.EDU/CLASSES/STEPHENS/TOP%20100%20PAGE.HTM](https://www.nyu.edu/classes/stephens/top%20100%20page.htm).

have followed a path that required so much independent assessment and unwillingness to bend to political pressures.

I had a good education at Swarthmore College and became a mathematician. But in 1961, at age twenty-six, when young children were being taught to hide under their desks on the warning of an incoming nuclear attack, I left my profession to try to save the world.

During the next six years, I tried one thing or another at two-year intervals until, in 1970, I found myself in charge of the Federation of American Scientists (FAS) (nee the Federation of Atomic Scientists [FAS]). This was my salvation.

In the beginning, working out of a single-room office with a half-time secretary and an annual budget of \$7,000 a year, I managed to avoid immediate organizational bankruptcy. At the end of my tenure thirty years later, the organization had a \$1,000,000 budget, fifty-seven Nobel prize-winning sponsors, and a handful of staff. Not nearly as big as some competing organizations, but quite a suitable basis for advancing any ideas I might have.

When I resigned as president at age sixty-five, I started Catalytic Diplomacy to continue my work. This turned out to be a wonderful decision that led to the most effective and pleasurable part of my life. For the next seven years, without the paraphernalia of a famous organization, or the responsibility to lead staff, I managed to be twice as productive as before and made forty country visits, advancing a number of goals with regard to four or five countries.

And when my own projects ran out at age seventy-two, I began supporting the forays of a handful of other activists or journalists while developing new projects, including health, related to world peace that did not require travel. This is what I am still doing.

I. Defending Humanity from Nuclear War with the Soviet Union

A. The Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty

First Thoughts on Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems

My decade-long odyssey in search of a US-Soviet treaty on anti-ballistic missile systems began in 1963, in the attic of my home in Elmsford, New York. The Russians who were experimenting with a missile defense system around Tallinn in Estonia, then part of the Soviet Union, should be talked out of it. They should be told that we would build a bigger one if they went ahead with their plan.

I wrote papers designed to turn the Soviet program off. My boss at Hudson Institute sent them to the Secretary of Defense, Robert McNamara.

At that time in 1964, a small group of eminent Americans, including Henry Kissinger, and the former science adviser to President Kennedy, Jerome Wiesner, were meeting privately with a half-dozen distinguished Russian scientists in Cambridge, Massachusetts. They invited me to present my paper.

Based on this good reception, my wife, B.J. Stone, began studying Russian, and we proceeded to make five annual visits (1966–70) to

Moscow to lecture and lobby the Russians into foregoing an anti-ballistic missile system. During these years, I wrote many relevant articles, two books on the subject, and an influential monograph, *The Case against Missile Defenses*, published by the International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS) in London. I had it translated into Russian and personally delivered the translation to the Russian bureaucracy in Moscow. In Russia, according to the 2002 book *Unarmed Forces*, the Russians were calling the ABM treaty “Jeremy Stone’s proposal” as early as 1967.⁸

In 1969, the Lyndon Johnson administration sought to build an anti-ballistic missile system designed against the smaller Chinese missile force and based around a dozen US cities. Scientists in the Federation of American Scientists (which I would later lead for thirty years) complained that the anti-ballistic missiles had nuclear warheads that might go off. The resultant “Bombs in the Backyard Debate” sealed the fate of that program. Subsequent efforts to build ABM systems to defend our missiles rather than our cities also failed under scientific scrutiny.

The opposition to anti-ballistic missiles systems in the United States grew to the point where its authorization passed the Senate only on a tie vote, and the Nixon administration agreed to negotiate a bilateral halt lest it find itself with no ABM while the Russians built one! Henry Kissinger, who in 1964 had mocked my position when I worked in his Harvard Center for International Affairs, actually negotiated the

⁸ Matthew Evangelista (1999). *Unarmed Forces*, New York: Cornell University Press, 201–2.

treaty. In the end, the Treaty, ratified in 1972, limited each country to one ABM site.

There was quiet on the ABM front until, a decade later, the Star Wars speech of President Reagan on March 23, 1983.

In Retrospect: It was the custom in the fifties and early sixties to assume that everything that could be built would be. Further, the notion that a complex treaty could be worked out with the Soviet Union to prevent the building of the ABM was beyond comprehension.

Indeed, much luck was required. Public rejection of the anti-Chinese ABM was one lucky break. A tie vote in the Senate was perfect—enough negative votes to prevent the administration from going forward, but not so many that it would have no negotiating position with the Russians. The fact the administration was a Republican one was crucial, as was the negotiating skill of Kissinger and the period of detente. Many other players were involved in having this happen. But I always considered it my idea, and pride of authorship kept me especially determined and active for decades.

Keeping Disarmament Going in the Face of Star Wars

The day after President Reagan gave his “Star Wars” speech calling for the invention of a total shield against ballistic missiles, I appeared on nine different domestic and foreign TV stations.

Star Wars, if built, would be a total violation of the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty. Furthermore, the instinctive Russian reaction would

certainly be to stop disarmament negotiations and build more missiles to ensure penetrating the shield, were it ever built.

In response, I published, in the *Washington Post*, a “bear-hug” proposal suggesting the Russians announce they *would* continue to engage in disarmament so long as the United States did not actually violate the ABM Treaty. Two years later in Moscow, I lectured on it to a very distinguished audience of about forty officials where it was well received and even videotaped.

Upon return, I briefed Paul Nitze, the chief state department official in charge of disarmament, on my Russian visit. I suggested he tell the Senate and others that the threat of Star Wars was forcing the Russians into—guess what?—disarmament agreements. Resurrecting my percentage disarmament proposal—which President Carter had proposed and the Senate Foreign Relations Committee had approved—I suggested he use this as the means.

Nitze, Secretary of State George Schultz, and the National Security Adviser actually conspired to persuade a President Reagan they knew to be inattentive, to approve the approach with a shrug. This made it possible for it to be presented to Gorbachev at the November 1985 Geneva Summit. It called for 50 percent reductions.

In February 1987, Andrei Sakharov, recently released from exile, urged Moscow to continue disarmament even if the United States violated the ABM Treaty so long as it had not begun *deploying*. By October 1989, Moscow had agreed to the bear-hug but had adopted my version rather than Sakharov’s—although his influence in Moscow

was absolutely key to the implementation of the approach. This idea had captured both sides!

By July 31, 1991, the START disarmament treaty (Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty), which the bear-hug made possible, was signed.

In Retrospect: According to Strobe Talbott, now president of the Brookings Institution, the bear-hug approach also had supporters in the Rand Corporation. But I had the special advantage of being able to lobby not only the administration, as they did, but the Russians also. Having FAS (Federation of American Scientists) as an independent platform was always indispensable. That I was able to maintain respectful relations with Paul Nitze despite policy differences was important. And the fact that the Russians finally had a thinking president in Gorbachev was quite essential. Much serendipity was involved.

Mothballing the ABM Treaty

In 2001, the Bush administration wanted to abandon the ABM Treaty. Of course I did not.

A former US official reminded me that at the 1986 Reykjavik Summit, Reagan had proposed that he would maintain the ABM Treaty for five years if the testing limits were relaxed. I called this the Mothball Plan.

After trying this on State Department officials, and with a visit to Moscow in mind, I met with the Deputy National Security Adviser Steve Hadley. He said the problem was that the idea was “too good”; the

administration wanted to end the Treaty. He urged me not to tell the Russians that “we could support this.” But later he called me at home, indicated that he had spoken to his superior, National Security Adviser Condoleezza Rice, and said that “*probably*” (emphasis added) the White House would not support this. I considered this an opening.

In Moscow on September 11, 2001, at eleven a.m., I met with Deputy Foreign Minister Georgiy Mamedov. He said his colleagues were amazed that I had so often “single-handedly” changed Russian policy, which they could not. On the plan, he said they were already saying they would interpret an extended treaty “flexibly.” He would try my approach. (By five that evening until nine a.m. New York time, Moscow TV was showing the 9/11 bombings.) Former Prime Minister Sergei Stepashin told me he was for the idea, but despite a long discussion, General Y. N. Baluyevsky, then deputy chief of the general staff was not. (Kennedy airport was closed for a week, and it took a week to get home.)

By October 29, news articles showed the Bush administration was warming to the idea. And on November 12, Condoleezza Rice told the Russians that the Bush administration would tear up the Treaty *unless* the Russians agreed to the Mothball plan. The Russians then hesitated and asked for the right to hear about each test before they agreed to it, and the deal fell through.

But by this time the Cold War was over, and the thirty-year ABM Treaty had served its purpose.

In Retrospect: In this case, the key idea of keeping the ABM Treaty in place without testing restrictions was not mine but was provided to me by a former US official. But I immediately saw the beauty of it and worked it hard in Washington and Moscow. It was fascinating to see the White House move from “no” to “probably not” to “yes” while the Russians moved from “definitely yes” to reluctance, to backing off.

At this stage, the Cold War was so over that the ABM Treaty had little meaning. In fact, debate over ABMs dropped off after the Treaty was torn up because it no longer provided a target for conservative opposition.

B. Getting Ideas to the Summit: Carter, Reagan, Clinton

The effort to get President Carter to propose “Shrink SALT II” (i.e., to lower weapon levels by a small percentage each year) to President Leonid Brezhnev at the Vienna Summit was successful, but the SALT (Strategic Arms Limitation Talks) II Treaty was never ratified. Another successful effort induced President Reagan to propose a “bear-hug” strategy at the Geneva Summit, and after a delay of some years, the Russians agreed. There was a further success in getting Prime Minister Sergei Stepashin to propose a most far-reaching disarmament proposal to President Clinton, but the proposal was hushed up and ignored in part because it arrived during a presidential campaign.

President Carter’s Meeting with Premier Brezhnev

For a year beginning October 1978, the arms-control community was preoccupied with the congressional ratification of SALT II and the shape of any follow-on SALT III agreement.

SALT II put a series of limits on various kinds of strategic weapons. It seemed the simplest possible SALT III agreement would shrink these levels by some small annual percentage (e.g., 5 percent a year).

On November 9, 1978, I lectured on this to a high-level advisory committee of the Arms Control and Disarmament agency chaired by IBM CEO Thomas J. Watson. He wrote that my lecture was “great, and the best one we have had in our ten-month history.” I sent a letter to President Carter on December 13 and published the idea in the *Washington Post* on Sunday, December 31.

I lectured to the staff of the Joint Chiefs of Staff in the Pentagon in May 1979 and testified to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, which approved the idea unanimously in October.

Les Gelb, A high-level state department official, told me the only person in the executive branch who would really like this idea was President Carter! He was right. President Carter, after consulting with the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, had made this proposal secretly at the June 1979 Vienna Summit. Much later, he sent me a handwritten note that said: “Jeremy—I still think this is a good idea. Best Wishes, Jimmy.”

Meanwhile, in an op-ed in the *New York Times*, I had called the SALT II Treaty an agreement between two alcoholics not to go on a binge. My senior officials were furious and publicly denounced my

point of view. They feared, in an anticipated close vote, it would help opponents of Senate ratification. Worse, some observers thought the precarious situation of SALT II ratification might have led the Soviets to give up on detente altogether when they invaded Afghanistan in December 1979. I was accordingly blamed by some close friends for the war and the subsequent failure of SALT II!

But historians discovered that the Soviet politburo was so eager to invade Afghanistan, evidently for fear of Chinese encirclement, that it had not even consulted its ambassador to Washington, then available in Moscow on medical leave. Detente and SALT had been irrelevant. I felt reprieved.

Reagan Summit Proposal to Gorbachev at Vienna

A basic history of this period was written by Strobe Talbott in *The Master of the Game: Paul Nitze and the Nuclear Peace* (Knopf 1988). He quotes my April 1985 speech in Moscow explaining how Moscow should tie disarmament to the ABM Treaty and describes my subsequent May 3 meeting on return with Nitze, then the chief disarmament adviser to Reagan's secretary of state George Schultz.

I had given Nitze the complete background on how Jimmy Carter had proposed reductions and explained how he could advise the Senate that, using the threat of Star Wars, he could force the Russians to the negotiating table where they would be destroying, in disarmament, the missiles we would no longer have to prepare to shoot down.

Nitze was a super-hawk who had once refused to debate with me before Congress. We were not friendly. But he sent an aide out to say,

“Nitze thinks you’re one of the few honest critics around,” so I had hopes.

According to Talbott's book, Nitze, Schultz, and National Security Adviser Robert McFarland managed to get Reagan’s approval for the idea by briefing an “inattentive” president in a “most low-key, cursory fashion” so as to elicit a “presidential shrug and a nod.”

This super-secret paper dubbed the Sunday Paper was the bear-hug strategy with two details added in: intermediate-range nuclear forces (INF) and specification of which interpretation of the ABM Treaty would prevail. It was to be of indefinite duration.

Prime Minister Stepashin’s Proposal to Clinton—Hushed Up!

Since the beginning of the Cold War, US nuclear strategy has been to threaten to attack the Soviet Union with nuclear weapons if it attacked Western Europe. And as the Cold War wore on, these plans included options to attempt to disarm Soviet nuclear forces with a “counterforce” strike if war seemed imminent. For this purpose, nuclear submarines were put on fifteen-minute warning and posted only ten-minutes’ flight time from Moscow so that warheads would arrive with no usable warning.

Ten years after the Cold War was over, I, along with many arms controllers, considered this high permanent state of alert excessive and dangerous. The only way to get rid of the option seemed to be through disarmament. According to my calculations, reductions to equal levels of one thousand ballistic missile warheads would maintain deterrence against Russian attack on the United States but would force

abandonment of the anachronistic first strike threats against Russia and high alerts. (The Russians never had the capability of successful counterforce strikes against our forces primarily because of our very competent submarine-based force.)

At this time (1999), the United States wanted to build a small ABM against the threat from North Korea, which would have required Russian agreement or withdrawal from the ABM Treaty. I devised a strategy called “Truncate the Sword and the Shield becomes Harmless,” which might have solved both problems and put them on a handsome illustrated button and left for Moscow. The proposal was that the United States and Russia agreed to equal levels of nuclear missile warheads (at one thousand) and that Russia agree to let the United States have a small ABM. My point was that Russia had nothing to fear from a small ABM if the United States could not destroy almost all the Soviet deterrent on the ground in a first strike—and this could not be done with equal numbers of warheads on each side.

Through some luck, I was able to secure an appointment with Prime Minister Sergei Stepashin. He asked questions and I gave answers. He said I had provided just what he needed—a proposal for President Clinton when he visited Washington the next week. (I learned years later that he had pushed this proposal through the entire Soviet bureaucracy so that it was quite official when he reached Washington.)

Asked what he could do for me, I requested a picture, and he said, “Of course, and I will wear your button; this is for the *Washington Post*.” Upon return, I went to the State Department and began briefing officials and showing them the picture.

Stepashin met with President Clinton alone. He told me a year later in Moscow that the president had said, “Unfortunately, Vice President Gore is running for president and doesn’t want any trouble.”

Surprisingly, this history has never been told. The most far-reaching serious disarmament proposal ever made has been hushed up. I believe this story has never been revealed because it would seem to disclose that a most-desirable disarmament proposal was held up for political reasons—albeit quite understandable ones. And Stepashin, within months, was dismissed by President Yeltsin.

In May 2000 and in February 2001, I again tried lobbying Moscow. In March 2001, I learned that President Putin had “ordered intensive investigation of your ideas and proposals for reductions that would preclude first strikes.” (Private communication from Russian Embassy) By later that year, the ABM Treaty had been abandoned, and nothing has happened since. The US forces are still on high alert even though the Cold War has been over since 1989.

In May 2011, at an Andrei Sakharov: Alarm and Hope conference in Moscow celebrating the ninetieth anniversary of Sakharov’s birth, I delivered a paper revealing publicly for the first time that the Russian government had approved these stabilizing reductions when Stepashin went to Washington in 1999.

In Retrospect: All three successful proposals that reached the Summit were simple and easy to understand. This is almost always critical to success. But the timing on the Carter and Stepashin proposals was bad (Afghanistan War, Gore presidential campaign).

Because of American presidential campaigns, there is a narrow window for successful negotiations with the Russians. The Stepashin proposal also ran up against the desire of the Pentagon war planners to have at least fifteen hundred warheads rather than a thousand to maintain the ability to strike Soviet (or Russian) targets. And in America, the Pentagon gets what the Pentagon wants, as does the Defense Ministry in Russia

C. Efforts to Restrict Nuclear Weapons Use by Using Congress and the World Court

Sustained efforts to secure a role for Congress in the first use of nuclear weapons failed because Congress did not really want to form a leadership crisis committee for that purpose. Interesting and unprecedented efforts to persuade the World Court to ban the first use of nuclear weapons received a bizarre and Delphic kind of tie vote.

A Congressional Role in First Use of Nuclear Weapons?

In 1971, during a congressional debate on presidential war powers, the thought occurred, while in the shower, that the US strategy in Europe rested on the assumption that the president had the right to introduce nuclear weapons into conventional conflict without further authority from Congress. And since no conventional war abroad could be lost instantly, there would be time to consult Congress. I felt it was essential to consult Congress. This approach appeared to be that rare thing—a new idea.

FAS later put out a press release, where Senator William Fulbright, chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, offered a suitable amendment to the War Powers Bill, which was defeated 68–10.

I went to Hiroshima on August 6, 1975, thirty years after the bombing, and presented the idea of “no one decision-maker.” It was picked up and discussed on the famous Huntley-Brinkley NBC news show.

But subsequent efforts to produce a congressional resolution failed. Involving Congress in nuclear decision-making was opposed by “hawks” as weakening deterrence and was seen by “doves” as authorizing nuclear use.

Turning to use of the law, I wrote an article, “Presidential First Use Is Unlawful,” arguing that the president’s constitutional authority to wage war existed only when congressional consultation was impractical. But a later weekend symposium for famous constitutional lawyers produced only a split decision.

The next approach was to create a leadership committee of Congress—without explicit reference to nuclear weapons—to deal with emergencies generally including presidential use of force. Our lobbying got nowhere until we published (with Scott Cohen) a *New York Times* article taking Congress to task. Six weeks later, on October 2, 1990, Congress set up the committee. But it existed only for one session.

The basic problem seemed to be that the congressmen complained about not being involved in key decisions but really did not want to take the responsibility associated with prior consultation.

Lobbying the World Court on Legality of Nuclear Weapons

In 1995, I began pondering the fact that chemical and biological weapons were considered illegal but nuclear weapons were not. I was surprised to learn that the General Assembly had already asked the World Court, by resolution, “Is the threat or use of nuclear weapons in any circumstance permitted under international law?”

I prepared an amicus brief (i.e., an unsolicited suggestion) for the World Court, urging a complete ban but observing that, as with poison gas in World War I, the violation of the convention by another party would free one’s hands to violate the rule. So this ban was really a ban on *first* use.

Putting this in the mail, I sent an op-ed version to the *International Herald Tribune* and flew to the Hague to watch the proceedings.

Upon return, I noticed the *Tribune* had published this piece and, at the same time, in a blinding flash, saw that no-first-use of nuclear weapons could be construed as customary international law—if various doctrines of various states were considered. Incredibly, lightning struck twice, and the *Tribune* published this second idea. In the end, the judges had read two op-eds of mine and four tutorial pieces, which a friendly judge was recirculating.

The key provision on first-use resulting in a 7-7 tie, the result was decided by the court president, Algerian Judge Bedjaoui. His personal opinion implied support for no-first-use, but in the final vote, he had

joined the six representatives of NATO states—all of whom voted with their governments in supporting first-use.

The result was Delphic—turning on one word: “the” or “a.” A week later, in Washington, a six-person panel that included government representatives who had actually appeared before the court, told 150 distinguished lawyers that the World Court *had* supported no-first-use. With regret, I explained the Court had not done so.

In Retrospect: Of course we knew Senators would rather criticize the president’s decisions than share responsibility for them, but we had hopes that a leadership committee for crises might be viable.

As far as the Court was concerned, the judges normally vote in a way that is consistent with the government that appointed them. If the fifteenth judge, who was deceased, had come from a non-NATO country, I think we might have prevailed. I felt I had worked hard and really well on this and was disappointed. I was lucky with the op-ed page of the *International Herald Tribune* and with the American judge, who was willing to distribute my papers to his colleagues.

D. Using US-Soviet Dialogue: Congressional Travel and KGB-CIA Cooperation

After multiple efforts over two decades, FAS is finally successful in persuading congressmen to visit Russia. As an outgrowth of this effort, a success occurs on the issue of CIA-KGB cooperation and, indeed, a success on our proposed topic: North Korea.

Congressional Travel

For centuries, visits to Russia have tranquilized Western hawks because of its relative poverty and backwardness. By contrast, Western doves became alarmed by its strict authoritarian restrictions on life. Based on this observation, for fourteen years I ran a campaign to persuade congressmen to visit Russia using the slogan “fear them less and trust them less.”

It started in 1969 when I accompanied Senator Mike Gravel (D-Alaska) to Moscow. Gravel decided to offer a bill to pay the travel of congressmen and their spouses, fifty governors, mayors of the hundred largest cities, and two state legislators from each state. It would cost about \$5,000,000—or the cost of a single missile. Supported by Averill Harriman and George Kennan, it passed the Senate 38–23. But the White House bottled the bill up in the House Committee on International Relations.

We tried again in 1974 when President Nixon had been both to Moscow and Beijing, but the White House still found congressional travel to Moscow threatening. We published research on all this in 1977.

And in 1982, we got the backing of President Ford and twenty former Senators and complained in a press release that more than 75 percent of the House (including two-thirds of the Foreign Affairs Committee) and 60 percent of the Senate had never gone to Russia to look around. It produced forty newspaper editorials in favor. Still nothing was happening.

In 1984, a friend, Ann Hoopes, the wife of a distinguished author and public servant, Townsend Hoopes, asked if there was something useful she could do. Asked to go door to door in Congress urging congressmen to visit Russia, she recruited a team that produced no fewer than twenty-six congressional delegations to Moscow. The Soviet embassy finally called her and said “call off your dogs.” They couldn’t handle any more.

We then tried but failed to create an institution to arrange parliamentary exchanges. But by this time, the Cold War was within several years of being over, with the Soviet Union being replaced by the Russian federation in 1991.

CIA-KGB Cooperation; North Korea for Starters

In 1988, Robert M. Gates, then deputy director of the CIA, was speaking on the Soviet Union and subsequently invited questions “no matter how irreverent.” I asked if he had ever visited the Soviet Union. Saying none of us would take sex education classes from a virgin, I wondered if he had ever “had intercourse” with Russians. He admitted he never had, and this admission was printed the next day in the *New York Times*.

I wrote the Soviet ambassador and suggested communication between intelligence officers “might be useful to combat terrorism.” In due course, a Soviet embassy employee visited my office, said my letter had been reviewed at the “highest level” (Gorbachev) and outlined ways Gates could visit Moscow in security and confidentiality and asked me to pass this along.

I also wrote the CIA suggesting areas of common interest more precisely. Gates wrote that he found my “suggestions and initiatives quite interesting,” encouraged me to send further ideas, and said he was moving over to the White House as Deputy National Security Adviser.

By December 18, 1991, I had just returned from a visit to North Korea. I began campaigning to have the CIA and KGB exchange information on North Korea (where the Soviets had an embassy and we never had).

William Colby, former director of the CIA, helped me in this campaign, as did the fact that I had met the former professor Yevgeny Primakov, whom Gorbachev had asked to run KGB’s foreign affairs and could write to him. (Gorbachev liked to “break the ring” (i.e., the agency mafia) by putting people in charge of agencies in which they had not risen through the ranks.)

Eight months later, on October 14, I read in the *Washington Post* that Gates, then head of the CIA, and Primakov had just had an unprecedented meeting in Moscow to discuss joint cooperation against terrorism, drug trafficking, and arms proliferation. And guess what? The first topic was North Korea. The United States had made Soviet cooperation on this a test case of its willingness to cooperate.

In Retrospect: The Nixon-Kissinger administration was too jealous of its authority; other presidents might have let the congressmen travel to Russia (e.g., Ford would have)—so this was bad luck.

The CIA-KGB cooperation success was made possible by the arrival of President Gorbachev. I had stayed clear of the CIA (and of course the KGB) for my entire career but was very pleased to have succeeded with this and felt I had done everything right.

E. Mobilizing Defense of Andrei Sakharov and Defending Human Rights in Russia

The physicist Andrei Sakharov invented the Soviet hydrogen bomb. Later, he became a famous Soviet dissident and won the Nobel Peace-Prize for his work on human rights.

It was my privilege to organize support for Sakharov through his five hunger strikes, his opposition to the invasion of Afghanistan and subsequent exile in Gorky, and his efforts to protect dissident scientists.

We used a diverse set of tactics. We boycotted a key Moscow scientific conference to help secure a visa for Sakharov's wife, Elena Bonner, to go West for an eye operation. We mobilized thousands of American scientists to protest the treatment of dissident fellow Russian scientists whom Sakharov identified. We successfully lobbied the National Academy of Sciences to set up a committee on human rights. And we worked closely with Senator Edward Kennedy in sustained quiet but ultimately failed negotiations to persuade the politburo to release Sakharov to the West in return for a visit by Senator Kennedy.

During his exile in Gorky, we smuggled letters and gifts to Sakharov, including a powerful handheld computer and received smuggled messages of thanks in return. In 1987, Gorbachev released him from exile. At their first meeting in the Kremlin, we heard Sakharov

say, “It’s nice to have freedom and responsibility.” Gorbachev shot back, “Its good you recognize that with freedom goes responsibility.”

That year, we worked together on Star Wars. (My version of the so-called “Sakharov finesse” was the one adopted by Moscow.)

Andre Sakharov had a most unusual character. Radicalized by his wife, Elena Bonner, who knew more about Russia than scientists who had spent years in secret atomic laboratories, he followed his principle completely. He definitely deserved his Nobel prize.

In Retrospect: I am especially proud of having insisted that FAS officials permit me to defend Russian colleagues in trouble for human rights violations over the complaints of some that it would reduce our effectiveness in working for peace with the Soviet Union. Our formula that, in conditions of detente, we would work to defend our colleagues was the right one, and these activities helped shape the attitudes of the scientific societies in America, including the National Academy of Sciences. Before our campaign, the only major scientific society that was pursuing this course was the American Physics Society.

II. Working to Avoid War with China and to Prevent a Chinese Invasion of Taiwan

Improving US Relations with China

A. Catalyzing Scientific Exchange; Zhou Enlai's Cancer

In the Spring of 1971, I wrote Chinese Academy of Sciences president Guo Moruo about sending a delegation to China. My wife, B. J., had already been learning Chinese.

Guo Moruo said our request was being considered “positively.” Two months later, President Nixon went to China—a momentous breakthrough. We wrote again and, within eight days, received a visa. It turned out that “positively” did not mean affirmatively! But when Premier Zhou Enlai found out we had been inadvertently misled, he ordered our entry.

I was asked whether the National Academy of Sciences (NAS) was an official organization of the United States or nonofficial. NAS had an office in Taiwan, and according to Beijing's “One-China” policy (which refers to the policy or view that there is only one state called “China,” despite the existence of two governments that claim to be “China.” As a policy, this means countries seeking diplomatic relations with the People's Republic of China [PRC] must break official relations with the Republic of China [ROC] and vice versa), it could not work with *official* organizations linked to Taiwan.

I said NAS was, technically, “quasi” official. They later advised me with fastidious diplomacy: “Thank you for assuring us that the NAS is non-official.”

Our three-person delegation met over dinner with Zhou Enlai. He said his doctor had told him to “stop smoking.” This was a signal, since he did not smoke! On return, I offered to send a delegation of cancer specialists but got no answer. I felt bad about this failure for decades.

A quarter-century later, a memoir by Chairman Mao’s doctor said Mao had to approve major operations for politburo members. He had not been willing to approve cancer treatment for Zhou, saying it would not work anyway. So my letter had certainly been intercepted. (Zhou had three independent cancers of the bladder, colon, and lung and could not have been saved.)

Five months after our visit, the first Chinese delegation arrived—after two decades of isolation from America. It announced at each stop that it was visiting at the invitation of NAS *and* FAS. We gave the farewell banquet in San Francisco. The Chinese called us the “pioneers.” So this was successful.

In Retrospect: Building upon the fact that two FAS members had been the first Americans to get visa to China (which led to my writing *Guo Moruo*) and a translation error by the Chinese, we managed to help restart scientific relations with China. We seized opportunities and got a lucky break.

B. A New Method of Unifying China

In 1996, Taiwan was planning its first democratic election for president. I went to watch. The Chinese tried to deter the election by announcing that missiles would be fired *over* the island. On the night of the firing, I fell out of bed. I ran downstairs assuming the missiles had misfired and *hit* the island, but it was only an earthquake.

On the issue of reunification with China, the Democratic People's Party (DPP) wanted eventual independence, while the Kuomintang Party (KMT--then the current ruling party in Taiwan) said it wanted eventual reunification.

On the plane to Taiwan, I had reflected that these points of view were incompatible in one dimension but might be compatible in two dimensions. Taiwan really wanted more "international space"—the joining of international organization, official links to other countries, and, eventually, membership in the United Nations. Perhaps the mainland would withdraw its opposition to more space if Taiwan agreed, in exchange to take steps toward reunification. I called this the Northeast Strategy because it led to a northeast trending curve on a two-dimensional graph.

After discussion in Taiwan, the KMT Foreign Ministry sent me a letter lauding the idea ("much admiration for your foresight"), and the DPP said it could support the idea because it included a plebiscite (i.e., a popular vote).

In a subsequent visit to the mainland, four different institutes positively received the idea, and I was invited by the Taiwan Affairs Office of the state council to an elegant luncheon in a splendid place

where, heretofore, no American had been. The idea was again declared positive.

But asked in 2014, a high-ranking former Taiwanese minister said that this principle had been “tested to some extent”—but only through economic matters—in the negotiation of twenty-one agreements. No political issues, including “international space,” had been discussed. A few had been handled on an ad hoc basis.

In Retrospect: This is an idea whose time has not yet come. Beijing and Taipei are still not in an active negotiating mode and it seems that they can't adopt the Northeast Strategy without warmer relations. But I think this time is coming.

Trying to Prevent a Chinese Invasion of Taiwan

C. High Level Meetings on Both Sides of the Straits

By 1999, Taiwan was planning its second democratic presidential election. Its Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) was challenging the fifty-year rule by the Kuomintang (KMT) and calling for formal independence from China. China had repeatedly indicated a readiness to wage war to prevent Taiwan's independence and was frightened at the thought of a DPP victory. The United States had a Taiwan Relations Act that would almost certainly drag it into any such war, and US officials were frightened.

In October 1999 in Taiwan, I attended twenty high-level meetings—including meetings with the DPP candidate, Chen Shui-bian, and his highest advisers. The next month in Beijing I had an

appointment with Deputy Prime Minister Qian Qichen, a Chinese official higher than the Foreign Minister!

I warned Qian that the KMT had split into two parties, and DPP would only need 37 percent of the vote to prevail. This turned out to be exactly what happened. I also explained the Taiwanese strategy with a story about a Chinese emperor and a sick horse, which was very well received.

He gave me a message for Taiwan, wished me luck, and told his assistants, “There was a lot there I can use”—presumably with the president of China or other officials.

In particular, I advised the vice premier not to worry about possible future Taiwanese statements that it was independent. (I said, “Taiwan can say it is living on the moon, but unless the international community accepts that it is, this means nothing.”)

A month later, President Jiang Zemin gave a New Year’s Day speech, saying, “The international community implements the One-China policy.” I took this as the adoption of my point of view.

Meanwhile, James Mann, an *LA Times* columnist, reported that the Chinese had also adopted the slogan “ABM—Paper Tiger” that was emblazoned on buttons I had distributed widely.

In Retrospect: I told the Vice Premier that the Taiwanese strategy was the same one adopted by a Chinese peasant during the Tang Dynasty when an emperor declared that his favorite horse was ill and

must be cared for carefully. The emperor further declared that whoever advised him that the horse had died would be executed.

When the horse died, the peasant, careful not to say the horse was dead, simply advised the Emperor that the Horse was not eating. He went on to say it was lying on the ground. And, finally, he mentioned that the horse was no longer breathing.

The Emperor, exasperated, said then that "the horse must be dead". In the fable, the people decided that it had been the Emperor who announced the death of the horse and that it was he who should be executed.

By analogy, it meant that Taiwan, knowing that the "One-China policy" was Beijing's favorite horse, and that they would be killed if they announced it was dead, was just contenting itself by saying that the One-China Policy was just lying on the ground, not eating and not breathing.

I told the Vice Premier that, if Beijing took offense at these observations, Taipei would just advise Washington that it was Beijing that was causing trouble and that it was Beijing that should be "executed".

This analogy, which I invented while walking to the meeting with the Vice Premier, was highly appreciated by China scholars (who asked if they could "use it"). And it was in response to this insight that the Vice Premier told me, on walking out of the meeting: "Tell the Taiwanese not to engage in overly sophisticated strategies."

The anecdote was, I am sure, one of the things that he had referred to as something "I can use" because it warned Beijing not to let itself be provoked and was something President Jiang Zemin needed to hear. So I felt I was engaged in high diplomacy!

D. Persuading a Taiwanese President to Discuss a One-China Policy

By January, I had had very warm meetings with the negotiators for both sides: former Shanghai mayor Wang Daohan (China's negotiator with Taiwan) and C. F. Koo (Taiwan's negotiator with China). And I was being encouraged, in various ways, by both sides to continue.

On January 11, I told presidential candidate Chen Shui-bian that his promise to visit China, if elected, was empty rhetoric because no visa would be given if he continued to oppose the One-China policy. Arguing that there must be forms of One China that DPP could support (such as economic ones), I urged him to announce that he would "discuss" the issue. He suggested he could say this in his inaugural statement.

When I explained the advantages of his saying so during the campaign and not just in his inaugural message, he fell silent. But three weeks later, the *LA Times* columnist, James Mann, reported, "Indeed, astonishingly, the DPP candidate said he was willing to talk with top Chinese leaders about their bottom-line demand that Taiwan's future be settle under the rubric of One China."

Chen Shui-bian was elected with 37 percent of the vote, probably because of an endorsement by its famous Nobel Prize-winner, Lee Yuan Tseh, who had endorsed him at the last minute.

Senior American figures, such as former Defense Secretary William Power, CIA director George Tenet, and former assistant secretary of defense Chas. W. Freeman Jr. immediately began alerting the public to the possibility of war over Taiwan.

My effort to go on to China failed for lack of a visa, which, I later learned, reflected the concern in Beijing that my arrival might be used to elect Chen Shui-bian if the DPP suggested to the press that it had an adviser (me) who was being listened to in Beijing.

Diplomacy Threatened by the *Washington Post*

On March 28, after his election, an exhausted Chen Shui-bian told me he had “taken your idea” about discussing One China, that it had been a “creative point” in his campaign and had helped him. He urged me to continue, called me an “excellent political adviser,” and inscribed his autobiography with “Ambassador of Peace across the Strait.”

In Beijing, on the thirty-first, I was advised that I was the “only one who predicted that Chen Shui-bian” would win. (Actually, I had just said it was possible.)

At the Beijing Grand Hotel, *Washington Post* reporter John Pomfret called and said he thought I was working for the US government. I laughed and got off the phone. He invented a quotation: “Please let me fade back into the woodwork” to provide color, and decided to suggest I was working for Taiwan. The *Post* blew it up further under the headline “Envoy Reaches out to Beijing for Taiwanese.”

This article was big trouble. Taipei announced it had sent no envoy, and Beijing denied it had received one. But I became such a hot item in Taiwan that it was difficult to go back without drawing too much attention. Journalism is definitely the enemy of diplomacy.

In Retrospect: It seemed incredible to think that my visit to China might, in the opinion of the Chinese leadership, have had an effect on the anxiously awaited Taiwanese election. I considered myself Clark Kent, not Superman. But this was not the only time I seemed to a country's government to be so influential. As shown later, I was deported from Iran for fear that my presence there might elect the wrong candidate for President.

E. High Level Meetings in Beijing; Tang Shubei's Proposal

The key official negotiator (Mayor Wang was unofficial) for China was Tang Shubei, deputy director of the Taiwan Affairs office. We had a wide-ranging discussion. He made a proposal that the Chinese side would discuss the content of the One-China principle so long as, while the discussions went on, key Taiwanese figures—Chen Shui-bian; Premier Tang; the foreign minister; and the chairperson for cross-strait relations—would not declare independence. I feel a sense of regret that I did not take this proposal more seriously.

In the early morning, I prepared a letter for President Jiang Zemin proposing that it permit Taiwan to enter “international agencies and banks and regional organizations” in return for Taiwan suspending its campaign to enter the United Nations. I argued that Taiwan was not going to declare independence for three reasons (America, China, and

his political future) and that he was the best one with which to negotiate independence.

Later, I had a second meeting with Vice Premier Qian Qichen. Scheduled for an hour, it lasted two. My Beijing hosts were excited by this success. Since the Pomfret article made it impossible for me to return immediately to Taiwan, I prepared a letter for President Chen Shui-bian and sent it to Taiwan from Washington through a Taiwanese assistant.

Returning to Taiwan in June, I sent ten ideas to the Taiwanese president. The head of the US diplomatic outpost was saying China might attack if it thought Taiwan was slipping away.

On June 27, while I was in Taiwan, President Chen Shui-bian announced he would accept “One China, each with its own interpretation” in order to start talks. This was a form of the 1992 consensus principle and should have been enough to start talks. This was going pretty far since 75 percent of the population objected to this One-China policy. A backlash developed within the DPP party and the President was forced to back off.

In Retrospect: Chen Shui-bian's decision to make this announcement was quite abrupt. My appointments on that day with both his National Security Adviser and his close adviser Lee Yuan Tseh, President of the Academy of Sciences, showed that neither had been advised of it in advance. I have come to believe that he saw my presence in Taiwan as an opportunity to make one last try which I could

convey to Beijing on my follow-on visit. But it failed and he went on to a different and more dangerous direction.

Eighteen Months of Brainstorming

In May 2001, I met with President Chen Shui-bian. We agreed to say I was not an “envoy.” I proposed cultural exchanges for senior officials on both sides. He looked uninterested. Some Taiwanese papers were still calling me a “secret envoy,” but sometimes that meant between the Taiwanese parties! In this atmosphere, the president’s special assistant would call on me in my hotel with questions from the president.

In Beijing, after this visit, I began working closely with Zhou Mingwei, an official in the office of Taiwan affairs. (On December 11, I had suggested three ideas, including another one on how the talks could be started. These ideas were called “theoretical but also practical.” And when he had subsequently come to Washington on February 28, I had thrown a party for him for high-ranking officials, including a former director of CIA and a former deputy director of the State Department. At that time, when he was questioned at his embassy press conference, he endorsed my work as a “never-give-up” approach toward promoting peaceful unification, efforts “highly appreciated” by him and his colleagues.)

I was told, “Our leaders followed your trip carefully,” from newspaper clippings—but it sounded like they were not concerned about them. The atmosphere in Beijing was tense because secondary leaders were being chosen and no one wanted to make a mistake. We

had a four-hour talk at a restaurant, and I gave Zhou a letter for the vice premier with ten points, which we discussed.

There had been a serious incident in US-Chinese affairs involving a collision between a US spy plane and a Chinese pursuer. I had been explaining to a few people what really happened, in contrast to Chinese propaganda. As a consequence, when I met with an assistant secretary at the Foreign Ministry--who, I later realized was in charge of the false Chinese propaganda--I was treated very coldly. Irritated, I left abruptly when the meeting was over. My hosts showed concern about the meeting, they realized my influence in the Foreign Ministry was hurt.

Back in Taiwan in March 2002, I read per usual the last six months' issues of *Taipei Times* to get caught up. I met with a former prime minister, Vincent Siew, and worked on how to organize a mainland counterpart to his Cross-Strait Economic Common Market Foundation.

I was circulating copies of a speech by Vice Premier Qian Qichen, with suggestions on how to build on its call for "serious, positive, and practical steps." I learned President Chen Shui-bian was trying to get a visit to Washington—something sure to offend the mainland. I urged his office to do something to balance that.

On March 20 in Shanghai I began working on a letter to Qian Qichen, suggesting China invite Chen to visit China on a cultural visit to preempt his going to Washington, and to encourage Washington to bet on better cross-strait relations through the cultural visit rather than offering a visa to Chen for a speech in Washington.

In Beijing, told that Qian had said Chen would not be invited unless they accepted the One-China policy, I asked, “Does a man have to accept the One-China policy to visit the graves of his ancestors?” But this idea was never implemented.

In Retrospect: As usual I spoke candidly to everyone I met and, in this case, speaking candidly about the airplane incident was reported to the Government as a kind of hostile act. But I should not have responded to the rude treatment in the Foreign Ministry. I had no diplomatic experience and toning down to the subtle style of interactions in Asia was always a problem.

F. Opposing Taiwanese Separatism: August 2002–June 2004

Following a request on July 25, I met a week later with an envoy from the presidential office who, to my amazement, wanted my opinion, and I sensed, my approval for aggressive policies of separatism. He wanted to cut the cultural tie and then move on to political independence.

He thought provoking China and then asking the Americans to fix it might be the “only way out” for Taiwan. He was eager to sabotage the success of a coming visit by Chinese President Jiang Zemin with President Bush. I warned the White House and State Department. (I learned later that he was trying to build a coalition in the presidential office for aggressive policies and thought my endorsement might help.) I decided I had better go promptly to Taiwan.

On August 3, having failed to secure acceptance of his willingness to negotiate on the One-China principle, and having been rebuffed on the sending of three representatives to Beijing, Chen had changed

course and begun to announce there were “two countries” on each side of the strait. He even introduced legislation calling for a plebiscite.

I set out for Taiwan on September 11 and learned that a significant part of the DPP—30 to 50 percent—wanted to provoke a Sino-American crisis on the theory that the Chinese economy was so weak that it would collapse and that America would support Taiwanese independence. I sent a letter to President Chen complaining about the policy described to me in Washington and warning of the consequences.

In Beijing, I drafted a UN resolution that would have the UN General Assembly reaffirm that the PRC was the legitimate representation of China, and I invited UN members to advise Taiwan authorities that no plebiscite unauthorized by the United Nations would lead member states to recognize Taiwan.

I learned that China was considering ways of causing pain in Taiwan and wrote President Chen about this danger. My fortune was rising, and both sides of the strait appreciated my diverting to Asia in the wake of the August 3 speech.

In January 2003, I asked if a statement by Vice Premier Qian (“On the premise of the One-China principle, all issues can be discussed”) was a green light for an idea I had proposed of basing the talks on the One-China principle without asking President Chen to accept that principle. It seemed, in favor of that interpretation, which the Chinese leaders had discussed “in depth,” they had dropped the word

“precondition.” I began urging that it be a referendum (put through the Parliament) and that it require 75 percent of the vote.

In October 2003, I persuaded the director of the American Studies Institute to work up a study dealing with the provocations that were arising from Taiwan. There was alarm from many quarters, and I wrote to the presidential office in Taiwan calling this “irresponsible behavior” that was “losing friends in liberal and conservative circles alike.”

In the run-up to the march 2004 Taiwanese election, the DPP faced a unified KMT and would need 50 percent of the vote, not just 37 percent as before. I decided, from the point of view of avoiding war and starting cross-strait talks, it would be better if the KMT won.

It seemed the Taiwanese would not even pay a token one dollar a year to “rent” Taiwan from China—a proposal that I had urged as an analogy to the tribute with which Vietnam had traditionally bought its freedom of action from the Chinese emperor.

With the fear of military action rising, I began proposing multilateralizing the conflict by organizing a group of Asian states to urge negotiations based on One China and to help guarantee any agreement reached. The regional states involved (South Korea, Japan, and Russia) were all “One-China states” (which would appeal to China), and all democracies (which would appeal to the United States). The American Institute of Taiwan (our embassy) was very worried about Chinese attacks on short notice and liked the idea. Later, in an important conversation with the key foreign policy adviser to the KMT,

we worked out a way for the KMT itself to propose the idea if it won the election.

I began urging this idea and others on the National Security Council in Washington even as Chen won the election with the narrowest of margins. I wrote a letter to Chinese President Hu Jintao and asked former Vice Premier Qian Qichen to pass it along—which he did.

In China on May 27, I gave a talk, asking, “Who are ‘the authorities’ in Taiwan?” about whom the Chinese spoke so often. Since Taiwan is a democracy, it was the citizens of Taiwan. Why not propose a referendum in Taiwan over a specific yes-able proposition that China could draft? My meeting with the Taiwan Affairs Office was unexpectedly friendly, but it had become quite naive about Taiwan, and politics generally, after Zhou Mingwei left.

Things were getting worse. There were credible reports that Taiwan policy was being caught up in factional fighting in the Beijing politburo over whether Taiwan should be “taught a lesson.”

In desperation, I managed to get an appointment with a political organizer who was seeking to promote a “third” force in Taiwan. I drafted a referendum that he could circulate, which citizens would sign supporting the opening of talks. But in the end, the organizers went in a different direction.

In Retrospect: An American based Chinese scholar in Cross-Straits Relations, once told me that my role in this period was like that of the Dutch boy “putting his finger in the dike” to prevent a disaster. It was

apt because I was inexperienced. But I definitely was having an effect. And I was acting professionally. One Chinese official told me: "Other experts come here to chat but you arrive with papers defending specific proposals."

G. Blowing the Whistle on Nascent Nuclear Plans

In August 2004, I saw a *Taipei Times* editorial saying, "Taiwan needs nuclear deterrent," and later received a tip that Taiwan had set up a secret committee to study this question. Saying I wanted to discuss an "important matter of national security," on September 1 I called on Michael Green, director of the Asian department of the National Security Council. He was alarmed and surprised and said he would check it out.

I left for Taiwan on September 14. A well-informed source said the purpose might be to get the weapons; bargain with the United States; or cause trouble on the mainland. Another said he had heard, "We still have a military project going in the nuclear area."

Taiwan had set up the Chung Shan Institute of Science and Technology (CIST) in 1955 to develop nuclear weapons. But in 1987, a high-ranking official defected to the United States with documents showing they were about six months away from constructing a bomb. President Reagan forced an agreement not to continue and to move backward.

The Taiwanese National Security Adviser, Chiou I-jen, denied that the committee existed, said there was "no plan, no intention, and no

funding,” and warned me that taking this rumor seriously could “harm you” and raise questions about my judgment.

I called on Admiral Nelson C. L. Ku, a key member of the Parliament’s defense committee. He said he would cross-examine the defense minister in upcoming hearings of the parliamentary defense committee. And he did. On October 14, the *New York Times* reported that he had “peppered Prime Minister Yu Shyi-kun with questions about the authorship of the [*Taipei Times*] editorial and asked if there was a five-person team planning the development of nuclear weapons.”

By September 12, I knew enough, wrote President Chen Shui-bian warning him not to continue, canceled my ongoing trip to the mainland, and returned to warn the White House on September 23 with a five-page courtesy report.

I proposed that Taiwan be encouraged to embed its obligations under the IAEA Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) into domestic law so scientists working secretly on a bomb would be subjected to prison sentences. When the Taiwanese premier starting talking about a “balance of terror” capability, I alerted the White House and got back a message: “Yes. We’re on it. Thank you.”

The National Security Council had asked me not to discuss the Taiwanese situation on my upcoming trip to the mainland, which I had no intention of doing. But upon return from Beijing and while at the airport, I heard that Chen Shui-bian had put out a statement on nuclear weapons, which I assumed was the result of my activities and US

pressure. But the text simply said, “We are willing to openly pledge that we will never develop these kinds of weapons and would like to urge China to openly renounce developing and using them.”

This of course means nothing. But National Security Adviser Chiou I-jen had interpreted Chen Shui-bian’s statement as “unilateral and irreversible,” responding, no doubt, to people who had read it closely. In Washington, I learned Taiwan’s Vice President Annette Lu had insisted on watering down the Taiwanese statement to this form.

In May 2005, I returned to Taiwan to check things out. The DPP administration was giving me the cold shoulder, as Chiou I-jen had predicted would be the result of my actions. But I considered this action well worth it, even though it undermined future activities.

In Retrospect: Luck was involved in our playing a role in starting scientific exchange with China, but I felt we played our hand skillfully, especially in deferring to the National Academy. When Chen Shui-bian became a candidate, we thought of him as the (conservative) Nixon who might thus be able to establish relations with China. We built up close relations with him and his counterparts on the mainland. And we tried a lot of different things.

I believe I mishandled a key opportunity, but the main problem was the *Washington Post* article that exposed my efforts and embarrassed both governments. Still, when Chen tried to agree to minimal conditions for dialogue, his own party shot him down. When he gave up on that tack and went toward separatist activities, we began to work the other side of the street, devising methods to prevent his

actions from provoking war and, eventually, even to work against him on the paramount for us, issue of nuclear weapons. So I feel good about using what influence I had to help Chen Shui-bian when he was trying to reach agreement and hindering him when he was not. Above all, I have no regrets in pulling the plug on his exploratory nuclear committee at the cost of relations with the DPP political party. After all, the danger of nuclear war was the highest priority of my life's work.

III. Moderating US-Iranian Relations (1998–2006)

During the Iranian presidency of Mohammad Khatami, I succeeded in reestablishing scientific relations with Iran and, further, in getting the heads of the two national libraries to exchange visits. (These may have been the only two successes in US-Iranian relations during the presidency of Khatami.) His efforts to start a parliamentary exchange failed when he was deported from Iran for fear he might destabilize the Iranian presidential election. His efforts to secure legislation in Iran embodying the “nuclear fatwa” (a religious edict) failed at first but may still succeed as part of the US-Iranian nuclear deal.

A. Reestablishment of Scientific Relations

In 1998, I located an interesting Iranian-born American scientist, Massoud T. Simnad, and decided he was the key to the Federation of American Scientists (FAS) project for working toward scientific exchange. Using his connections, and the fact that he was an invited speaker to a Non-Renewable Energy Sources Congress, we got myself and FAS Vice Chairman Robert Adams invited as well. We fancied ourselves the first scientific delegation to Iran in twenty years since the 1979 revolution.

On December 17, our two-week visit was cut short when the United States started bombing nearby Iran. But after eight months of difficult negotiations, we located, invited, and managed to secure the agreement of a return delegation from the Iranian Academy of Sciences.

It arrived on September 7, 1999, and was introduced, among others, to America's leading scientific organizations on chemistry, physics, and the National Academy of Sciences (NAS). We offered NAS a full day with the delegation in hopes, eventually vindicated, that the two academies would work up a program of continuing exchanges.

B. Reestablishment of Political Relations (of a Kind for a Time)

Next I decided to try to step up to a political exchange between the heads of the two national libraries. On September 14, 2000, we organized a meeting at the Library of Congress in which Librarian of Congress James Billington agreed with an Iranian official that relations between the libraries should be restarted.

On June 20, 2002, I went to Iran to try to get the exchange going. I met Kazem Mousavi-Bojnourdi, the head of the Iranian National Library, and we negotiated a place for officials of the two libraries to meet. In talks with other officials, I generated three ideas on improvement of relations that I was certain would be transmitted to President Khatami.

But I ran into a bureaucratic infighter at the Library of Congress who decided to try to block the initiative. We then persuaded Bojnourdi to visit America, but he found his welcome in Dubai, where he went to get a visa, unsatisfactory.

Accordingly, we asked Bojnourdi to invite Billington, to which Iran agreed after five months of internal discussion. On November 3, 2003, we presented the invitation to Billington. Then Senator Ted Stevens (R-Alaska), the head of Billington's oversight committee, said he wanted to

join the delegation. But he was much too high ranking for Iran, who had never even had a congressional assistant visit Iran.

Billington's decision to go continued to come in agonizing dribbles with concerns over every damn thing, including guarantees of personal security. With one week to go before he was to leave, he announced that "Iran had endorsed Bush," so he could not go for at least a month. He finally went a few days before the 2004 presidential election and returned a few days later, in the hope of reducing press coverage.

It became apparent that he was not planning to put out a press release. Accordingly, we told the *New York Times*, which ran an article headlined "Rare, Discreet Visit to Tehran." This resulted in a *Washington Post* article with interview from Tehran. In the end, Billington was extremely happy about the whole thing. But it had taken four years to effect this visit! Much time had been lost on improving relations. A year later, in December 2005, he hosted Bojnourdi in Washington.

C. Expulsion from Iran and the Election of the Wrong Man

Exhausted from Library to Library exchange, I began thinking of parliamentary exchanges. Zarif, the Iranian ambassador to the United Nations, thought my idea of going there and inviting parliamentarians to come here might work. (This man is now the Iranian Foreign Minister.)

I wrote letters to two key Iranians: the Speaker of the Majlis (Parliament); and the Chairman of the Expediency Council, former president Akbar Hashemi-Rafsanjani, asking for meetings upon my

arrival in March 2005. These letters were faxed to President Khatami's office with a request to pass them along. This turned out to be my undoing.

At the Tehran airport, my visa was not accepted. After five hours waiting in the airport, I was put back on an airplane and deported. After fifty hours out of the country, without legally entering any country, I returned exhausted to the United States.

It appears that the faxes from the president's office were monitored by the Supreme Leader's office. It considered the idea of my contact with former President Rafsanjani threatening. Such a meeting by an American "operative" might give rise to rumors that America supported Rafsanjani, and this might lead to Rafsanjani's election!

So in the great game of "May I," I had overstepped. In trying to arrange key meetings before arrival, I had blown a fuse. Would the Iranian election have turned out better if I had not overplayed my hand? This possibility is disturbing because the election of Mahmoud Ahmadinejad was a complete disaster for Iranian-American relations.

D. Embedding the Fatwa in Iranian Domestic Legislation

When an Iranian intermediary visiting Washington, one with the capacity to rapidly transmit ideas, asked me if I had an original idea on the nuclear confrontation, I said the problem was that no one believed the Iranians. To make the Iranian commitment credible, the Iranians should "issue some kind of religious fatwa making such activities a sin" and then embed this notion in legislation.

The idea occurred because, that very afternoon on October 20, 2004, I had been at the White House National Security Council telling officials that I had recently urged Taiwanese officials to embed in Taiwan's domestic legislation its commitment to the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). The officials had replied that the G8 powers at the Sea Island Summit in 2004 had already agreed to "criminalize" proliferation (i.e., to make it a domestic crime for individuals to help violate the treaty).

I vaguely remembered that the Supreme Leader had said something about weapons of mass destruction being "un-Islamic," which he had obtained on several occasions in 2003 and 2004.

On November 5, 2004, the Foreign Ministry, trying to spell things out, said the Fatwa was "prohibiting the production, stockpiling, and the use of nuclear weapons" but said nothing about "developing."

On November 6, a legislator did try to embed this in legislation in the Majlis. He expected unanimous support, but another legislator said there was no religious law against have such weapons as a deterrent (i.e., to "scare the enemy and prevent it from attacking"). And the law did not seem to have been passed.

In a telephone conversation after the Iranian election, a presidential holdover from Khatami's administration asked me to prepare a draft speech on this approach for President Ahmadinejad to give to the United Nations on September 17, 2005. I drafted a speech that would have announced the fatwa at the UN, along with an

intention to embed it in legislation. Not a word of this speech draft appeared.

But by January 2006, I was told that a fatwa-type law being passed by the Majlis was part of an Iranian package deal in negotiations with the European Union as an item conditional on general agreement.

In Retrospect: These activities required the finding of intermediaries: first an American scientist born in Iran with dual citizenship, and then a businessman with a lot of experience in the United States. It took a while, as it did in China, to gauge the internal political pressures and culture that were making people behave as they did. The decision to try first for (non-official) scientific exchange and then for (official) political exchange that was really cultural exchange was appropriate. The idea of embedding the fatwa in legislation may be the major, still actionable idea. Here again, the success depended upon a new idea.

IV. Working to Suppress Super-Maoist Threats in Cambodia, North Korea, and Peru

A. Cambodia

Preventing Overt US Involvement in an Indochinese War

As a result of US secret bombing of Cambodia during the Vietnamese War, an extreme Maoist group, the Khmer Rouge, had taken over Cambodia. It drove Cambodians out of the cities and killed a substantial fraction of its own population. Toward the end of its rule, it attacked Vietnamese border villages.

In response, the Vietnamese invaded Cambodia, pushed the Khmer Rouge into the jungle, and set up a government led by a Khmer Rouge defector Hun Sen.

The United States, propelled by anti-Vietnamese feelings arising from the recent war, was backing a coalition of three groups opposed to Hun Sen—a democratic faction, a royalist faction, and the same Khmer Rouge. The US goal was to overthrow Hun Sen.

In 1989 I visited Hanoi, where I was told Vietnamese forces were withdrawing from Vietnam. In Phnom Penh I met with Hun Sen, whose government seemed the main bulwark against a return of the genocidal Khmer Rouge.

On return, I began lobbying against our policy arguing that if the coalition won, the Khmer Rouge would readily defeat the other two factions. This involved speaking at the State Department and at the Council on Foreign Relations, writing op-eds, appearing on TV,

appearing before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee (with Bill Colby), and helping the few groups opposing the policy.

Hearing that Congressman Stephen Solarz, Chairman of the House Asian subcommittee, was pressing to provide US arms to this coalition, I alerted Senator Alan Cranston, chairman of the Senate subcommittee responsible for Cambodia. This could draw America back into another Indochinese war. He readily agreed to hold hearings that, in due course, led thirty-three Senators to oppose lethal aid to the coalition. This killed Congressman Solarz's effort and kept US involvement covert.

A Failed Effort to End the War by Revealing Secrets

In September 1989, at the Thai border with Cambodia, I located journalist Nate Thayer, a courageous, experienced expert on the Khmer Rouge who spent much of his time on the Thai border with forays into Cambodia.

His report was alarming. Only the Vietnamese forces, then in the process of withdrawal, were holding the Khmer Rouge in check. He knew more than he dared publish (without Thai reprisals) and agreed to send me dispatches that we could use anonymously.

Nate sent a dispatch describing how the war was organized. The two non-Communist groups had a joint military command that was supplied through Thai operatives and CIA agents who reviewed battle plans, disbursed direct cash, etc. The CIA paid for almost everything. The Khmer Rouge weapons came through Thailand.

Thinking this would get nowhere published under “anonymous,” and that its publication might end the war, I submitted it to the *New York Times* under my own name. The *Times* op-ed editor confirmed the facts but said he could not publish hard news on the op-ed page without giving the *Times’* reporters a chance to investigate.

On November 16, to my horror, the *New York Times* published a short piece with the same facts but downplayed them as just “new details” about the war. This undercut the op-ed, published that day, under “Secret US War in Cambodia.” A reporter at the State Department briefing asked, “Got anything on those two stories on Cambodia?” Told no, he subsided. Absolutely nothing else happened! As Les Gelb, the *Times* op-ed page editor, had warned me about my hopes to end the war, “Washington is brain-dead.” The war continued.

An Idea Providing the Necessary Diplomatic Breakthrough

By the beginning of 1990, in Vietnam, the Foreign Minister confided to me that Vietnam had expected to lose 30 percent of Cambodia to the Khmer Rouge when it withdrew, but in fact only 10 percent had been lost.

But I was still intensely concerned: writing Chinese Premier Li Peng and boycotting Chinese embassy receptions (since China was the main support of the Khmer Rouge), holding press conferences, releasing petitions signed by Nobel Prize winners, and visiting Australia to lobby its government to help.

In Moscow for the seventieth anniversary of Sakharov’s birth, I met with Sergey Sergeevich Razov, director of the Division of Far

Eastern and Indochinese Affairs in the Russian Government. At that time, the major UN powers were offering to turn over Cambodian sovereignty to a Council of the four contending factions that would work toward elections. They were having trouble getting the disputatious factions to agree to details.

I proposed to Razov a new approach to getting the four Cambodian factions to work together—viz. stepping back and leaving it to them to work out the details. He said he would write the Chinese. A few months later, Chinese foreign minister Qian Qichen agreed, saying, “Time for Cambodian chefs to make Cambodian cuisine, not foreign cooks.”

My role had been to approach the Australians. In due course, Australian foreign minister Gareth Evans wrote me that there had been a “fundamental and positive shift in the peace process. This shift has, in fact, been in the direction your suggest.”

This breakthrough led to the Supreme National Council of four factions becoming operational. With its headquarters in Phnom Penh, governments could then form embassies attached to the SNC. The United States did so. And this led to my final contribution.

Bringing Hun Sen to Washington to Fund the Election

In 1990, the president of the Vietnamese Academy of Sciences, Nguyễn Văn Hiếu, invited me to return from Cambodia by way of Vietnam and to meet with the Premier and Foreign Minister. We invited one of his assistants, Nguyễn Huỳnh Mai, to spend a year in our office in Washington studying scientific exchange.

At a mid-January 1992 meeting at the Carter Center in Atlanta, I had the brainstorm of inviting Hun Sen to Washington as, earlier, we had invited Cambodian ambassador (and later foreign minister), Hor Namhong.

Washington was debating whether to help fund the Cambodian elections necessary to end the war, and it seemed the visit might produce the money.

Senator Alan Cranston and the Council on Foreign Relations were helping with letters of willingness to meet with him if he came. Hun Sen showed our letter of invitation to the US embassy in Phnom Penh, and it agreed to provide a visa.

I flew to Chicago to meet the prime minister's plane and gave him a plaque to place at the Tomb of the Unknown Soldier. In Washington, he addressed several prominent foreign policy think tanks, the *Washington Post* editorial board. He met with key Senators and congressmen, including Stephen Solarz. He visited the State Department and the White House, and we went to New York to meet the UN Secretary General and the *Wall Street Journal* editorial board. He was making a big hit everywhere.

Halfway through the visit, the *New York Times* wrote, "In the administration and Congress, there is an increasing that the young prime minister has evolved into a statesman." The *Washington Post* wrote in a similar vein. He left on March 28, and three days later, the House of Representatives passed a foreign-aid bill providing \$270 million for six months to cover all US peacekeeping operations. The

election was held in 1992. Hun Sen came in second, and a kind of coalition between his faction and the Royalist faction began to govern.

In Retrospect: When working on Washington-Moscow issues, one was competing with an enormous number of interested analysts and activists of all kinds milling about. It was extraordinary to do something that was both useful and identifiably related to one's work. When I moved on to working in Cambodia, I discovered a very different scene. One could read all the books on the situation, and only a handful of people cared about the danger.

In this smaller pond, one could be a bigger fish. I was amazed then, and now, at how much influence I had. I was particularly pleased with stopping lethal aid to a force dominated by Khmer Rouge. I was startled at how little effect my *NY Times* op-ed produced. In retrospect, if I had persuaded a reporter to put out this material, the editor would have ensured that the article made a bigger splash. I still don't fully understand why the *Times* sabotaged the op-ed by downplaying the new facts in the front of the paper.

The success in finding an idea that would break the international deadlock on proceeding to an election was a combination of a great idea and the luck of finding a powerful actor in Moscow at a meeting for some other purpose. Inviting Hun Sen to Washington to help fund the election was a clever idea.

B. North Korea

Insights into North Korean Thinking

In 2002, a North Korean ambassador to the United Nations told me, in relaxed circumstances, that “the worst enemies sometimes become friends” and gave as examples the US friendship with Germany and Japan after the war. He was visibly disappointed to hear that this was only because both had surrendered and had their governments remade by the United States. The Russians, by contrast, had lost the Cold War, not surrendered, and had not become friends.

In Beijing the next year, I learned that Pyongyang had hoped to change its relations with the United States, as had China, with some Kissingerian visit but had become discouraged. No doubt this change of heart had little to do with my comment, but I regretted being so frank.

The best expert on North Korean thinking was its Professor Hwang Jang Yop, ranked twenty-fourth in the hierarchy. It was he who had invited me to Pyongyang in 1991. Five years later I finally managed to get him a visa for a reciprocal visit.

A few weeks after the visa was approved, a formerly friendly North Korean representative in New York became inexplicably hostile. Subsequently, Hwang defected. It led to imprisonment in labor camps for his family and several thousand associates.

I visited him a few years later in South Korea, curious to determine whether the visa might have played a role in his destabilization. He said perhaps but it was mostly Kim Jong-il’s criticism of a speech he had given.

His *Memoirs of a Defector*, published in Korean, described Kim Jong-il, North Korea’s second leader, as Machiavellian, merciless,

sadistic, oversensitive, hot-tempered, very strict, and not a deep thinker. Worried that the world would learn of his crimes, Kim Jong-il believed nuclear weapons would permit him to extort funds from outside powers. Unfortunately, according to a Japanese chef who served the family, the current leader, Kim Jong-un has the personality of his father.

Deterring the Sale of North Korean Fissionable Material

US Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld was telling people in 2002–03 that the most serious problem posed by North Korea was potential sales of fissionable material.

How could this be deterred? An expert advised me that uranium or plutonium from North Korea could be identified if found before it was detonated. So the North could be warned that its sales could lead to retaliation! (But it seemed that the source of the fissionable material could not be determined from the fission products of its detonation.)

Accordingly, in Beijing in January 2003, I asked officials to warn Pyongyang that it could not keep secret its sales of fissionable material.

Two months later, in Russia, I found a key official who agreed to advise North Korean representatives, at meetings, that their sales would have their fingerprints on it. At the Russian Ministry of Atomic Energy (Minatom), they showed a willingness to study this problem and to collaborate on it with the United States.

Back home, I generated interest in the subject at the National Security Council and with an Assistant Secretary of State. All this was

created with enthusiasm by a small, poorly funded project of nuclear attribution at Livermore Laboratory, which welcomed my encouragement and wanted to work with Minatom.

Management of North Korea through Ideas for Beijing

Among a slew of ideas proposed to the Chinese Foreign Ministry, two original ideas of continuing potential value stood out.

1. Follow the Example of Jimmy Carter

In October 2003, of five suggestions on North Korea, what seemed to attract the most attention involved the recitation of a dramatic story.

It seems that President Clinton, Vice President Gore, and Defense Secretary William Perry were discussing what seemed like an imminent threat of war with North Korea when a call came through from President Carter, who was in Pyongyang.

He told the White House that, in five minutes, he was going to be on CNN television describing an agreement he had reached with President Kim Il-sung to defuse the crisis. The high-ranking officials were startled and unhappy but turned on the TV. They then decided to “make lemonade out of this lemon” and agreed with Pyongyang on the line Carter had proposed.

My advice was: “Follow the example of President Carter.” If China reached a suitable understanding with the North, it could announce that it and North Korea were prepared to X if the United States would do Y. I was startled to hear my counterpart say, with unusual enthusiasm: “This is a very good idea.”

2. Generate Trust: The Hard-Line/Soft-Line Swap

In June 2004, back in Beijing with another five ideas, the one considered most valuable concerned trust. Beijing could provide the trust in North Korea, which America lacked by guaranteeing any agreements reached. Put another way, America could agree to take a softer line with Pyongyang if Beijing agreed to take a harder line in the event that agreements were violated by Pyongyang.

(Encouraged by a Foreign Ministry comment that this idea was “very valuable,” I discussed it with a senior member of the National Security Council, who seemed appreciative. It definitely seemed to be, at least, original.)

Next in importance, in Beijing, was an idea that China host a six-party summit that would produce an opportunity for an American president to shake hands with Kim Jong-il. I described how American attitudes toward China had changed greatly when President Nixon shook hands with Chinese leaders—probably a bad analogy, but it was something.

The response to this idea was that it was “very interesting and a real possibility” if the summit were linked to peaceful order in the region, economic issues, and political relations—not just North Korea. Of course this was right.

In Retrospect: It may not have been a real possibility that North Korea would sell fissionable material rather than keep it for themselves, but there was definitely a kind of panic about this in Washington. In that context, the idea of warning them that their fissionable material,

uranium or plutonium, could be identified was a good one and borne out by the fact that there were underfunded parts of the government trying to work this. Getting the Russians interested in this problem and sending people to tell the North Koreans was clever.

C. Peru

Sendero Luminoso was a super leftist movement whose leader, Abimael Guzman, had been trained in Maoist China. The movement's terrorist strategy was to destroy the state to save it. Sendero was glacially patient, infiltrating villages and assassinating those who opposed it.

In Peru, I learned that our intelligence community had been told "to fight drugs but to avoid another Vietnam." So it was giving no advice, help, or intelligence.

The CIA was afraid that any intelligence it might provide Peruvians, if used to kill Guzman, would trigger a case against it for violating a US law against assassination! This was absurd. I personally delivered a letter on FAS stationary saying so to high-ranking officials in the State Department, the White House, and the Pentagon and wrote the CIA.

On June 9, 1992, I confronted CIA Director Robert Gates at a public event and told him that Guzman could not leave Lima for the mountains because of a blood disease. It was thought he was traveling in a green Mercedes with frosted windows from one safe-house to another. Gates was interested. I published an op-ed in the *Washington Post* alerting the public to the danger in Peru.

On August 2, two days after I talked to high-ranking UN officials about saving failed states, Guzman was captured. Peruvians were ecstatic with relief.

When he was shown to the public, he shouted over the heads at the press conference, “Don’t change the Guzman line.” This prevented his junior subordinates from shifting the strategy, which did the movement in.

A White House official admitted that the government had dropped its various fears of involvement by writing me and saying, “We did a lot.” It seems that in order to locate Guzman, British intelligence had followed everyone who bought an unusual kind of cigarette he favored.

In Retrospect: The good idea of lobbying the US government into ignoring fears of an irrelevant law against assassination was suggested to me. But I acted on it with determination. I also found out key information. I sounded the alarm, along with the Assistant Secretary of State for Latin American Affairs.

V. Working to Avoid Ethnic Conflict in Serbia

In 1992, without President Tito to hold it together, war had broken out in Yugoslavia. Its constituent Republics were seceding and turning into independent states: Croatia, Serbia, Montenegro, Macedonia, and Bosnia.

In Bosnia, the Serbs were laying siege to Sarajevo. After an effort to generate support for Bosnia via an op-ed (“Break the Siege of Sarajevo”) in the *Washington Post* with Bill Colby, former CIA director, I decided to try to get ahead of the spreading war.

The Albanians of Yugoslavia had not been in a separate Yugoslav Republic, whose status permitted secession. But they wanted their independence. It seemed the Serbs would next attack the Albanians in Kosovo to prevent this. I went to Pristina, the capital of Kosovo, and met with Ibrahim Rugova, the leader of the Albanians.

While talking to him, I had an idea! The Vietnamese had preserved their independence from Imperial China by paying tribute. The modern form of such tribute would be “rent.” Had the Albanians ever considered paying rent to the Serbs for the right of quiet enjoyment of living in Kosovo? This rent would replace taxes. The payment would—it was hoped—persuade the Serbs that they owned Kosovo and had no need to attack. The Albanians would have their goals effectively realized. There were other possibilities for a peaceful solution (partition, plebiscite, trusteeship), but they all had serious problems.

In Washington, talking to a famous economist, Alice Rivlin, I asked what the rent should total. She said, “Jeremy, you need a realtor, not an economist.” I saw the light, pulled out a lease agreement, and elided its terms into a rental agreement between Kosovo and Serbia.

Back in Pristina, I discussed the lease with President Rugova, who had only one small change to make, and set out to Belgrade to see what could be done. I returned home awaiting some signal to come back. This was, I think now, my mistake. I should somehow have found the time to lobby this further.

In 1998, the Albanians created a shadowy guerrilla force that struck at Serbs and suffered massive retaliation on Albanian villages.

As the fighting raged, I reached Richard Holbrooke, ambassador-designate to the United Nations, who had authority to handle Kosovo. We had a positive exchange, and he took the idea under advisement.

In time, beginning in 1999, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) provided air support to the Kosovo Liberation Army, which also received ground support from the Albania army. The war was won and the international community provided it with full sovereignty in September 2012.

In Retrospect: Although Rugova seemed content with the idea of “rent,” a younger translator confronted me, after the conversation with Rugova, seeing this idea as a sellout. Some Serbs just laughed at the idea. In the Balkans, rational solutions are harder to sell than I had realized, and this one might never have had a chance. But I wish I had found the time to have been more vigorous in pressing this idea. I was

then busy writing and publishing the monthly FAS Public Interest Report and running the organization. To achieve this, if it were possible, would have been a full time job for a long time.

VI. Defending Freedom In America

A. Critiquing the Pentagon, and White House Retaliation

Many have seen the real-life film *Fair Game*, in which Joe Wilson claims President Bush lied in a State of the Union address that Iraq was getting uranium from Niger. In return, he is smeared and his wife is exposed as a clandestine CIA official.

Much the same happened to me when I authored a fifty-page paper claiming that the third-highest-ranking Nixon administration official in the Pentagon had been shamelessly exaggerating the Russians' research and development (R&D) capabilities.

I collected Dr. John S. Foster's statements from years of congressional testimony and concluded that the R&D gap has been, like the Missile gap and the Bomber gap, a mirage. It was, our report concluded, "A classical numbers game featuring selective disclosure, questionable assumptions, exaggeratedly precise estimates, misleading language, and alarmist non sequitur conclusions."

Our May 6, 1971, press conference produced results: Walter Cronkite mentioned it; the *Washington Post* gave it ten inches; a Herblock cartoon resulted ("More Money! The Russians May Be Outspending Us"); and the previously lethargic R&D subcommittee of the Senate Armed Services Committee held a public hearing on May 19, covered by *TIME* magazine, among others.

The Nixon White House employed one Charles Colson as what H. R. Haldeman called its "hit man" and who called himself "ruthless."

Colson put me on the Nixon Enemies List, which he collected, and seems to have persuaded Joseph Alsop, widely read columnist, to smear me in six hundred newspapers as a traitor whom the Russians wanted to have “get” Johnny Foster. Alsop further “outed” me as the son of “radical journalist” I. F. Stone.

Alsop called me an “an exceedingly left wing ... political scientist” from Princeton when, in fact, I was a liberal mathematician from Stanford. Because 75 percent of scientists are liberal, Federation of American Scientists (FAS) members were not disturbed by this flap and so I survived it.

In Retrospect: A journalist told me that I had "opened the shutters" and let a bit of light into the Pentagon. But I never expected this aggressive retaliation. Truth tellers need a firmly independent base if they want to say anything penetrating.

B. A Last-Minute Key Role in President Nixon’s Resignation

It was an arrow aimed at Henry Kissinger that inadvertently played a last-minute role in the resignation of President Nixon. It all started when Henry Kissinger tried to plead executive privilege to avoid testifying before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee.

On investigation, in a Federation of American Scientists (FAS) newsletter, I showed that six White House officials who claimed executive privilege as presidential advisers were, nevertheless, testifying under a second job title.

We suggested Kissinger testify as Director of the National Security Council (NSC), which he effectively was. When the *Washington Post* editorial page showcased this idea, Kissinger agreed to meet privately with the Committee in Blair House. He wrote urging me to accept the deal.

The White House counsel, John Dean, also wrote. He said the newsletter was accurate and that presidential aides had no immunity against testifying.

A year passed. Senator Sam Ervin's Watergate investigating committee was demanding John Dean's testimony. Desperate to prevent this, President Nixon was claiming presidential aides had blanket immunity from testifying (something he had strenuously opposed twenty-five years before).

On March 21, 1973, I handed the Dean letter to Ervin's chief counsel, Sam Dash, saying, "This is the smoking gun." By six p.m., an angry Senator Ervin was waving the letter around on TV and shouting, "There is no better evidence of the slippery, spurious nature of Mr. Nixon's current claim."

The next day the press went wild. Ironically, a letter from John Dean as White House counsel might be the key to John Dean testifying! A *Washington Post* editorial called the letter a "footnote in history."

That morning, Attorney General John Mitchell advised presidential aide H.R. Haldeman, "The only real problem the [president] has is invoking executive privilege." But real it was. Dean's testimony

could not be suppressed, and the testimony forced the president's resignation.

In Retrospect: In fact, I had forgotten the letter in question. I was reminded that I had it by a call from the greatest US expert in Executive Privilege, my friend Raoul Berger, with whom I had shared the letter when I got it. So this was really fate taking a hand. But I felt it was a justified revenge for the indignity of the Nixon White House smear of me.

C. Inadvertently Halting an Illegal CIA Operation

In June 1975, an alert *Science Magazine* reporter called to ask if we were the "association of scientists" referenced in a Rockefeller Commission investigation on illegal CIA activities.

Unbeknownst to us, a letter I had written to Chief Postal Inspector W. J. Cotter struck a nerve that resulted in the termination of a twenty-year-old illegal CIA program of opening foreign mail to and from Americans.

Without any suspicion or special knowledge, I had asked Mr. Cotter asked if the post office was permitting any other agency to improperly open the mail. He denied it and said the seal on first-class mail was "sacred."

He knew better—better, indeed, than anyone. His last job had been at the CIA in charge of its mail-opening program, HTLINGUAL! He seemed to have been made chief postal inspector to provide cover for it.

Alarmed, he wrote CIA Director Helms asking that the program be discontinued. Helms asked Attorney General Mitchell to call the postmaster general and shut Cotter up. Meanwhile, on May 19, 1971, the CIA high command met secretly to decide what to do about the threat of disclosure.

Helms was told that, outside the CIA, the only witting persons were the FBI and the “little gray man” who got a \$50 monthly bonus for trundling the bundles of mail back and forth. Helms told the group not to worry about one of my officials, a former deputy director of CIA for Science and Technology, who had been a “consumer” of HTLINGUAL.

The program continued until, in 1973, Attorney General John Mitchell was in jail, Helms had been fired by President Nixon, and Postmaster General Blount had retired. Cotter complained again. The new CIA director, James Schlesinger, stopped the program. Moral: “The wicked flee when no man pursuith.”

In Retrospect: This is a most astonishing story of how my honest inquiry, without special knowledge, provoked rumbles inside the bureaucracy for a few years. I knew nothing and did virtually nothing. After this event, I never doubted but that my actions would be felt within the bureaucracy. It gave one hope.

D. Protecting Freedom of the Press against Prior Restraint

A researcher named Howard Morland came to my Federation of American Scientists (FAS) headquarters asking for information on how to make a hydrogen bomb. We refused to cooperate. But he wrote the

article, and we learned *The Progressive* magazine was about to publish it.

When we later read the article, it admitted that it might permit “India, or Israel, or Pakistan, or South Africa to get the H-bomb sooner than they otherwise would ...” But Morland’s (truly tortured) reasoning was that, “Secrecy ... contributes to a political climate in which the nuclear establishment can conduct business as usual, protecting and perpetuating the production of these horror weapons.”

The federal government went to court to stop the presses at *The Progressive*. Our organization, founded by the original atomic scientists of World War II, clearly did not want the hydrogen bomb secret revealed. On the other hand, 75 percent of scientists being liberals, our organization was strongly in favor of freedom of the press. What to do?

I prepared an amicus brief urging the court to work out a non-legal solution that would be a good precedent by convening a panel of lawyers and scientists to negotiate what would be dangerous to reveal.

Given a good seat at the Milwaukee Court by the judge’s secretary, I was startled to hear the judge tell the two parties he was “greatly impressed” with the FAS proposal. He ordered them to agree to it over the lunch break or he would stop the presses. The government agreed, but the magazine did not. The first federal order for prior restraint of publication was duly ordered.

Later, the key secret having been discovered in an unclassified book on a Los Alamos book shelf, the government withdrew its suit. So the unfortunate article and the unfortunate precedent both occurred.

In Retrospect: This is possibly the most egregious example of freedom of the press misused. I was very glad to have participated in an effort to resolve it peacefully. And I hope that the Judge's precedent in focusing on my solution will be remembered in future occasions such as those involving biological weapons.

E. Protecting the East Coast from an Earthquake Scare

The world-renowned astrophysicist Carl Sagan placed an urgent call. Two scientists, Thomas Gold and Gordon J. F. MacDonald, believed a rare East Coast earthquake was impending. They would announce it, he said, only if I held a Federation of American Scientists (FAS) press conference for them.

Hot potato! Announcing a false prediction would be bad. Failing to announce an accurate one would be worse. I began working round the clock.

The scientists thought recent mysterious noises off Nova Scotia and the East Coast were caused by methane belching out of a disturbed Earth, igniting spontaneously and foreshadowing earthquakes. I called East Coast zoo directors. They reported no unusual animal activity.

Because of a snowstorm, MacDonald missed a meeting. His secretary confided that his facts had come from a “little old lady in Nova Scotia” and gave me the lady’s fifty-page precise tabulation of booms and rattles afflicting her home.

This was the Rosetta Stone. The Canadian noises were booms from Concorde flights saving fuel by shortcutting over the tip of Nova

Scotia. The light rattles were Eastbound Concorde booms reflected downward from the stratosphere.

I briefed the president's science adviser on my calculations. He agreed. The Canadian government thanked me because the two scientists had been on Canadian radio with their alarming prediction.

What about the East Coast booms? The Naval Research Laboratory (NRL) computers said the unusual US noises were fighter aircraft booms. But the fighter aircraft had been there for many years without any such disturbances.

Later, a meteorologist reading a *Science* magazine report asked me for relevant weather maps. He showed the US booms were caused by unusual twists in the jet stream that blew normally offshore booms onto the shore.

The two scientists never apologized. They wanted FAS credibility and also wanted FAS to share the potential fall. I felt set up.

In Retrospect: The handling of the earthquake scare involved hard work, identification of the Concorde as the problem, and avoiding a serious problem for Americans and my organization. It made me feel like a "real" scientist which, of course, I was not. Briefing the White House Science Adviser on why an Earthquake was not about to occur in Canada was, certainly, my finest scientific moment!

PART II
CURRENT PEACE-RELATED PROJECTS

VII. Burma Project

On a visit to Burma in 2006, which Priscilla Clapp, former US *chargé d'affaires* in Rangoon helped me organize, I concluded that only China had influence there and America should work through China. I made the case to Beijing, through written recommendations provided to the Beijing embassy in Washington, that respect for it would increase if it would cooperate with the United States on Burma.

Priscilla, who was influential in the State Department on Burmese affairs, urged cooperation between Beijing and Washington on Burma.

All this seems to have borne fruit when representatives of both United States and China met in Beijing to discuss Burma. (No doubt this had other causes as well.)

Priscilla then agreed to become head of the Catalytic Diplomacy Burma project. In that capacity, we invited the Chinese Institute for Contemporary International Relations (CICIR) to send two experts on Burma to Washington for a ten-day visit, during which they would be introduced to Burma experts in Washington and New York.

The visit was historic. They met with hosts at the Nixon Center, the Council on Foreign Relations (DC), the East-West Center (DC), the Stimson Center, the Open Society Institute (NY and DC), the Asia Society (NY), the State Department, and the Brookings Institution/SAIS. Each of these institutions was free to choose the participants they wished to invite, so the full spectrum of views on Burma was represented in the various meetings. At their request, the Chinese visitors also met with Senator Webb (who later played a key role in

opening US relations with Burma) and a group of faith-based organizations providing humanitarian assistance in Burma and on the Thai border.

At Priscilla's recommendation, Catalytic Diplomacy sponsored a visit by a retired Burmese ambassador to Washington in 2009 to signal the beginning of the end of sanctions on visits to the US by Burmese officials and the opening of a higher level official dialogue between the two countries.

On July 28–29, 2011, she organized an international (China, United States, Myanmar, Europe) group of ten experts with backgrounds in government, business, civil society, and academia for an off-the-record workshop in Bangkok to explore issues surrounding major Chinese infrastructure investments in Burma, focusing especially on the oil and gas pipelines across Burma and the large Myitsone Dam in Burma's northern Kachin state. (This dam was later sidelined.)

Later, Priscilla's Burma Project received funding to translate Chinese media on Burma, to see how Burma is being presented to the Chinese public, and how Chinese views of Burma's political transition are evolving.

In Retrospect: This is a case where Catalytic Diplomacy found and utilized a retired professional practitioner of diplomacy to help make the breakthrough in US-Burmese affairs. When this change occurred, Priscilla was well positioned to advise many other larger NGOs, but she continues to work with Catalytic Diplomacy on specific projects she funds through us.

VIII. Health, Nutrition, and Disease Project

Carb-Concentration Diet; Catalytic Longevity Website Launched

This project began when I started skipping meals to lose weight and wrote a paper on carbohydrate concentration, in which one would avoid carbohydrates at other meals. I related the diet to experiments done on rats with alternate day feeding that produced great benefits in longevity. And I saw the benefits were connected to autophagy—a process whereby cells, recognizing conditions of low insulin, begin cannibalizing parts of the cell to cleanse and renew the cell.

After presenting this paper at a scientific conference, and hearing no objections to the low-insulin diet it represents, I learned that this diet was a practice first proposed by the Hellers in their popular “Carb-Addicts Diet.”

I induced biomedical scientist Mark McCarty to work with me to develop a suitable website and to document the benefits of the diet.

I learned how talented he was and how quickly he was writing scientific papers. Mark had been publishing speculative scientific reviews—primarily in the journal *Medical Hypotheses*. He had more than 240 publications in the PubMed-cited biomedical literature.

The editor of the *Journal of Medical Hypotheses*, Bruce G. Charlton, advised me, “Mark McCarty’s papers were among the highest quality, most original, and most influential papers ever published by *Medical Hypotheses* during my editorship of the journal (2003–10) and that of the founder, Dr. David Horrobin (1975–2003). It would be

accurate to state that, over a time span of more than two decades, Mark McCarty was our single most-valued contributor.”

At my request, he began writing on cancer, dementia, and Parkinson’s, and we began posting these reviews on the Catalytic Longevity website. In effect, he was “mining Medline”—surveying the peer-reviewed biomedical literature in an effort to draw practical conclusions regarding strategies that could promote health, and to offer insightful suggestions for future research.

We changed the focus of the website, maintaining it as a resource for information on carbohydrate concentration, while putting the main emphasis on Mark’s wide-ranging and credible insights. He became the director of the project displayed at Catalytic Longevity (www.catalyticlongevity.org).

It was obvious that he was an international asset of great value in the world’s struggle for security against aging and disease. His recommendations were extraordinary.

The widow of the author of the *Physicians’ Desk Reference* [PDR] *for Nutritional Supplements* told me, “My late husband, Shelly Hendler, PhD, MD, author of *PDR for Nutritional Supplements*, worked closely with Mark and once told me confidentially, ‘Mark and I are the only two people in the world who really understand nutritional supplements.’”

David Rorvik was Hendler’s coeditor of the *PDR for Nutritional Supplements*, and he wrote this:

Over the years I interviewed and collaborated on writing projects with some of the most brilliant minds in science and medicine, including several Nobel Laureates. None outshined either Shelly or Mark, and when working together

they were even more formidable, continually illuminating important human health issues that had long been neglected or misunderstood. Mark is a master medical sleuth whose ability to grasp and explicate some of the most difficult and significant medical issues of our time is unmatched in my experience.

Addressing Ebola Victims with Regimen Designed for Sepsis

Most recently, Mark discovered a connection between a paper he had written on sepsis and the kind of regimen that might keep ebola patients alive while their immune system grappled with the disease. Currently, we are trying to draw attention to this and to catalyze a suitable study. Readers interested in this should repair to our website at www.catalyticlongevity.org.

IX. Journalistic Independence Project

Democratic institutions require a free press. This requires journalistic independence, especially needed in dealing with the polarizing issues of war and peace. In efforts to produce suitable role models, both Harvard University and Ithaca College are giving annual awards in honor of legendary journalist I. F. Stone.

Ten-Minute Educational Video Produced

White Pines Pictures (WPP) of Toronto has undertaken to make a documentary, *All Governments Lie: The Legacy of I. F. Stone*, that could inspire journalistic independence. Catalytic Diplomacy secured a \$25,000 grant from the Knight Foundation to hire WPP to make a ten-minute educational video that it could use for educational purposes.

WPP is using it already to secure the needed financing—about \$800,000—to make a full documentary. WPP has already filmed the presentation of the Izzy Award at Ithaca College and will be filming the presentation of Harvard’s I. F. Stone Medal for Journalistic Independence in February 2015.

X. Religious Conflict Project

I began studying religion and its relation to peace in late 2011. I wondered if Pantheism might become a religion for environmentalists and/or for the “nones” who write “no religion” on questionnaires. I went on to thinking about whether “a rationalist faith in the mind” might be organized as a spiritual religion for the “nones.”

In 2013, I discovered a scientific paper concluding that St. Paul had been epileptic. In due course, I discovered another such paper concluding that Mohammad was too. I began to study the life of Martin Luther and discovered, in a paper published in German, that he had admitted being epileptic.

I learned that a form of temporal-lobe epilepsy called Geschwind Syndrome had a half-dozen characteristics, some of which actually tended to produce the qualities necessary to start a new religion. Looking closely, I gathered evidence that Paul, Mohammad, and Luther all had these qualities. Thus I had discovered that the three largest Western religions all had been founded by persons with the same mental disorder: TLE/Geschwind Syndrome.

This condition produces visions, religious conversions, compulsive writing and preaching (hypergraphia), obsessive religiosity, great determination, aggressiveness, and hyposexuality. Taken together, these conditions provide the will, determination, and literary motivation to create new religions despite the enormous political and social obstacles to do so and to energize others to adopt them. In other words, this mental disorder actually "inspired" these religions--

produced not just the visions underlying them but the impetus to create them. In other words, these people were not just epileptics but religiously obsessed epileptics with a determination to write and preach what they came to believe was true.

This was a newsworthy discovery. I decided to withhold publishing it until I had worked up a general theory on religions relating it to some specific useful purpose. But when the Islamic State arose in the Middle East in 2014, I decided civilization had a serious tendency to return to religious war.

Believing that mankind should look again at the origins of the religions at war, I decided to go public with a website entitled: *Visions: The Epileptic Origins of Western Religions* (see www.catalyticreligion.org) and to add further commentary as thoughts occurred.

The general theme is that fundamentalism has to be effectively confronted by modern civilization. And this is only going to be possible if Mankind stops averting its eyes from the human origins of human religions.

CONCLUSION

Some principles of entrepreneurial activism can be derived from my experience with the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty.

One Needs a Salable Product

The idea of an anti-ballistic missile defense was inherently implausible (“hitting a bullet with a bullet”), and the capacity of the other side to outflank any kind of ABM (e.g., the “Maginot Line,” a line of concrete fortifications along the French-German border in the 1930s) was obvious. The costs were very great. And interest in more arms race was declining so the time was right.

Pride of Authorship And Excitement Are Important

Throughout the forty years of on-and-off work on this subject, I felt a kind of pride of authorship that kept me focused—mixed, of course, with real concern about the fate of the planet. When one senior colleague commented acidly about my obsessive focus on ABM by saying, “We expect to see more from you”—meaning you should show your talent by writing about something else, anything else—I was startled.

My effort was not an exercise in building an academic reputation. On the contrary, having tried academia at the Harvard Center for International Affairs, I much preferred a life of lobbying for a good cause.

Having an Independent Base—One That Provides Psychic Return (i.e., Psychological Reinforcement)—Seems Critical

From the beginning, the Federation of American Scientists (FAS) was a highly independent organization beyond anyone's ability to coerce. And by the time I had built it up from its low point, it was like a custom-made suit that fit me perfectly and gave me freedom of movement.

Further, it provided psychic return, since even if my proposals and efforts failed, my audience of FAS members would read about them in the newsletter and applaud. In today's world, all this probably means being part of the non-profit, public-interest sector.

The good news is that one can, in a week, incorporate a 501c3 tax-deductible public interest organization with as small a board of directors as three people! Building one's own organization is feasible.

Ideas Have to Be Simple

In "selling" ideas to another organization, to a committee, to a political party, or to a government, the idea has to be simple enough to be reduced to a sentence or two. Nothing else will propagate through the multiple audiences and bureaucratic byways necessary.

And the argument for it has to be simplified. Often it is best not to give supporting arguments but to rely on one's best, strongest and most incontrovertible argument. This is because in the alternative, the opponents will focus on weaker arguments provided, and the debate will spin off onto ground that is less defensible. Especially in public debate, it is often better just to hammer away with one's best point.

**People Have to Consider You Sincere,
and You Must Treat Them with Respect**

In dealing with individuals, institutions, and governments, you won't get far unless people respect your intentions, and this requires treating them with respect.

Infecting Institutions with Ideas

Just as the human body has a skin designed to protect the person from pathogens, institutions of all kinds, especially governments, have defense mechanisms against foreign ideas. In order to transmit the idea to the institution, it is necessary to find a sympathetic representative of the institution and to gift it to him or her (i.e., to say "If you like this idea, it is your idea").

After all, in most cases the idea won't get far with your name on it—certainly whomever is transmitting the idea inside the institution needs to be free to use your name—or not, as the occasion demands.

Working on Impossible Dreams

For reasons not easy to summarize, I found myself comfortable espousing impossible dreams designed to resolve intractable problems. Often, of course, these ideas did not work out. But over time, the intractable sometimes became tractable, and one would be there ready to seize the moment.

Also, when working on the intractable, there were fewer competitors. Accordingly, one could control the campaign more easily and place the idea where it should be.

Persuading Oneself

No doubt all of us idea-mavens talked ourselves into thinking the unworkable was workable. The first job of a salesman, after all, is to

persuade himself that his product is the very best. How else can one sell it with sincerity?

Attributable Success Is Much Rarer than Success Itself

In complex societies, many efforts at improvement of the way things are may produce no echoes at all, even though they made a difference. This is especially true of efforts to influence a bureaucracy that has a tendency to hide from you the degree to which your ideas were influential.

One Has to Enjoy the Process

Accordingly, one has to enjoy what one is doing. You can't rely upon the infrequent pleasure of being able to prove that you made a difference. This is the lot, for example, of a man who makes his living writing newspaper editorials. Very rarely indeed does anyone credit an editorial with changing his mind about anything. Nevertheless, editorials play their role in shaping public opinion. The point is that editorial writers have to enjoy writing editorials; they can't do it on the blind faith that they are playing an important role. And they have to enjoy the anonymity.

Entrepreneurial Activists Needed

Today's complex and fragile civilization requires a growing number of intellectual entrepreneurs who make a career of working on the defense of civilization.

Perhaps inevitably, the role models of today's students are the professors who teach them. Like children in parochial schools who early decide to become priests, the best of students in academic institutions

are drawn to emulating their professors in a career in academia. But the vast majority of academics make very little contribution to mankind outside of their teaching. Most advances in science, and knowledge generally, are made by only a small fraction of the very best academics. So most academic articles disappear without a trace.

In this way, it was a mistake for me to earn a PhD in mathematics. I would have been a fourth-rate mathematician, and I certainly was a poor teacher of mathematics. In my experience, intellectual skills, determination, and persuasiveness can go a great deal further in the public-interest sector than they can in academic pursuits. And these pursuits were, at least for me, are more enjoyable.

In sum, based on these experiences, an intellectual entrepreneur should be:

- scholarly enough to learn all about the dilemma at issue;
- ingenious enough to come up with simple, saleable, and workable ideas;
- shrewd enough to see how the ideas might best be sold to the body politic;
- persuasive enough to make the sale despite the bureaucratic and ideological defenses against change;
- patient and determined enough to work for long periods of time on a single goal;
- social enough to work with others and have others work with him or her;
- autonomous enough to follow a path determined by the goal rather than by the funding or the superior;
- self-standing with the psychic and financial support necessary to sustain the effort;

- willing to give the credit for success to those who have the power to advance the idea;
- manic enough to believe he or she can achieve impossible dreams and goals that others could not;
- enjoying the process enough to tolerate the often-inevitable failure;
- working in an age and world context where means of communication, and political structures are sufficiently flexible to absorb change; and above all,
- lucky enough to see, from time to time, the stars fall into place.

We need to help students, early in their academic life, to determine whether they have these skills and interests. We need to encourage them if they do. And we need to place them in appropriate positions.